



Assembly of Captive European Nations

Albania

Bulgaria

Czechoslovakia

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Ninth Session

1962 — 1963

Resolutions, Reports,
Organization

Assembly of Captive European Nations

Ninth Session

SEPTEMBER 1962 — SEPTEMBER 1963

Resolutions, Reports,
Organization

ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS

GENERAL COMMITTEE

(Tenth Session : 1963-1964)

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Vice-Chairman : FERENC NAGY, *Hungary*.

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Deputy Secretary General : EDMUND GASPAR, *Hungary*.

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PREFATORY NOTE

The six previous volumes (ACEN Publications Nos. 5, 12, 16, 22, 37, and 42) have described the purposes, the organization and the activities of the Assembly of Captive European Nations during its eight Sessions, namely, from the date of its inception, on September 20, 1954, through September, 1962. This volume undertakes to render the record of the Ninth Session.

A summary of the activities of ACEN from September, 1962, to September, 1963, is provided in the Introduction. The documents of the Ninth Session are divided into two parts. The first one contains the texts of resolutions and reports adopted during this period as well as other documents of importance. The second part is devoted to the ACEN Colloquy held in Strasbourg, France, on May 5-7, 1963. The final section of the book contains data on the organization of ACEN as well as up-to-date reference material, including a list of ACEN publications. The text of the ACEN Charter is also included.

The purpose of this volume is to provide those interested with a fairly complete record of work accomplished by the Assembly during its Ninth Session.

October 15, 1963.

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INTRODUCTION

This introduction foregoes a detailed account of routine organizational information and concentrates instead on a number of highlights of the Ninth Session. These are presented under the heading "The Main Operations".

THE MAIN OPERATIONS

I. SOVIET COLONIALISM

The Assembly continued its campaign to expose Soviet Colonialism in East-Central Europe, concentrating its efforts on the United Nations.

In its Resolution on the United Nations, Self-Determination and National Independence, adopted at the beginning of the Ninth Session, ACEN urged the free-member nations of the United Nations to initiate action in the General Assembly with a view to entrusting the Committee of Seventeen, or any other organ, with the task of investigating the denial of self-determination in East-Central Europe.

The Assembly's efforts to achieve a single standard on colonialism in the United Nations, met with remarkable approval and support. Following are two outstanding examples:

The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, having heard an incisive Report by Mr. Camille Linden (Luxembourg) on "Methods of Soviet Colonialism in Central and Eastern Europe", adopted on September 20, 1962, a Recommendation which was hailed by ACEN. The Recommendation calls upon the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to invite the member governments to ask the General Assembly of the United Nations to insist on the holding of genuinely free elections in the Communist-ruled European countries.

In a similar vein, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions submitted on September 24, 1962, a statement to the United Nations General Assembly, calling for an end of the double standard in the United Nations with regard to Soviet Colonialism.

2. THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM

The Assembly fought a losing battle on the Hungarian Question.

At the opening of the Ninth Session, in a Resolution on the Question of Hungary, ACEN appealed to the United Nations General Assembly: "To call anew on the Soviet Union and the Kadar regime to comply with the basic demands of the United Nations Resolutions on Hungary and, should their defiance persist, to consider measures of enforcement; to reject the credentials issued by the Kadar regime which the General Assembly had branded as one imposed by the armed intervention of the Soviet Union; and finally, to maintain the office of the United Nations Special Representative on the Question of Hungary."

In addition, in its Declaration on the Hungarian Revolution Anniversary, the Assembly called on the United Nations "to demand that the Soviet Union and the Hungarian puppet regime immediately release all Hungarian political prisoners and restore the basic human rights to the Hungarian people."

At the beginning of the 17th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Question of Hungary was again included on the agenda; the Report of Sir Leslie Munro, United Nations Special Representative on the Question of Hungary, emphasized that self-determination remained the core of the Hungarian problem.

The Assembly undertook a variety of steps toward achieving a strong United Nations resolution on the Hungarian Question. These steps included the co-sponsorship of the booklet *Hungary Under Soviet Rule VI*, published on November 29, as well as cables and letters to President Kennedy and to United States legislators, urging them to take a firmer stand on Hungary. Members of the General Committee saw many United Nations delegates, urging them to consider the Hungarian Question as a flagrant violation of the people's right to self-determination. Memoranda explaining ACEN views on Hungary were addressed to all non-Communist delegations. Yet a shift in the attitude of some Western Powers toward the Hungarian problem, soon became evident. On December 10, in a telegram to the United States Secretary of State, ACEN expressed its "deep concern with regard to the fate of the Hungarian Question before the United Nations General Assembly." ACEN interpreted the absence of specific Western initiatives as an indication of intent to downgrade United Nations concern for Hungary, to suppress the position of the United Nations Representative and to drop any call for compliance with the past resolutions.

The subsequent developments in the United Nations have, unfortunately, confirmed all the forebodings of ACEN. On May 16, the Assembly expressed

deep anxiety over the United States Government's intention to change its policy toward the Hungarian puppet regime. In telegrams to prominent United States legislators, the Assembly emphasized that "official condonement of illegal Communist rule in Hungary will encourage Communist efforts to take over still free countries." The Congressional reaction to the ACEN view was favorable.

The United Nations Credentials Committee approved the credentials of the Hungarian Communist regime on June 5, 1963. The following day, the Assembly issued a statement on the adverse effects on the captive countries of the approval of the Hungarian credentials. The statement stressed that "the real issue is not whether some amelioration has occurred in Hungary, but whether the right of self-determination has or has not been restored to its people." ACEN strongly appealed for the raising of the "real issue" during the next United Nations session.

ACEN widely circulated a critical evaluation of the 1963 amnesty decree of the Hungarian Communist Government. The thoroughly documented report showed that the clemency granted by the regime was very narrow in scope and covered only a small number of persons convicted for political reasons, especially participants in the freedom fight of 1956.

3. UNITED NATIONS AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

The Assembly continued its efforts to convince the free nations of the imperative necessity of placing the issue of the captive nations on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as well as of the practical feasibility of such a step.

In congratulating the President of the United Nations General Assembly on the occasion of United Nations Day, ACEN deplored "the double standard on the question of self-determination that is becoming more and more entrenched in the world organization." ACEN expressed its hope that the world organization will not delay its active concern over the evils of colonial rule in other parts of the world, especially in Eastern Europe.

The Assembly used every appropriate occasion to challenge the right of the Communist delegations to represent the nine captive nations in the United Nations. The Assembly also protested against any form of international recognition, open or implied, of the Soviet-imposed Communist regimes in East-Central Europe.

At its 100th Plenary Meeting, on September 19, 1962, ACEN sent a letter to the United Nations Acting Secretary General, expressing "deep concern" about his statement, implying that the regimes in power in East-Central

Europe were established by the free choice of the peoples concerned. The ACEN letter recalled the fact that the countries of East-Central Europe had lost their independence as a result of the armed intervention of the Soviet Union, and stated that: "The peoples of Eastern Europe are entitled to expect that if the United Nations is reluctant to take remedial action, it should at least refrain from representing as freely chosen a situation imposed by foreign force."

On February 11, 1963, ACEN conveyed to the President of the United Nations General Assembly its "profound regret" at the inclusion of Communist Bulgaria, subject to Soviet colonial rule, in the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

In a letter addressed to the Director General of UNESCO, on February 12, 1963, ACEN asked for the immediate withdrawal from circulation of the booklet "Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR", published under the UNESCO imprint, extolling the alleged social and political equality in the USSR and asserting that the Baltic States "voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in 1940." The ACEN letter charged that the authors of the booklet "abused the authority and good name of UNESCO" for "cheap Soviet propaganda."

The UNESCO booklet became subsequently a target of outspoken criticism in the United States Congress and in the Western press. According to the Associated Press, protests over the booklet "have forced UNESCO to review its publication policy". *The New York Times* of February 18, 1963, wrote: "The Assembly of Captive European Nations, representing the subjugated countries of Eastern Europe, has scored a substantial victory in asserting its members' right to freedom. At its protest, and another by the United States, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has set up a review committee to establish policies which would prevent more Communist propaganda from being spread under UNESCO's imprimatur."

4. COUNCIL OF EUROPE

During the Ninth Session, the Assembly maintained its close cooperation with the Council of Europe. The ties between the two organizations were further strengthened.

A delegation of ACEN attending the September, 1962, meeting of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, paid the

closest attention to the work of the Committee on Non-Represented Nations. The Assembly's spokesman thanked the Committee, on September 17, for the excellent report on Soviet colonialism presented by the Rapporteur, Mr. Camille Linden. Commenting on the Recommendations, he voiced the hope that the free world governments represented in the Council of Europe will undertake the necessary steps towards placing the problem of Soviet colonialism in East-Central Europe on the United Nations agenda, asking for free elections in the area.

Mr. Pierre Pflimlin, the Rapporteur of the General Committee of the Council of Europe, assured the delegation of the support of the Council for the aspirations of the captive European peoples.

A Recommendation, presented by the Committee on Non-Represented Nations, was adopted on September 20, 1962. It read:

The Assembly,

Expressing its concern at the non-implementation of Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe under Communist rule;

Emphasizing that whereas the policy of Member States of the Council of Europe in Africa and Asia is designed to lead the colonial peoples to self-determination and self-government, the aim of Soviet imperialism in Central and Eastern Europe is to hold the bloc states under Soviet control;

Recommends

That the Committee of Ministers should invite the Member Governments to ask the General Assembly of the United Nations to insist on the holding of genuinely free elections in the European countries under Communist rule;

That the Committee of Ministers should urge the Member Governments to oppose charges of "imperialism" and "colonialism" levelled against them in the General Assembly of the United Nations, by initiating public debates on the methods of Soviet colonialism as applied in Europe.

The Committee on Non-Represented Nations also presented a Report on Albania.

An ACEN representative attended the Winter Session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. He was received, on January 16, 1963, by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The ACEN representative distributed among the participants of the session ACEN's statement on "Trade Between the Free World and the Soviet-Dominated Area."

The agenda of the Winter Session included a debate on "Contacts with the Peoples of Central and Eastern Europe under Communist Rule".

On May 5-7, the Assembly held a colloquy in Strasbourg. The aim of the colloquy was to renew the contacts with the members of the Council of Europe and to discuss with them problems affecting the one hundred million captive European peoples. The main reports at the colloquy analyzed the ways to achieve freedom for the captive nations; East-Central Europe as a factor of Western security; European and Atlantic integration. A large number of prominent European parliamentarians took part in the debate and underscored their solidarity with the enslaved part of Europe. Their attitude can best be summed up by the following statement of Mr. Ole Bjorn Kraft, former Foreign Minister of Denmark, and currently President of the Cultural Committee of the Council of Europe: "I believe like you that a free Eastern Europe without war is not an illusion, but a practical possibility that can be achieved by the common effort of the free and the enslaved."

The Committee on Non-Represented Nations discussed the situation in the Baltic States, in its meeting of June 29, 1963, in Copenhagen. The ACEN Representative in Denmark appeared before the Committee on behalf of ACEN and read two reports on the situation in the Baltic States. It is noteworthy that both reports were circulated as Council of Europe documents.

On August 12, 1963, Mrs. von Lowzow, Denmark, presented to the Committee on Non-Represented Nations her draft report on "The Present Situation in the Baltic States". The draft report gives a comprehensive view of the Soviet colonial practices in the Baltic States and expresses hope that the "solidarity" of the Baltic people, who refuse to accept foreign rule, "will meet with some response of international solidarity from the peoples of the free world."

5. CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

On July 14-20, Captive Nations Week was observed for the fifth consecutive year in the United States, on the basis of the Joint Resolution adopted by the United States Congress in July, 1959, now Public Law 86-90, and the Proclamation issued by President John F. Kennedy.

As in previous sessions, the Assembly joined the American Friends of the Captive Nations and the Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent in the preparatory work for the event. A joint appeal was sent out by the three organizations to American legislatures throughout the country, to the Governors of the fifty states and the Mayors of all American cities. Furthermore, the three organizations appealed to the United States churches and synagogues to deliver special prayers and sermons during the Week. Editorial writers were approached

to help highlight the event. All communications media were constantly supplied with advance material and press releases dealing with the events of the Week. A kit of background material was mailed to almost two thousand editorial writers, newsmen, legislators, church dignitaries, etc.

This was the most successful Captive Nations Week ever. Twenty-seven proclamations were issued by State Governors and 48 by Mayors of large cities (including New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, St. Louis, etc.)—the highest number since the initiation of the Week in 1959. Over one hundred speeches were delivered on the subject in the Congress. In the widest coverage so far, over 300 editorials and columns were published in the United States press. Special prayers and sermons during the Week were said in churches of all denominations.

ACEN commemorated the opening of Captive Nations Week, 1963, with a flag-raising ceremony and the unveiling of the new poster at ACEN House opposite the United Nations building, on July 14, 1963. A joint Manifesto of ACEN, the American Friends of the Captive Nations and the Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent was made public on the occasion. The Manifesto emphasized that "any relaxation of tensions can only follow not precede the realization of self-determination through free elections in the captive nations."

Captive Nations Week was also observed on July 16, 1963, in an impressive ceremony on the steps of New York's City Hall. Deputy Mayor Cavanagh, representing Mayor Wagner, made public a proclamation designating Captive Nations Week, 1963. At the Captive Nations Week Award Dinner, on July 17, in Washington, D.C., ACEN was host to a large group of United States legislators, diplomatic and government representatives, with United States Senator Thomas J. Dodd presiding.

Press and radio outside the United States also commented on Captive Nations Week. As in previous years, the satellite press took its cue from Moscow in attacking the Week. Beneath the veneer of contempt, the Communist comments showed intense frustration about the growing popularity of Captive Nations Week.

In Taiwan, a highly successful Captive Nations Week (July 14-20, 1963), was highlighted by the opening of the ACEN-prepared exhibit *Soviet Empire*. ACEN Vice-Chairman and Deputy Secretary General represented the Assembly at the observance of Captive Nations Week in Buenos Aires, September 9-15, commemorated for the second time in Argentina.

6. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

ACEN consistently sought to convince the NATO Powers that they should embrace the cause of the captive European peoples, both as a matter of moral obligation and enlightened self-interest.

In a message to the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris, in December, 1962, the Assembly expressed its hope that their deliberations would result: "First, in the re-affirmation of the principles set forth by the Council in December, 1956, in its declaration of policy for Eastern Europe. Second, in a decision to initiate the requisite steps to inscribe the issue of the denial of self-determination to the peoples of East-Central Europe on the agenda of the United Nations and to keep it on the agenda until the rightful aspirations of these peoples are fulfilled. Third, in resolve to insist in the United Nations on compliance with the Resolutions on Hungary and, consequently, to oppose attempts at diminishing United Nations concern, condoning Soviet aggression or endorsing the Kadar regime."

On May 24, ACEN cabled the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Ottawa, urging a Western policy that would promote self-determination for the peoples of East-Central Europe. The ACEN telegram also expressed concern about "Western inclination to pursue a policy of accommodation with the Communist regimes in captive Europe instead of outspoken support of the legitimate freedom aspirations of the captive peoples."

The Assembly undertook immediate action against the Soviet-touted non-aggression treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In a telegram in connection with the Cuban settlement, dated October 28, 1962, ACEN appealed to President John F. Kennedy "not to engage in negotiations and not to enter into agreements in a NATO-Warsaw Pact framework" as this would imply the recognition of the East-Central European puppet regimes and thus serve the purposes of the Soviet Union. An ACEN letter to President John F. Kennedy, on July 26, 1963, spoke of "the highly detrimental consequences of any non-aggression arrangements in which the right of self-determination of the peoples of East-Central Europe would not be expressly safeguarded."

ACEN views on the Soviet-proposed non-aggression treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, received strong support in the United States Congress as well as in the newspapers, many of which had received ACEN letters on the subject.

7. THE CUBAN CONFRONTATION

At the outset of the Cuban crisis, in the fall of 1962, the Assembly assured President John F. Kennedy of its "understanding and support". In

a telegram dated October 23, 1962, the Assembly also stated that the captive peoples "will rejoice at this evidence of American determination and will hopefully regard it as the beginning of the big roll-back of communism."

When a partial settlement of the Cuban crisis was reached, ACEN cabled on October 28, 1962, to President John F. Kennedy, its apprehension about the possibility of NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations as an outgrowth of the Cuban settlement. "Our apprehension is all the greater," the telegram said, "as we have reason to believe that the determination displayed by the United States in the Cuban crisis and the demonstration that the Soviet Union is reluctant to face a showdown with the United States, are having an electrifying effect in our homelands."

8. HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

On the occasion of Human Rights Day, December 10, 1962, ACEN sent a telegram to the President of the United Nations General Assembly. The telegram asked for "increasing attention to ways and means to put an end to the double standard now prevailing in the United Nations over the issue of self-determination and that every effort will be made to achieve universal observance of human rights."

In a Resolution adopted on December 10, 1962, ACEN appealed to the members of the United Nations: "To complete the Draft Covenants on Human Rights with provisions for an effective machinery of enforcement and to bring them before the General Assembly for adoption at the earliest possible time; to insist on the prompt consideration by the competent organs of the United Nations of the 15 principles adopted by the Subcommittee on Discrimination of the Human Rights Commission and for the early adoption of these principles by the General Assembly; to establish, in the meanwhile, a special committee, with broad terms of reference, to investigate the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the captive European countries and to report their findings to the Eighteenth General Assembly."

Earlier in the Ninth Session, on October 23, 1962, ACEN adopted a Resolution on Political Prisoners which, among others, urged the establishment of a special committee "to investigate the status and conditions of the political prisoner", and called for "the immediate release of persons imprisoned because of their political or spiritual beliefs or past affiliations" in concordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

On June 6, 1963, ACEN appealed to the World Food Congress meeting in Washington "to urge all governments to take a resolute stand against

politically motivated agricultural policies" as well as to adopt policies conducive to "respect for the fundamental human rights of farmers."

9. "NON-ALIGNED" NATIONS

The Assembly continued its campaign to inform the representatives of the so-called non-aligned nations about Soviet colonialism in East-Central Europe and to warn them of the dangers facing all nations of the world if the illegal Soviet occupation of East-Central Europe was allowed to continue.

In a telegram dated February 6, 1963, ACEN sent its greetings to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference meeting in Tanganyika. The telegram said that, "in extending its concern to peoples fallen victim to Soviet colonialism, this Conference will strengthen its moral authority and thus hasten the accomplishment of its present purposes."

On February 18, 1963, the Assembly issued a statement condemning Communist brutality and persecution directed against African students in Bulgaria and other countries of East-Central Europe. The statement expressed the Assembly's hope that "the recent experiences of African students in captive Europe will generate a more positive response of the African countries to the efforts of the subjugated European peoples to regain self-determination." The same thoughts were expressed by ACEN in telegrams to the Heads of States of the countries from which the persecuted African students hailed, namely, Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Mali, Togo and Cameroon.

10. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

As in previous years, ACEN again challenged the participation of "so-called parliamentarians from the captive countries of East-Central Europe" in the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in Brazilia, October 24-November 1, 1962. In an Appeal to the delegates from the free nations, the Assembly expressed confidence that the IPU will use its great influence to bring about the release of all political prisoners and will voice its great concern for the denial of the basic rights of man in the Communist-ruled countries of East-Central Europe. ACEN also said it hoped that the delegates would study the report of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and would agree with its recent recommendations that the question of the denial of self-determination for the peoples of East-Central Europe be placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

11. FREEDOM DAY CELEBRATIONS

On January 23, 1963, ACEN held an Extraordinary Plenary Meeting to commemorate the Asian Peoples' Freedom Day. A Declaration adopted on the occasion emphasized the solidarity between the captive peoples in Europe and Asia. It expressed the hope that the free world would "take advantage of the troubles in the Communist empire and will advance the cause of freedom by firm and bold policies."

Representatives of ACEN took part in the annual World Freedom Day celebration, this time sponsored by and held in the city of Philadelphia, on July 1, 1963.

12. EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

ACEN further cemented its ties with the European Movement.

A delegation of the Assembly participated at the meeting of the Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement, on December 10, 1962, in London. Letters spelling out ACEN's position on "Trade between the Free World and the Soviet-Dominated Area", were distributed to the participants.

ACEN was also represented at the Fourth International Congress of the European Movement, held in Munich. The Congress adopted a Resolution dealing with the political unification of Europe, which stated that the European Community "may also be extended to other countries, as soon as their freedom is restored to them and their political development permits their joining the European Community."

13. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES

ACEN delegations and individual members took part in numerous international Congresses, in addition to those described previously. To mention but a few of them, the Assembly was represented in: the Congress of the Italian Social Democratic Party in Rome (fall 1962); the Conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (October 1-5, 1962); the International Conference on Communism in Malta (October, 1962); the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in Paris (November, 1962); the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Liberal International in Paris (December 1-2, 1962); the Eighth Session of the Western European Union in Paris (December 3-7, 1962); the 20th Congress of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire in La Baulle, France (May 23-26, 1963); the inaugural meeting of the Committee for the Liberation of Eastern European Countries in Florence (June, 1963).

14. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Cooperation with the Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent and with the American Friends of the Captive Nations was as close as during the previous sessions. Joint action was undertaken in such major operations as Captive Nations Week and the Hungarian Case in the United Nations. Cooperation with United States organized labor and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was also extensive. Contact was maintained with the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League.

Other non-governmental organizations, especially those having consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations were kept regularly informed of ACEN activities.

ACEN also continued its cooperation with movements espousing human rights, such as the "Appeal for Amnesty" in London.

15. GOODWILL TOURS

Representatives of ACEN went on several goodwill tours in order to acquaint the governments and the people of the countries visited with the existing situation in East-Central Europe, and to seek their support for specific actions designed to promote the cause of the captive peoples. The itinerary of the ACEN representatives included the capitals of Japan, the Republic of China, Thailand, India, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, France, England, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Canada.

In many of the countries visited, ACEN representatives were received by heads of state and leading parliamentarians. The goodwill tours received extensive press coverage. Below are but a few examples, illustrating the importance and value of ACEN goodwill tours:

During his tour of Asia, in the fall of 1962, Mr. Ferenc Nagy, the Hungarian delegate in the ACEN General Committee, was received by President Chiang-Kai-Shek of the Republic of China as well as by Prime Minister Nehru of India.

An ACEN delegation headed by the Chairman had a comprehensive exchange of views with prominent members of the Bundestag and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Spring of 1963. At the same time, other ACEN delegations were received, among others, by the President of the French National Assembly and high officials of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In Latin America, the ACEN Secretary General had, in November of 1962, an audience with the President of Argentina, while ACEN's Deputy Secretary General was received by the Foreign Minister of Chile, a month earlier.

16. ACEN PANELS AND LECTURES

The Assembly continued its efforts to establish a broader exchange of views on the problem of East-Central Europe among experts and the general public by means of panel discussions and lectures. The main undertaking in this field was the colloquy in Strasbourg, on May 5-7, 1963, which attracted a large number of distinguished European parliamentarians. Members of the Assembly delivered lectures on problems of East-Central Europe in various academic institutions and took part in meetings and seminars dealing with international affairs.

17. ACEN AWARDS AND BOOK CITATIONS

ACEN awards—plaques adorned with the flags of the captive nations—were presented to the following champions of the captive nations' freedom cause: Mr. George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO (December 13, 1962); Kenneth B. Keating, Senator of the United States; John S. Monagan, Member of the United States House of Representatives; Mr. Roscoe Drummond, writer and journalist; Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, writer and journalist (July 17, 1963); the people and the State of Indiana (represented by Congressman John Brademas).

A Literary Advisory Committee of ACEN was established to award monthly citations for new books on the Captive European nations, the Soviet Union, other Communist-controlled countries, or international communism. During the Ninth Session the citations were awarded to:

Death in the Forest by J. K. Zawodny, Notre Dame University Press, Indiana;

The Forgotten People by Seymour Freidin, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York;

My Land and My People by the Dalai Lama of Tibet;

The Iron Curtain by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., New York;

Poland 1944-1962 by Richard F. Staar, Louisiana State University Press;

Russian Frontiers: From Moscovy to Khrushchev by William G. Bray, Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis and New York;

Man in the Struggle for Peace by Dr. Charles Malik, Harper and Row, New York;

Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraisal by Marshall D. Shulman, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass;

Albania, China's Beachhead in Europe by Harry Hamm, Praeger, New York.

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The operations summarized in the preceding pages represent the efforts of all the organs of ACEN. This report, however, would be incomplete without a brief survey of the main activities of each of these organs: the Plenary Assembly, the General Committee, the Working Committees, the Secretariat and subsidiary organs like the delegations and offices abroad.

PLENARY ASSEMBLY

Beginning with the 97th Plenary Meeting, on September 18, 1962, nine Plenary Meetings were held in New York, the last one taking place on January 13, 1963.

The ACEN colloquy in Strasbourg, on May 5-7, 1963, consisted of three meetings.

During the period covered by this report, eight resolutions were adopted by and four reports presented to the Plenary Assembly in New York.

In addition to matters of organization, the following subjects were discussed by the Plenary Assembly in New York: Usurpation of Sovereign Rights and Misrepresentations of the Captive Nations in the United Nations; International Situation and the Captive European Nations; The Hungarian Issue; The Fate of the Political Prisoners in the Communist-ruled Countries; Denial of Political Rights in East-Central Europe; Trade Between the Free World and Soviet-dominated Area.

The ACEN colloquy in Strasbourg dealt with the following subjects: Whither Europe? Continental Integration, Atlantic Union or a Combination of Both; The Road to Freedom in East-Central Europe: Accommodation with the Regimes or Support to the Peoples; East-Central Europe Factor of Western Security.

The guest speakers who addressed the Plenary Assembly in New York during the Ninth Session are listed here alphabetically:

The Honorable Gordon Llewellyn Allott (R., Colo.), Senator of the United States, Member of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N.; Dr. Ernesto Aragon,

representing Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Revolutionary Council of Cuba; General Aramburu, the former President of Argentina; Mr. Roger Baldwin, Chairman, International League for the Rights of Man; Mr. Irving Brown, U.N. Representative of the International Confederation of ICFTU; Dr. Martin B. Dworkis, N.Y.U.; Miss Geraldine Fitch, President, Women for Freedom; Mr. Seymour Freidin, Executive Foreign News Editor of the New York Herald Tribune, author; The Honorable Cornelius E. Gallagher, Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; The Honorable Vance Hartke (D., Ind.), Senator of the United States; Ambassador Yu Chi Hsueh, Deputy Representative of the Republic of China to the United Nations; The Honorable Jacob K. Javits, Senator of the United States; The Honorable Kenneth B. Keating, Senator of the United States; The Honorable Armistead Inge Selden, Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Mr. Tran Tam, Secretary General of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League; Mr. Bernard Yarrow, Senior Vice-President of Free Europe Committee.

The ACEN colloquies in Strasbourg were addressed by the following guest speakers: Dr. Elinor Hubert, Member of the Bundestag, Federal Republic of Germany; Mr. Peter Jacobs, Member of the Bundestag, the Federal Republic of Germany; Mr. Peter Kirk, Member of the British Parliament; Mr. Ole Bjerne Kraft, former Foreign Minister of Denmark; Mr. Camille Linden, Member of the Parliament of Luxembourg; Mme. Marie Antoinette von Lowzow, Member of the Parliament, Denmark; Mme. Agnes Maxsein, Member of the Bundestag from Berlin; Mr. Rene Radius, Member of the French National Assembly; Mr. Ronald S. Russell, Member of the British Parliament; Mr. Lujo Tonicic, Chairman of the Austrian Delegation to the Consultative Assembly; Mr. Albert Voilquin, Member of the French National Assembly.

THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

During the Ninth Session the General Committee held 24 meetings.

Since the organizational matters and all the operations described herein have been initiated and decided upon by the General Committee, no further elaboration seems to be required.

THE WORKING COMMITTEES

The Working Committees were in permanent session. They studied all matters assigned to them by the General Committee and prepared a large number of valuable documents in their particular fields.

The Political Committee held 18 meetings. Among the issues discussed by it were: Discrimination in the Matter of Political Rights; Developments

in the U.N.; Political Aspects of the Common Market; Misrepresentation of the Captive Nations in the West; The Situation in the Captive Countries; The Hungarian Case; Sino-Soviet Relations.

The Social Committee held six meetings. The outstanding subjects on its agenda were: The Situation of Churches; Violation of Human Rights; Labor Conditions; Freedom of Association; Trade Unions in Captive Europe; The Living Standard in East-Central Europe.

The Legal Committee met four times. It discussed the following: Right of Everyone to be Free From Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile; Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country Including His Own, and to Return to this Country; Consideration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the U.N.; The Right of Asylum before the U.N.

The Economic Committee had six meetings. It discussed, among others: The Agriculture in the Captive Countries; The Living Standard in the Captive Countries; Economic Exploitation of the Captive Countries; Foreign Trade Between the West and the Captive Countries; The Economic Exploitation of the Captive Countries; East-West Trade; Credits of the Captive European Countries to the Underdeveloped Countries; Investment Questions in East-Central Europe; Military Expenses in Captive Europe; COMECON and the Common Market; Captive Nations' Economic Help to Cuba.

The Cultural Committee held six meetings. Its agenda contained: Freedom and Non-Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices; Communist Propaganda Among the Ethnic Groups in the United States; Sport as a Means of Communist Indoctrination of Youth; Cultural Developments in the Captive Countries; The Mood of Youth in the Satellite Countries; East-West Cultural Contacts.

The Information Committee met eight times. It discussed the following subjects: The Fate of Political Prisoners in the Soviet-Occupied Countries; Draft Convention and Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information; The Communist Youth Festival in Helsinki; Freedom of Information; National Holidays of the East-Central European Countries; Radio Broadcasts to East-Central Europe.

SECRETARIAT—PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

The Secretariat, in addition to implementing the decisions of the General Committee and its day-to-day operations, has carried the burden of most of the public information activities.

United States and World Press gave extensive coverage to ACEN activities during the Ninth Session. Editorials of *ACEN News* were frequently quoted and commented upon. The Assembly's views and activities were given special prominence in the articles discussing Captive Nations Week, 1963. As in the previous session, ACEN press conferences and reports on economic questions enjoyed particularly wide publicity. The international press coverage of the ACEN colloquy in Strasbourg was also very satisfactory.

Comments in letter form by ACEN members on the problems of captive Europe and international communism remained a constant feature in the United States and World press. More ACEN representatives appeared on television and radio to air the problems of subjugated Europe than in any of the previous sessions. The Assembly also cooperated with radio and TV networks in preparing programs on East-Central Europe.

During the Ninth Session the Assembly published the following titles:

Assembly of Captive European Nations, a 216-page Yearbook, covering the eighth session of ACEN.

Hungary Under Soviet Rule VI, a 51-page booklet, reviewing developments in Hungary from September, 1961, to October, 1962.

A Survey of Recent Developments in the Nine Captive Countries, volumes XII and XIII, covering the periods of January, 1962—June, 1962, and July, 1962—December, 1962, respectively.

East-Central European Papers, volume VI, the sixth in a series of essays and articles by ACEN members.

The Western Choice in East-Central Europe, a topical ACEN Memorandum, also published in the French, German and Italian languages.

Les Naciones Cautivas de Europa, a Spanish version of nine ACEN reports on the Communist takeover in the captive countries published in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Que Pueden Esperar los Obreros del Sistema Comunista? A study of labor under the Communist system, published in Montevideo, Uruguay.

Comercio Entre la Union Sovietica y las Naciones Cautivas Durante 1960, a Spanish version of the ACEN report on Soviet-captive nations trade, published in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Seven issues of *ACEN News* (Nos. 91-101) were published during the Ninth Session.

ACEN bulletins continued appearing in the Arabic, Finnish, Spanish and Swedish languages.

Forty-two press releases were issued during the time span covered here. ACEN supplied on a regular basis material to Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.

The ACEN-sponsored exhibit *Soviet Empire: 1917-1958* was displayed in Auckland, Christchurch, and Wellington, in New Zealand, on October 31-November 3, 1962. From New Zealand the exhibit was transferred to Taiwan, where it had the most impressive popular success to date. During the week of July 14-20, some 200,000 spectators have viewed the exhibit, which will be taken on tour to many other cities in Taiwan. In the United States, a copy of the ACEN-prepared exhibit, now owned by the National Education Program, was on permanent display at the Harding College in Searcy, Arkansas.

A series of lectures for a seminar on communism and captive Europe, given in Latin America during the first part of September, 1963, was prepared and edited by the Secretariat, under the guidance of the Deputy Secretary General.

A newly established ACEN Speakers' Bureau arranged a number of lectures by members of the Assembly in colleges and high schools.

Two new ACEN posters were displayed during the Ninth Session on the ACEN House opposite the United Nations. One of the posters depicted Berlin's "Wall of Shame" with this statement underneath: "U.N.: To Build Peace—Raze Wall of Shame and Iron Curtain." The other poster carried a quotation from President John F. Kennedy's recent speech, beneath a map of divided Europe: "Freedom is Indivisible And When One Man is Enslaved, Who Is Free?"

DELEGATIONS ABROAD

ACEN Representatives outside the United States were successful in presenting the case of the captive European nations to the governments, communications media and the population of their countries of residence.

ACEN Delegations and Offices in the European capitals prepared the ground for the visits of the members of the ACEN General Committee to the European Capitals. Delegations of ACEN in Latin America made a substantial contribution to the tours of the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General which took them to many capitals, and Foreign Ministries of Argentina, Chile, Colombia and other countries.

Representatives of ACEN carried the message of the Assembly to the highest offices in their countries of residence. Representatives of the ACEN

Delegation in Australia, for instance, were received by the Chairman of Australia's Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The ACEN Delegation in France was instrumental in assuring proper representation for the Assembly in the meetings of the Council of Europe and the NATO nations. The ACEN Delegation in London performed a similar function for international meetings held in the British capital.

The ACEN Representative in Denmark testified on behalf of the Assembly before the Committee on Non-Represented Nations of the Council of Europe, on June 29, 1963.

ACEN Delegations abroad made a tangible contribution to the Assembly's publications program. Thus, the Delegation in Stockholm continued publishing its periodical bulletin in Swedish and an annual newsletter in Finnish. The Spanish-language bulletin *Novedades de Ance* is being published by the ACEN Delegation in Buenos Aires, which also put out several booklets in Spanish.

ACEN Representatives organized, co-sponsored and supported meetings, rallies and commemorations designed to serve the cause of a free East-Central Europe. Among the most impressive events of this kind were the Captive Nations Week in Argentina, on November 12-16, 1962, proclaimed by a special Decree of the President of Argentina, and on September 9-16, 1963. The ACEN Delegation in Australia co-sponsored a "Genocide Day" in Melbourne. The Delegation in Bonn, Germany, held a press conference in July, 1963, and distributed material on the Captive Nations Week in the United States, obtaining wide publicity in German and Swiss newspapers.

The ACEN Representative in Lebanon continued his very effective press activity by placing hundreds of articles in the Middle East press and distributing translated ACEN reports throughout the Arabic countries. The Arabic language bulletin, edited by him, enjoyed an increasing popularity.

The ACEN Delegation in Buenos Aires played an important role in organizing the highly successful American Seminar on Eastern Europe and communism, held in September, 1963, in Buenos Aires which attracted renowned Latin American parliamentarians, writers, professors and leaders of various organizations.

An ACEN Delegation was established in Canada. It joins the other ten delegations active in the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Uruguay. ACEN Representatives functioned in Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Lebanon, Mexico and the Philippines, ACEN correspondents in Ecuador and Japan. Efforts are under way to extend the network of ACEN Delegations, both in Europe and in other parts of the world.

CONCLUSIONS

Our Report on ACEN's activities during the Eighth Session concluded with these words:

"We can only hope and pray that during the Ninth Session of our Assembly the negative drift regarding East-Central Europe will be reverted, and that Western policies and the aspirations of the captive peoples will come to be harmonized—for the victory of peace with freedom."

It must be frankly stated that the Assembly's hopes were not fulfilled. Only for a brief period, during the Cuban confrontation, the West and the captive peoples saw eye to eye. The strong stand taken by the United States had an electrifying effect in East-Central Europe: the captive peoples were jubilant, the Communist minorities verged on panic. Once the Soviet bluff on Cuba had been called, the entire Communist power structure in East-Central Europe was exposed in all its weakness and impermanence. There was genuine hope in the air for a retreat of communism in Europe, achieved by pressure short of war.


But the Cuban moment of truth was merely an exception in the course of events during the Ninth Session. As soon as the crisis was patched up, the West fully resumed its policy of accommodation with the Communist regimes in East-Central Europe, based on the erroneous assumption that accommodation fosters liberalization. The first major victim of this policy was the Hungarian Question in the United Nations.

As the Tenth Session opens, new dangers loom before us. The most immediate danger is the possibility of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the so-called Warsaw Pact countries. Although strongly criticised by influential Western voices, the idea of the treaty has supporters who wield almost as much influence. Oblivious of the fact that the captive peoples would regard the signing of the treaty as a confirmation of their slavery, the Western supporters of the treaty are eager to strengthen immeasurably the Soviet power position in East Central Europe by one stroke of the pen in order to receive benefits that are less than ephemeral.

During the Ninth Session, world communism suffered the most damaging ideological splits in its existence. The Kremlin was hard pressed on several fronts; the Peking "heresy", the popular ferment at home, the growing economic troubles, the hostility of communism in East-Central Europe. It will be a puzzle to future historians why, at a moment like this, the Western Powers decided to cast their lot with the Communist regimes and not with the captive peoples; to choose accommodation with their enemies instead of pressure against them; to enhance the prestige of bankrupt

satellite rulers at the expense of the freedom aspirations of the peoples they oppress.

We begin the Tenth Session by refusing to accept the present Western policies toward our countries as final. Instead we persevere in our trust that the Western Powers will refrain from the fatal step of sanctioning the *status quo* in East-Central Europe and will take advantage of the present disarray in the Communist camp to press for an overdue solution of the East-European problem.



I. ORDINARY SESSION

1. RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS

USURPATION OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA AND MISREPRESENTATION OF ALBANIA, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, POLAND AND ROMANIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Declaration adopted in the 97th Plenary Meeting,
on September 18, 1962

ACEN RES/PA 316 (IX) Pol.

With the opening of the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the time has come for the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the spokesman in the free world of the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania who continue to adhere to the democratic concept of life, to bring once more to the attention of the free members of the United Nations, as a matter of basic importance, the following:

1. The Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, after being assigned to the sphere of Soviet influence by the sinister secret agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, of September 23, 1939, were then forcibly occupied by the Soviets.

No right and no authorization can be derived from acts of force in our time. If the Soviet Delegation, even while professing to adhere to the Charter of the United Nations, poses as spokesman for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and pretends to have the authority for them, it is but an act of misrepresentation.

2. For similar reasons, the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania cannot consider the Delegations appointed by the Soviet-imposed Communist regimes as their genuine representatives either. Indeed, these Delegations derive their authority from regimes which

the Soviet Union imposed upon these countries, between 1945 and 1948, by measures ranging from infiltration and subversion, engineered in the presence of Soviet agents and backed up by more or less veiled threats of violence, to political intervention carried out in the presence of Soviet troops and accompanied by terror and threats of force. The same methods of deceit and brutal force were used again in 1956 when the Soviet Union reimposed the Communist regime in Hungary after its people had risen in revolt against it and had overthrown it.

The preparatory work of all these operations, consisting of a series of frauds on the part of Stalin, went back to the time when the first sweeping victories of the Red Army opened up the possibility of threats to the freedom and the independence of countries lying between Soviet Russia and Germany and in which the Soviets, for imperialistic reasons—disguised as “deep concern for their national security,” had always shown the greatest interest. The Western Powers thought they would be able to meet this potential danger by winning Stalin over to the idea of sharing the supreme power in the world, on an equal footing, with the United States and Great Britain. Stalin at first seemed quite willing to continue his participation in the Great Power Alliance after the war and to join the projected world organization. But then more than a year passed and important amendments to the draft charter of the United Nations had to be accepted by the Western Powers before Stalin made the express promise to enter the United Nations, while still remaining silent on the question of his participation in the Great Power Alliance.

On the other hand, he did not hesitate to accept the idea of making the post-war fate of the East-Central European countries an object of common concern. No sooner, however, had Stalin put his signature to the Yalta Agreement than he started actions which violated every letter of this document. It was only then that he ceased to make a secret of his long-conceived intention not to participate in a post-war Great Power Alliance. If Stalin got away with all these frauds, it was because he made them coincide with the closing months of the war and the first wave of the post-war fatigue.

3. There is no denying that the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, are represented in the United Nations by Delegations quite different from those who would represent them if it were not for the intercession of Soviet violence and deceit. As the current pseudo-Delegations are but direct or indirect spokesmen of the power which initiated and carried out all these acts of violence and deceit, there can be no doubt as to the interests which these Delegations are serving. Far from working for the restoration of

freedom, independence and sovereign rights of these peoples, they are, on the contrary, acting in such a way as to insure the permanence of their enslavement. Even after 1956, the so-called Delegation of Hungary was admitted, although without formal acceptance, to the exercise of all its functions.

Thus, the United Nations is supposed to offer these pseudo-Delegations the full use of its tribune and its whole apparatus for activities conducted against the interests and aspirations of peoples they pretend to represent. Moreover, it is supposed to secure continued maintenance of situations brought about by deceit and force on the part of the Soviets or other Communist countries, in placing these situations under the protection of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, while on the other hand, the United Nations frequently denies the same protection to long-standing legitimate rights of free member-states. The United Nations has been maneuvered into a situation from which its free members have every interest to extricate it.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations reiterates, therefore, its urgent appeal to the free members of the United Nations to give the most serious consideration to this situation with the view to denying to the current Delegations of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania the authority to represent these countries in the United Nations and of refusing to the Delegation of the Soviet Union the right to speak for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY

**Appeal to the United Nations adopted in the 100th Plenary Meeting,
on September 19, 1962**

ACEN RES/PA 317 (IX) Gen.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations feels in duty bound to appeal, at this beginning of the Seventeenth Session, to the General Assembly of the United Nations on a matter which has been, for the eighth time, proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the World Assembly: The Question of Hungary. It must give voice, first of all, to its apprehension in the face of an increasing tendency to accept the Soviet description of this question as a mere "cold war issue." The practical consequence of this tendency is a widespread reluctance to inscribe the issue on the agenda, to debate it and to press persistently for compliance with the resolutions previously adopted by the General Assembly.

In calling attention to this development, the Assembly submits that it would be most unfortunate if the tragedy of the Hungarian people, victims of one of the most brutal and perfidious aggressions in recent times, were to come to be regarded as an issue of political and propaganda warfare—a “cold war issue” in other words. The Question of Hungary originated in a premeditated aggression by a permanent member of the United Nations, the Soviet Union, against a smaller nation, Hungary, which, by a national and popular revolution, succeeded in shaking off, in October, 1956, a foreign-imposed dictatorship. It began, therefore, as a “hot war issue” and remains, to this day, an issue involving the basic, moral, legal and political principles of the United Nations Charter. As such, attempts to downgrade it to an episode of the “cold war” can only succeed at the price of undermining the very foundations of the World Organization and of placing the permanent members above the law.

Another argument advanced for the purpose of removing from the concern of the United Nations the Question of Hungary and other questions involving the lawlessness of the Soviet Union in her international conduct, is that the United Nations “should not adopt resolutions on matters it can do nothing about.” It is the view of the Assembly that the acceptance of this conception would be tantamount to the abrogation of the principles of the Charter and to substituting for them the rule of unlimited expediency. The practical effect would be that any great power unscrupulous enough and contemptuous enough of world opinion to invoke the veto at its pleasure and to flout majority decisions whenever not to its liking—would become immune to United Nations action or even censure.

In the considered view of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, past failure to bring about compliance on the part of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian authorities with resolutions adopted in a case of flagrant aggression—constitutes no valid excuse for desisting from further efforts to the same end. Any other position would imply that the passage of time enables the United Nations to condone aggression. Such conception would render more than questionable the value of the United Nations as defender of the smaller nations. It is, therefore, for the latter to seek to demonstrate on all occasions that aggression does not pay and, to this end, to press, with a persistence commensurate to their stakes in a world ruled by law, for compliance with the basic demands of the United Nations resolutions on Hungary.

The Assembly must furthermore stress that the major demand of the United Nations resolutions on Hungary was the “re-establishment of the political independence” of Hungary. To this end the various resolutions called on the Soviet Union to desist from armed intervention and withdraw its armed forces from Hungary. To the same end, they urged

the observance of human rights and free elections under United Nations supervision. These facts must be recalled now that the inclination is to ask, not for compliance with these basic demands, but only for measures to alleviate the plight of the Hungarian people—as if this plight, moral at least as much as material, could be really alleviated by means other than those clearly provided for in the United Nations resolutions.

It is incumbent upon the Assembly of Captive European Nations to point out that the inclination to put forward in the case of Hungary “ameliorative” measures as a substitute for self-determination is in contradiction with the inalienable rights of all nations and with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. This inclination is more often than not based on a misreading of developments in Hungary. The easing of terror on the surface and the intensely advertised purge of “Stalinists” who, in fact, had long before lost power in inter-cine Communist Party struggles, are quite successfully represented by the Kadar regime as steps in a process of “liberalization.” In fact, very little has changed in the situation in Hungary. The system is still a totalitarian police regime, imposed and maintained by foreign forces of occupation. Its head, the notorious Janos Kadar, himself, publicly admitted that his regime did not have the support of a majority of the Hungarian people. It behooves, therefore, the member nations interested in making the provisions of the Charter effective, to urge compliance with the original demands of the United Nations resolutions. It equally behooves them to reject credentials issued by the Kadar regime or, at least, to maintain the only sanction, however mild and unpractical it may be, they have repeatedly adopted on the Question of Hungary by refusing to act on such credentials.

It is the conviction of the Assembly that if even this expression of moral condemnation were called off, the sufferer would be primarily the World Organization. For such action would go against the Charter, the fourteen resolutions of the General Assembly and the unanimously hailed and overwhelmingly adopted Report of the Special Committee on Hungary.

Mindful of these considerations, the *Assembly of Captive European Nations* appeals to the United Nations General Assembly:

- (1) *to call* anew on the Soviet Union and the Kadar regime to comply with the basic demands of the United Nations resolutions on Hungary and, should their defiance persist, to consider measures of enforcement;
- (2) *to reject* the credentials issued by the Kadar regime which the General Assembly had branded as one imposed by the armed intervention of the Soviet Union;
- (3) *to maintain* the office of the United Nations Special Representative on the Question of Hungary.

**THE UNITED NATIONS, COLONIALISM, SELF-DETERMINATION
AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE**

**Resolution adopted in the 100th Plenary Meeting,
on September 19, 1962**

ACEN RES/PA 318 (IX) Gen.

THE ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS,

Stating that the universal recognition of the right of self-determination and national independence, and the consequent process of liquidation of colonialism are among the most significant developments of the second part of the twentieth century;

Noting that on December 14, 1960, the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, expressing conviction "that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory," solemnly proclaiming "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations," and declaring that: (1) "The subjection of peoples in alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation," and that (2) "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development;"

Considering that by their very nature, these provisions of the December 14 Declaration are of universal scope and call for world-wide application without distinction as to continents or to the color of the skin of the peoples concerned;

Reminding that, since the outbreak of the Second World War, the Kremlin forcibly transformed the formerly sovereign and independent Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—into undisguised Soviet colonies, and suppressed the independence and freedom of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania by imposing upon them, along with regimes subservient to the Soviet Union, Soviet institutions and values, by exploiting them and by treating them in fact, if not in name, as colonial possessions of the Soviet state;

Stressing that the Soviet Union today is the largest colonial empire which has ever existed in history and is seeking to expand in all directions;

Stressing further that the Soviet colonial system is one of the most cruel and oppressive ever devised and that the Soviet colonial empire is the only modern empire in which no subject people has ever been offered any choice concerning their future and their destiny;

Emphasizing that the situation so created in East-Central Europe violates the United Nations Charter and endangers peace and security;

Mindful of the Resolution on Northern Rhodesia, introduced on April 24, 1962, by the Soviet Delegation in the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, known as the Committee of Seventeen (Document No. A.AC 109/L.8) which, with a few minor substitutions and changes, could serve as an appropriate draft for a resolution setting forth a procedure for securing the right of self-determination to the countries subjected to the colonialism of the Soviet Union;

Urges the free member nations of the United Nations

- (1) *to place* on the agenda of the Seventeenth Session of the United Nations an additional item entitled "The Universal Application of the Right of Self-Determination;"
- (2) *to initiate* action in the General Assembly with a view to entrusting the Committee of Seventeen, established by General Assembly Resolution 1654 (XVI) or any other organ, existing or to be created, with the task of investigating the situation in the nine formerly independent and free states of East-Central Europe, now in Soviet bondage, with a view to determining whether and to what extent and in what form the right of self-determination is denied to them, and reporting their findings in the 18th Session of the General Assembly.

MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE OF BERLIN

**Declaration adopted in the 100th Plenary Meeting,
on September 19, 1962**

ACEN RES/PA 319 (IX) Gen.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations expresses admiration for and solidarity with the valiant people of the City of Berlin, a dramatic symbol of the abnormality and precariousness of the present situation in Europe. The Assembly is confident that they will persevere in their

courageous and self-sacrificing defiance of Soviet attempts to perpetuate and to legalize the division of Europe into a half-free and a half-slave part—preliminary to the Sovietization of the rest of Europe.

APPEAL TO THE WESTERN POWERS

**Declaration adopted in the 100th Plenary Meeting,
on September 19, 1962**

ACEN RES/PA 320 (IX) Gen.

The Second World War, its preliminaries as well as its aftermath, has hit particularly hard at Europe, especially at its Eastern half. After Czechoslovakia, Poland and Finland, three more free and independent nations—Estonia Latvia and Lithuania—became victims of the Soviet-Nazi conspiracy and aggression and were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. Immediately after the end of hostilities, in rapid succession, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, not to speak of East Germany and East Berlin, although left nominally independent, had the Soviet pattern of political, social and economic order and subservient dictatorships foisted upon them by the direct or indirect intervention of the military and police forces of the Soviet Union.

Today, seventeen years after the end of the Second World War hostilities, all these nations of East-Central Europe remain in Soviet-Russian bondage. There can be no more fitting description of their present status than the one Nikita Khrushchev has used, before the United Nations, in regard to the Western colonies:

There, the complete arbitrary rule of the foreigner reigns supreme. People of the colonial countries have not only been deprived of the right to independence and self-government, but their national and human feelings and dignity are insulted and flouted at every step. The foreign monopolies pump out of the colonies all that is valuable, barbarically plunder the wealth by means of merciless exploitation.

The "complete arbitrary rule" of the Soviet Communist Party and of Moscow emissaries or appointees reigns indeed supreme in the nine formerly independent states of East-Central Europe. Their people were robbed of practically all their human rights and fundamental freedoms. An alien pattern of thought, feeling, organization and living has been foisted upon them by terror and violence. Their children are taught an alien dogma. Atheism, contempt for the past history of their nation, hatred

for traditional values and blind admiration and loyalty to the "mother country of socialism", the Soviet Union, are systematically implanted in their minds. Their chosen leaders were killed or imprisoned, their intellectuals subjected to the most merciless thought control; their middle classes ruined and outcast; their workers tied to their jobs, deprived of labor union rights and exploited; their peasants coerced into the new serfdom of the Soviet-type collective or state farms; hundreds of thousands of peasants who actively opposed the collectivization, especially from the Baltic States, deported to Siberia. And no other colonial power has ever attempted such a drive for total assimilation or, for that matter, has ever dared to hurt so deeply and so continuously the national feelings and dignity of their victims. The wealth of these countries has been plundered by the greatest foreign monopoly ever—the Soviet state. At least twenty-five billion dollars were extracted from them under Stalin. In the six years from 1955-1960 these countries have lost over five billion dollars because the Soviet Union has overcharged them on her exports to and underpaid them on goods imported from them. Moreover, exploitation is now being followed by systematic integration which is but another name for economic incorporation into the Soviet Union.

The eruptive nature of the present situation in East-Central Europe has been tragically demonstrated by the revolt in East Germany in June, 1953, the unrest in Pilsen in 1955, the events in Poznan and Warsaw of June and October, 1956, the spontaneous national revolution in Hungary of October-November, 1956, with its reverberations in all the captive countries, and by the present situation in Berlin.

Each and every one of these nations had their share, commensurate to their potentialities and conditioned by the political realities of that time, in the allied victory and in the overall resistance against totalitarianism. Pre-war and war-time arrangements, such as the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration by the United Nations, and the Declaration on Liberated Europe, of February, 1945, served them as sources of inspiration and motivated their decision. Their record and their rights entitle them to live in freedom, under laws and governments of their own free choice, and to be fully independent members of the international community. And statements to the contrary from the holder of the highest international office notwithstanding, the people of the captive countries yearn for freedom with all their heart; they believe in human dignity, in fundamental freedoms like freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of belief, freedom of conscience, freedom of association and freedom to choose their own lawmakers; they certainly do not belong to the "hundreds of millions of people" who, according to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, "believe otherwise".

The people of the captive countries emphatically reject the concept that their aspirations for both national independence and freedom can be furthered by a Western policy that would seek "closer ties" and develop "more normal and active relations" with the Soviet-imposed and maintained dictatorial governments in the captive countries. They reject the concept that while the population of even the tiniest island under Western colonial administration is entitled to full self-determination, they should content themselves with those marginal improvements their colonial over-lords and local satraps feel safe enough to hand down to them. With them the Assembly of Captive European Nations believes that far from being conducive to less internal repression and more concern for the welfare of the people, a policy of friendship with and assistance to the Communist regimes would suppress external and internal pressures, that is precisely the forces which have brought about in the past such result.

It is the firm conviction of the Assembly of Captive European Nations that the mutual interests, short and long term, of both the Western Powers and the captive nations can only be served by a policy of unambiguous commitment to the goal of freedom and independence for the nations of East-Central Europe. This is the only way to preserve the deterrent effect of the spirit of resistance in the strategically vital area of East-Central Europe at a time when the Soviet Union once again prepares a massive political-psychological assault to impose its terms in Berlin and thereby advance toward its goal of breaking up the Western coalition. This is the only way to achieve progress towards the removal of the profound causes of the political tension in Europe without which all efforts to settle major political problems are doomed to failure.

Having in mind these considerations and the facts presented and the conclusions drawn in the report entitled "The International Situation and the Captive Nations", the Assembly of Captive European Nations appeals to the Western Powers to deny to the Soviet Union and the countries under its control any external successes which would discourage and thus render ineffective the forces of disintegration within the Soviet Empire. The Assembly furthermore appeals to the Western Powers to grasp the initiative in the decisive area of Europe and to this end:

1. *Elaborate, announce and promote* in all dealings with the Soviet Union a plan for an overall European peace settlement, based on the right of self-determination and national independence, and on the observance of the war-time and post-war commitments and pledges with regard to the nations of East-Central Europe.
2. *Bring before the United Nations* the question of the denial of self-determination to the nations of East-Central Europe.

It is the firm conviction of the Assembly of Captive European Nations that regardless of their immediate practical outcome, such initiatives would eventually bring far-reaching benefits to the cause of peace with freedom. The Assembly, therefore, gives voice to its hope that the proposed measures will be favorably considered by the Powers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will receive the active support of the great European institutions which embody at once the political wisdom, enlightened self-interest and spirit of solidarity of Western Europe and the aspiration towards a Europe united and integrated within its natural confines—the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community.

THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

**Declaration adopted in the 101st Plenary Meeting,
on October 23, 1962**

ACEN RES/PA 328 (IX) Gen.

Six years ago the Hungarian people rose in a national revolution against their colonial oppressor, the Soviet Union, and its Communist puppets in Hungary. The bravery and self-sacrifice of the Hungarian freedom fighters accomplished what the world but few days ago considered completely impossible—the defeat of the occupation forces and the re-establishment of Hungary's independence. The Soviet government was confronted with the gravest challenge of the post-war years and was seriously considering a retreat in Hungary. Yet in that crucial juncture the West failed completely to give even minimal political and diplomatic help to the resurrected Hungarian nation. Having realized that they could act without any risk, the Soviets launched a massive attack on November 4, 1956, and crushed with sheer numbers of men and steel the poorly equipped forces of the Hungarian freedom fighters. Hungary became a Soviet colony again, and unprecedented terror swept over the nation.

On the sixth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution the Assembly of Captive European Nations pays solemn tribute to the heroes of the Hungarian Revolution and to the enslaved Hungarian people who are bearing the burden of oppression and are still nurturing the flame of resistance today.

At the same time, the Assembly must express its gravest concern about a disquieting drift of the free world policy toward Hungary, portending another abandonment of the Hungarian people. The vote on the question of Hungary in the General Assembly of the United Nations, during the inscrip-

tion debate, has been the most disappointing ever since 1956, despite the clarity of the issues involved and of the demands contained in the United Nations Resolutions on Hungary. This drift toward the acceptance of Hungary's subjugation is mostly based on a misleading argument that the question of Hungary serves no useful purpose in the United Nations and is merely a "cold war" item. The present alleviation of the terror regime in Hungary is mistakenly regarded as proof that the United Nations debate of the Hungarian question is an obstacle to the improvement of the lot of the Hungarian people.

The falsity of these arguments is obvious. First of all, the Kadar regime owes its very existence to a "hot war", in which the Soviet Army massacred the Hungarian people, armed or unarmed. Furthermore, it was the concern of the United Nations that has been to a great extent responsible for whatever easing of repression that Sir Leslie Munro, United Nations Special Representative on Hungary, was able to notice in his last report. The real cause of the so-called improvement in Hungary was the decision of the Communist regime to appease the population and thus forestall a drift toward economic chaos and the danger of new ruptures. Dropping the question of Hungary from the agenda of the World Organization would not only gravely impair the morale of the Hungarian people, but also enable the regime to return to more repressive policies.

Neither is the Hungarian question a "cold war" issue—the issue of outright aggression and of a country's independence can never be reduced to such a vague term or dismissed with such a flimsy pretext. An aggression cannot be condoned simply because six years have elapsed from it; such a condonement of aggression would create grave dangers for the territorial integrity and independence of any country, especially of those who have recently gained their freedom. Hungary's elimination from the United Nations agenda would also enshrine a double standard in the World Organization on the question of self-determination.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations believes that the free world owes not only to the Hungarian people, but also to its own vital interests, to keep the case of Hungary's independence alive in the United Nations and in all international conferences. The hopes and fears of the Hungarian people, as those of all the captive European peoples, are today focused on the free world, especially the United States. Should the free world passively accept the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, the ensuing disillusionment would lead to the strengthening and consolidation of Soviet power and, consequently, to an essential increase of its capacity for adventurous, expansionism, in Berlin and elsewhere.

Therefore, in the name of the Hungarian people, the Assembly of Captive European Nations feels duty bound to appeal to the United Nations:

- (1) *to reject* the credentials and expel the Hungarian Communist delegation as having been appointed by a regime placed in power by the Soviet Army against the will of the Hungarian people;
- (2) *to adopt* all necessary measures in order to pave the way for the implementation of the Resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Hungary;
- (3) *to demand* that the Soviet Union and the Hungarian puppet regime immediately release all Hungarian political prisoners and restore the basic human rights to the Hungarian people.

THE FATE OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE COMMUNIST-RULED COUNTRIES

Resolution adopted in the 102nd Plenary Meeting, on October 23, 1962

ACEN RES/PA 329 (IX) Inf.

THE ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS,

Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, in Paris, on December 10, 1948, as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations;

Reminding that according to this Declaration, all members of the United Nations are obliged to respect inalienable basic civil and political rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens, particularly the right to life, liberty and personal security, the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court, the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty and the right to defense and to effective remedy by the competent national tribunal;

Pointing out that since the establishment of Soviet and Communist regimes in East-Central European countries, the rule of terror and lawlessness toward elimination and liquidation of their opponents has been introduced, under which justice, law and courts have been perverted into an instrument of arbitrary political power;

Stressing that innumerable thousands of innocent men and women have been and are put in jail, tortured, sentenced to death or long prison terms in secret trials, banished from their houses and domiciles or deported from homelands with their property confiscated;

Stating that among them have been and are respected national, political, religious and cultural leaders who have been and are undergoing

unspeakable suffering in Communist prisons or concentration (forced labor) camps, many of them having died in prisons;

Emphasizing that there is no reason whatsoever, and even less justification, for holding these people in prison or for banishing them from their homes or their homelands;

Bearing in mind that during the past years the death penalty in general, and mostly for alleged disloyalty to Soviet colonial regimes, has been extended and made a common penalty in the Soviet occupied Baltic States;

Reminding that the persecution of people for their political beliefs or past political affiliations and, in general, the denial by the Soviet-imposed dictatorial governments in East-Central Europe of fundamental human rights and the inherent human dignity, constitute not only grave violations of the principles and specific provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also a threat to peace;

Commending the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' suggestion to the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly concerning political prisoners, particularly its proposal that a convention on the rights of political prisoners should be adopted, providing for a clear definition of the category of political prisoner, as well as for safeguards with respect to his arrest, persecution, trial, execution of the sentence and status after release, and establishing some international machinery of surveillance and enforcement;

Condemns the misuse of political power by the Soviet and Communist regimes;

Raises the most vigorous protest against the barbarous denial of human right to life by the extension of the death penalty;

Appeals to the conscience of the free world and

Urges the United Nations

- (1) *to establish* a special committee to investigate the status and conditions of the political prisoner and to begin such an investigation with the countries in which the largest proportion of the population is confined to prisons, detention or labor camps for political reasons;
- (2) *to call* for the immediate release of persons imprisoned because of their political or spiritual beliefs or past affiliations, for a halt to repressive measures against political dissenters and for the observance of the obligations set forth in Articles 3 to 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

- (3) *To speed up consideration of the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to complete the texts so far elaborated with provisions establishing both an effective international control of the universal observance of human rights and an international machinery for the enforcement of these rights;*
- (4) *to give favorable consideration to the proposal for a convention on the rights of political prisoners which the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has presented to the 17th General Assembly.*

DENIAL OF POLITICAL RIGHTS IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Resolution adopted at the 103rd Plenary Meeting, on December 10, 1962

ACEN RES/PA 333 (IX) Soc.

THE ASSEMBLY OF CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS,

Observing, on December 10, 1962, with the rest of the free world, Human Rights Day, which commemorates the fourteenth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Recalling again with deep concern to the members of the United Nations and to the public opinion of the free world that the rights defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and especially the political rights of self-determination and free choice of the government and political system under which they want to live are consistently denied by the Communist regimes of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania;

Condemning the hypocritical stand taken by the representatives of the Communist regimes in the United Nations in posing as the defenders of human rights and champions of the liberation of colonial peoples and countries while denying to the people of the countries over which they rule the most basic personal and political rights and stubbornly opposing the very idea of an objective investigation of the observance of human rights in areas under their control;

Noting with satisfaction the unanimous adoption by the Sub-committee on Discrimination of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations of a set of fifteen principles on freedom and non-discrimination in the field of political rights and of a resolution calling on member states to use these principles for their guidance in an endeavour "to eliminate all discrimination in the matter of political rights;"

Trusting that the adoption by the General Assembly of the Draft Covenants on Human Rights, as well as of the aforementioned principles and resolution will usher in a new era of compliance with the obligations the member states have undertaken in subscribing to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Appeals to the members of the United Nations:

- (1) *to complete* the Draft Covenants on Human Rights with provisions for an effective machinery of enforcement and to bring them before the General Assembly for adoption at the earliest possible time;
- (2) *to insist* for the prompt consideration by the competent organs of the United Nations of the fifteen principles adopted by the Subcommittee on Discrimination of the Human Rights Commission and for the early adoption of these principles by the General Assembly;
- (3) *to establish*, in the meanwhile, a special committee, with broad terms of reference, to investigate the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania and to report their findings to the Eighteenth General Assembly.

THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

**Declaration adopted in the 105th (Extraordinary) Plenary Meeting,
on January 23, 1963**

ACEN RES/PA 338 (IX) Gen.

Ever since 1956, the Assembly of Captive European Nations has made the Question of Hungary one of its main concerns. This concern was and is motivated not only by the moral and political solidarity binding all victims of Soviet imperialism. It also stemmed from the expectation that the brutal aggression the Soviet armed forces perpetrated before the eyes of the whole world, against a people which succeeded in overthrowing a Moscow-imposed Communist regime, would refresh the memory of similar armed interventions which, in the confusion of the final phase of the Second World War and of the initial post-war period, brought forth the establishment of Communist regimes throughout East-Central Europe. It was the hope of the Assembly that the leading free nations would be thus prompted to open the issue of the forcible suppression of freedom and independence in all captive countries, this unresolved consequence of World War II, before the United Nations and at all high-level international confer-

ences, and to keep it open until resolved in harmony with the universally recognized right of self-determination.

The decisions taken at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Question of Hungary, and the trends revealed by the handling of the matter and by the debates as well, once again dim these expectations. They are, indeed, indicative of a rather general reluctance to broaden the issue, and suggest a growing inclination to downgrade and eventually eliminate it from the concern of the United Nations.

The resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the proposal of the United States comprise two positive features the Assembly of Captive European Nations is all the more anxious to welcome as they are in accord with the requests it repeatedly presented to the free United Nations member nations. One is the decision of the Committee on Credentials, promptly confirmed by the General Assembly, not to validate the credentials submitted by the Kadar regime. The other, is the reaffirmation, in the preamble of the resolution adopted on December 20, 1962, of the objectives of the resolutions adopted in 1956 and 1957. In the words of the report submitted on September 25, 1962, by Sir Leslie Munro, Special United Nations Representative on the Question of Hungary, "basically these resolutions were directed toward three objectives: (a) withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary; (b) free elections in Hungary under United Nations auspices; (c) observance by the Hungarian authorities of fundamental human rights and freedoms." It is a matter of regret that the resolution carefully avoids spelling out these objectives and that it contains no direct call on the Soviet Union and the Kadar regime to comply with past resolutions, and no condemnation for their defiance of the authority of the United Nations.

The resolute part of the resolution raises serious questions. It provides for the suppression of the position of United Nations Special Representative on the Question of Hungary and requests the Secretary General "to take any initiative that he deems help in *relation* to the Hungarian question." It must be noted that the last holder of this position, Sir Leslie Munro, was given in 1958 the task "to represent the United Nations for the purpose of reporting to member states or the General Assembly on significant developments relating to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Hungary." The terms of reference given for the Secretary General are at once broader and much more vague. He is not asked to report on developments, nor to seek compliance with past resolutions. He is given a blank authority to exercise any initiative in relation to the question of Hungary. It is to be hoped that there will be no attempt to construe this as meaning that the General Assembly and the individual members have divested themselves of the right of taking

any initiative on the Hungarian question in favour of the Secretary General. The recent suppression of the United Nations' news broadcasts to Hungary on the alleged ground that the Hungarian question is no longer on the agenda, and news reports about behind-the-scenes talks on an amnesty in Hungary, to be announced before or during the projected visit of Secretary General U Thant to Budapest, and to be followed by the rehabilitation of the Kadar regime, are by no means the only developments justifying serious apprehension in this respect. There have been further disturbing developments the Assembly of Captive European Nations is enjoined to mention:

- (1) Unlike in past sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Question of Hungary was not dealt with directly by the Assembly, but was assigned to the Special Political Committee which ranks way behind the Political Committee, and placed on its agenda as the last item.
- (2) United States initiative was late in taking shape. The ground was thus left open for an intense effort on the part of the Communist delegations, aided by some non-aligned delegations, to push the argument that Hungary was a mere cold-war issue and, as such, had no place on the agenda. Another consequence was that time for debate was reduced to a minimum and friendly delegations were not encouraged to speak.
- (3) Most supporters of the United States-sponsored resolution studiously averted mentioning the main demands of past resolutions and stressed, instead, as the United Nations objective, the alleviation of the "plight" of the Hungarian people.

As all other captive peoples, the Hungarian people would naturally welcome any improvement in their lot. But they are not prepared to give up their birthright, individual freedom and national independence, in return for some marginal ameliorations. By the same token, they would welcome an amnesty for a number of political prisoners now smarting in Kadar's jails. But not at the price of shutting the prison doors on a nation of ten million; not at the price of sealing their national subjugation! The prisoners themselves, in jail precisely because they stood up for freedom, would not welcome a bargain which would deprive their sacrifices of any meaning. The Assembly of Captive European Nations hold that the West has the right and duty to demand freedom for them without any blackmail payments, by using the many means of pressure available to it.

* * *

The fundamental issue, of which the recent developments on the Hungarian question are but reflections, is whether the United States and

its allies will put their faith in the people of the captive countries and continue to press for the restoration of their rights by every legitimate means; or whether they will put their faith in an effort to bribe, cajole and convert the Communist masters of these countries in the vain expectation to wean away from the Soviet Union—the source and only proven safeguard of their power and privileges.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations would be remiss in its duties if it were not to warn against the harmful consequences of the latter option for the moral integrity and political security of the free world. It trusts that for reasons of principle and self-interest the leading free nations would choose to side with their true allies—the peoples of the captive countries. It hopes that this decision will soon be reflected in a determined effort to maintain United Nations concern for Hungary and to extend it to all captive nations.

THE NINTH ANNIVERSARY OF FREEDOM DAY

**Declaration adopted at the 105th (Extraordinary) Plenary Meeting,
on January 23, 1963**

ACEN RES/PA 339 (IX) Gen.

January 23 marks one of the most glaring defeats of Communist imperialism. On that day nine years ago over 22,000 Chinese and Korean prisoners of war in the custody of the United Nations forces in Korea, refused to return to their Communist-enslaved homelands. Despite systematic efforts by Communist agents to coerce them, they chose freedom. Their valorous act has lost none of its importance and inspirational value today.

The Republic of China inaugurated the Anti-Communist Freedom Day to commemorate the courage of the 22,000. During the nine years since its inauguration, organizations all over the world have joined in, making Freedom Day a truly global event. The Assembly of Captive European Nations takes pride in its traditional association with Freedom Day.

The annual Freedom Day serves as a rallying point to anti-Communist freedom forces all over the world. It presents them with an opportunity to survey their cooperation and to strengthen their unity, which was born in struggle and has been cemented by common goals and ideals. The peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania are intently following the liberation struggle of the captive Asian nations. At the same time, the enslaved peoples of China,

North Korea, North Vietnam and Tibet take heart in the resistance of the captive European nations. An excellent example of this close interdependence between freedom fighters in Europe and Asia, is the impact of the Hungarian national revolution of 1956, which spread panic among the Communist overlords in Asia.

On this ninth Freedom Day the captive peoples in Asia and in Europe derive encouragement from the recent strains and stresses in the Communist empire. Khrushchev's retreat from Cuba bolstered the hopes and confidence of the captive European people. The continuing economic and ideological troubles of the Chinese Communist regime are nourishing the spirit of rebellion on the mainland of China. The Chinese Communist assault against India and their open support of the Viet Cong have exposed them as a clear threat to peace and liberty in Asia and the entire world; consequently, the support for their admission to the United Nations has decreased. Above all, the cleavage between Moscow and Peking has tangibly weakened the aggressive power of Communist imperialism.

The captive peoples of Asia and Europe expect that the free world will take advantage of the troubles in the Communist empire and will advance the cause of freedom by firm and bold policies. The time is now to begin giving real help to the Chinese people to shake off the Communist yoke; to extend assistance to the people of North Korea, North Vietnam and Tibet; to press the issue of self-determination for East-Central Europe in all international forums and negotiations. The captive peoples of Europe and Asia would support such a freedom drive to the limit of their possibilities, as the Chinese and North Korean prisoners so eloquently demonstrated nine years ago.

2. R E P O R T S

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE CAPTIVE EUROPEAN NATIONS

**Report presented in the 100th Plenary Meeting,
on September 19, 1962**

ACEN Doc. 311 (IX) Gen.

INTRODUCTION

An ACEN Report on the Situation in East-Central Europe (ACEN Doc. 276 (VIII) Sp.S.V.), presented on October 20, 1961, to the ACEN Fifth Special Session in Paris, confronted a number of current Western beliefs and expectations regarding East-Central Europe with the factual situation and developments in the captive countries.

The findings of the report were as follows :

(1) Instead of enjoying a process of liberalization, the captive European countries are increasingly subjected to Sovietization. The best illustration of this trend is the case of Poland, where the freedoms won by the Polish people in 1956 are gradually being narrowed down.

(2) The assumption that at least since 1956 the captive area has become an economic liability to the Soviet Union, is not supported by Soviet foreign trade statistics.

(3) The drive for collectivization of agriculture, except in Poland, is continuing with unprecedented brutality, especially in Hungary.

(4) The living standard in East-Central Europe has been stagnating in recent years.

(5) A militant anti-Church campaign is under way in all the countries of East-Central Europe.

(6) Although since Stalin's death many excesses of the Communist regimes have been removed, the machinery of terror is kept intact, and fear remains the main component of Communist rule.

(7) Instead of achieving more autonomy, the countries of East-Central Europe are being systematically integrated into the Soviet Empire.

(8) Against the background of Communist aggressive confidence and Western passivity, the captive people are still refusing to come to terms with the system imposed on them, and persevere in their resistance.

On the basis of the above findings, the ACEN Report on the Situation in East-Central Europe concluded that:

- (a) The developments in the captive European nations did not support the theory of a "liberalization process" in East-Central Europe, but rather pointed to increased Soviet repressions and accelerated integration into the Soviet Empire;
- (b) The captive peoples still refuse to accept communism and continue their resistance;
- (c) The captive peoples' will to resist now requires support by an active Western policy that seeks clear-cut self-determination and closely identifies itself with the aspirations of the captive nations.

The purpose of this Report is to review the main developments in East-Central Europe since October of last year and find out whether they still support the findings and conclusions of ACEN Report on the Situation in East-Central Europe (ACEN Doc. 276 (VIII) Sp.S.V.).

DE-STALINIZATION

The event that raised most hopes, in the East as well as in the West, for a "liberalization" of the Communist system was a new "de-Stalinization" campaign, initiated at the XXII Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow, which ended on October 31, 1961. The Communist regimes in the captive countries hailed the de-Stalinization campaign as the final triumph of "Socialist legality." The captive peoples began asking for more rights. And in the West, the proponents of the theory foreseeing an inevitable mellowing of communism, saw their predictions justified.

Yet it soon became apparent that the Communist regimes in Europe have removed only some of the external trappings of "Stalinism," while its substance remained untouched. Instead of a thorough transformation of the inhuman aspects of the system, the first concern of most of the satellite rulers was to transfer their own guilt on convenient scapegoats, most of them ghosts of the past.

In Romania, for instance, the leading Communist, Gheorghiu-Dej, disclaimed any responsibility for crimes committed under his rule and struck at people who were either out of favor or dead (Pauker, Luca, Chisinevischi, Constantinescu). Similarly, in Czechoslovakia the Party leader Novotny put most of the blame for "Stalinist crimes" on Rudolf Slansky, already executed as a "Titoist." The Bulgarian Communist leadership blamed the former excesses on the already demoted former Party leader and Premier, Vulko Chervenkov. In Lithuania, the Stalin-appointed First Secretary of the Party, Sniechkus, an organiser of mass deportations, pointed to the executed Soviet Security chief Beria as the scapegoat.

The Communist authorities then took pains to emphasise that liberalization was the last thing they intended. As Kadar of Hungary pointed out on December 1, 1961: "It would be completely erroneous to think a liberalization current is about to run through the Communist movements and the various Communist parties."

The Soviet and satellite Communist leaders have been making a supreme effort to contain the popular ferment within controllable limits. Their main goal remains to maintain themselves and the ruling cliques in power. One of the main eloquent illustrations for this attitude is the new draft statutes of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, to be presented to the Party Congress in December.

These statutes are more "Stalinist" in nature than the new Soviet Party statutes adopted in October, 1961, on which the Czechoslovak ones are based. The statutes do not provide for secret elections of Party bodies; severely curtail the right to opposition, and are so designed as to bar any threat from younger or more liberal Communists. The statutes also tighten the Party's grip on all fields of public life—a common trend for all East-Central Europe.

THE EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY

At first sight, some of the events in Hungary during the last twelve months seem to contradict the trend toward stronger Party control. These events are: replacement of a number of Party officials by non-Communist experts, a purge and demotion of "Stalinist" officials, an offer of reconciliation to past enemies of communism and promises of greater artistic freedom.

After the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian freedom fight and the brutal suppression of organised resistance, Kadar realised that the country of ten million inhabitants cannot be efficiently governed with a 400-thousand strong party, the nucleus of which was composed of Rakosi adherents. He also saw that the gulf between the Party and the people would make the maintenance of power precarious and might lead to another eruption. Therefore he tried to win over the "Stalinists" by persuasion, but they refused to change their mind and even started plotting against him. Consequently, Kadar struck back and in a bitter internal struggle eliminated the "Stalinists" from the leading posts and replaced them by people of his own choosing.

Still, Kadar's measures against the "Stalinists" are considerably milder than those applied against "revisionists" or outright opponents of the Communist system. It

is also to be noted that Kadar dismissed Rakosi and Gero from the Party not for their crimes against the Hungarian nation, but for mistreating Party members.

The events are part of a new Kadar policy aimed at winning the support of the masses, as well as his admission that it is no longer possible to rule Hungary by terror alone. At the same time the changes in Hungary are a sign of the regime's confidence that the Hungarian people's disillusionment with the West can now be fully exploited.

POLY-CENTRISM

The personal, tactical and economical divergencies that emerged in the Communist empire in the wake of the XXII Congress revived the question of leadership of the world Communist movement. A debate on whether there should be "one or several centers" in the Communist world, has arisen behind the Iron Curtain. And the growth of "polycentrism" was hailed by some in the West as proof of a further decline of the Communist potential for aggression and expansion.

While it is true that Khrushchev has not succeeded in reestablishing undisputed command of the Communist movement, Western optimism with regard to "polycentrism" should be balanced with certain incontrovertible facts. It must be emphasized, first of all, that the ultimate purpose of the Communists has not changed. Even at the extreme point of the Communist rift—the Moscow-Tirana quarrel—the opponents, Hoxha and Khrushchev, both claim to be better interpreters of the Communist creed; their disagreement is also about tactics best suited to defeat the West.

Furthermore, the Communist leaders are too well aware that they would not survive in power without Soviet support. As Kadar said in his speech of December 3, 1961: "We do not make a secret out of it . . . that we rely on Hungarian-Soviet friendship, on the Warsaw Pact organization, the Socialist camp, the international Communist movement . . ."

The Soviets themselves made it clear that subordination to Moscow remains the law. Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet Central Committee's "Section for Liaison with Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist countries," emphasized in December, 1961, that the new Soviet Party program was a document for Communists everywhere and was recognized as such by other Communist parties.

ECONOMIC CRISIS

Since October of last year, the communized economies of the captive countries, instead of fostering stability and insuring a higher living standard, have further deteriorated. In some areas these economies are at a crisis point.

The crisis atmosphere is especially conspicuous in the agriculture of East-Central Europe. A massive statistical study on economic developments in the Soviet-occupied part of Europe, prepared by the research staff of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, indicated that the average citizen in East-Central Europe had less to eat and buy in 1961 than in 1960. The study, based on Communist-supplied data, implied that forcible collectivization has had a ruinous effect on agriculture and adversely influenced the entire economy.

The revelation of a profound agricultural crisis in the colonial motherland, the Soviet Union, at the beginning of 1962, was followed by a steep increase of prices

for butter and meat. This pattern was soon repeated in the other captive countries: in July, 1962, food prices were sharply raised in Bulgaria ("to overcome difficulties in supplying the population with foodstuffs"), and a similar price rise seems to be imminent in Czechoslovakia. Lines in front of food-stores are growing longer all over East-Central Europe. The only country which was relatively free of food problems was Poland—due to the fact that 87 percent of its arable land is still farmed privately.

Poland was also the only country that was able to increase its farm production in 1961—by 8 percent. (The Albanian claim of a 22 percent rise in agricultural production in 1961, as compared with 1960, is openly doubted even by the other Communist regimes). The 1961 agricultural performance in the other Communist-ruled countries, according to official data, which, as usual, give an over-optimistic picture, is as follows:

*Albania—fall in production as compared with 1960.

*Bulgaria—"nearly at the same level" as in 1960.

*Czechoslovakia—a 1-2 percent increase, as compared with the planned increase of 7.1 percent.

*Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania—overall decrease in production as compared with 1960.

*Hungary—output was 8 to 9 percent below the plan and somewhat less than in 1960.

*Romania—planned increase not achieved; no details published but the true situation is illustrated by the re-introduction of bread and meat rationing.

The hostile attitude of East-Central European peasantry toward collectivized agriculture has been admitted by Hungary's Kadar in these words: "We cannot deny that the majority of the peasants oppose the system of deliveries and were also against the Socialist transformation (collectivization) of agriculture." The passive resistance of the peasantry is the main reason for the agricultural crisis in the Communist empire.

The weakness of the foundations of Communist economy, including the highly touted industry, were revealed by the impact of the Common Market on the captive European countries.

For the people of East-Central Europe the success of the Common Market is another proof of the superiority of Western democracy against the Communist system. This popular attitude has been confirmed by the Communists themselves. Thus, Radio Budapest stated in August, 1962, that many Hungarians believe that the Western European Common Market is superior to the Soviet-run Communist Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON)

COMECON's reaction to the challenge of the Common Market has been one of commotion and confusion, but of few practical measures. The COMECON "Summit Meeting" in June, 1962, in Moscow, contrary to the expectations of significant new economic developments produced only some organizational changes and phrases about "division of labor." Official Communist statements since the meeting showed a new sense of urgency over coordination of economic activity. At the same time, these statements blame conflicting nationalist interests of the member countries for the lags in economic co-operation.

The success of the Common Market and the economic problems of the Communist regimes, however, should not cause the West to underestimate the huge potential of the economic resources of East-Central Europe and its importance to the Soviet power apparatus.

THE OPPRESSION OF THE SPIRIT

The Communist effort to achieve total control of the minds and souls of the captive populations, and to indoctrinate the young generation, has not abated since October, 1961.

Poland, a country in which more religious freedoms exist than elsewhere in captive Europe, serves as a barometer of the Communist warfare against religion. During the last twelve months these freedoms were further reduced, in an incessant warfare between the Church and the regime. The various stages of that warfare can be seen in the following developments:

In a series of Lenten sermons, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski renewed his criticism of the Communist authority for the "atheistic harassment" of the Roman Catholic Church. The sermons followed a renewal of a petition by the Cardinal that the Polish Parliament investigate anti-Church and anti-religious policies of the Communist authorities. The petition listed a series of grievances, ranging from official impediments of religious instruction to specific examples of tax and administrative decrees affecting Church interests. The petition was subsequently returned as "unacceptable".

The Polish Communist regime announced that schools and orphanages run by monks and nuns are to be taken over by the Ministry of Education within a year. Stefan Wyszynski protested against closure of such religious institutions in the Warsaw area, in a pastoral letter of 12 August, 1962. With this measure the Gomulka regime surpassed even the pre-1956 "Stalinist" regime, under which the Church had a number of schools and orphanages.

On August 26, 1962, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski warned Polish Communist leaders that they were obstructing the nation's progress with "a religious war and hatred of God."

The anti-religious campaign remained in other countries as well. In January, 1962, two Catholic priests in Lithuania were sentenced in a mock trial for alleged speculation in critical commodities (lime, cement, sheet-lead) while building a church; the newly-built church was then seized and converted into a music school. Also in Lithuania, the bishops of Kaisiadorys and Panevezys, as well as the administrator of the archbishopric of Vilnius, were removed from their places of residence and are kept under police supervision. The ancient Roman Catholic Cathedral of Lithuania was transformed into a museum. The Dome Cathedral (Lutheran) of Latvia was transformed into a concert hall. In Albania and Bulgaria numerous churches and monasteries were made into museums, restaurants or barns. Numerous arrests of priests, on charges ranging from illegal contacts with Church hierarchs abroad to possession of "illegal" leaflets, were reported from Czechoslovakia. The measures taken against the Orthodox Church in Romania, the only important religious organization now existing in the country, have become harsher: students and professors of theology have been imprisoned or even executed; additional monasteries and convents have been closed; religious instruction has been further restricted and the churchgoers are threatened with repression.

While the professed goal of the Communist regimes is total eradication of religion, the arts are destined for complete subordination to the Party and transformation into instruments for the creation of the Communist "new man." The balance sheet in the sphere of arts is also a negative one: the artist is, on the whole, burdened with more restrictions than in October, 1961. The exception here is the tactical retreat of the Communist regime in Hungary which promised, in August of 1962, "a free rein in artistic activities (other than Socialist realism) which are well intentioned and have no hostile designs."

There was an upsurge of hope among the writers of East-Central Europe for more creative freedom, following the disclosure of the XXII Soviet Party Congress. But the Communist authorities hastened to explain that "Socialist realism", although without Stalin's excesses, still remained the norm.

In Poland, arts are still less regimented than elsewhere in captive Europe, but the last twelve months saw there a further narrowing of artistic freedoms. Here are but a few examples: the well-known intellectual club Crooked Circle was shut down; new works by the poet Antoni Slonimski, dealing with freedom and Utopia, are being denied publication; the writer Jerzy Kornacki was arrested; custom controls for books were increased.

During a debate on the need to widen the limits of freedom in Poland, the physicist Leopold Infeld stated that he would agree to the present restrictions "on the condition that our children's freedom will be increased, not decreased." Another Communist, Henryk Holland, delivered an extremely pessimistic comment on Infeld's hope for the future: well-remembered for his struggle for reforms and liberalization after 1956, Holland committed suicide on December 19, 1961, while Communist secret police were searching his apartment. He had no hope left for an increase of freedom in Poland under the Communist system.

This absence of hope for the possibility of a liberal version of communism is even more pronounced among the artists and intellectuals in the rest of East-Central Europe.

FERMENT, RESISTANCE, REPRESSION

One of the aims of the XXII Soviet Communist Party Congress, and the "de-Stalinization" campaign initiated here, was to whitewash the Communist system. For the West, the anti-Stalin campaign was to be a proof of the humanization of the Soviet Empire. For the captive populations, the promised departure from the excesses of the past was supposed to remove grounds for popular discontent.

But like the XX Congress in 1956, the new de-Stalinization campaign opened more valves for the discontent to rise into the open. Popular ferment increased, and its extent can be judged from the warning in the *Pravda* of 27 December, 1961, against losing control over the program of de-Stalinization. On 12 February, 1962, the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Zhivkov, called for a struggle against the people who had fallen under "decadent Western influence." In Hungary, Kadar emphasized that "revolutionaries" (i.e., participants in the 1956 Freedom Revolution) would not be "rehabilitated morally or politically."

The discontent of the captive people was further heightened by the gap between the official praises of de-Stalinization and lack of any genuine measures of liberalization.

The vitality to the opposition to the Communist system has been admitted by the Party in Czechoslovakia. In July, a Communist official, writing in the newspaper *Nova Svoboda*, stated that:

It has been demonstrated during recent months that demagogues and enemies have been clever in making use of some of our economic difficulties; clandestinely and even openly they began to spread doubts as to the Communist principles of economy, politics, culture and relations among people; they have attacked the principles of democratic centralism, have made propaganda for decayed liberalism, absolute freedom for demagoguery and slander under the guise of a so-called unlimited freedom of criticism. In some cases clearly reactionary views were expressed with the purpose of violating proletarian internationalism.

Concern with passive resistance was also evident during the Congress of Communist propagandists in Lithuania, on 13 April, 1962. The main speaker at the Congress warned that "remnants of the bourgeois past are still alive in the minds of some individuals," and "some people have an uncritical view toward the bourgeois way of life."

In 1962 the Communist press carried many items concerning persons arrested for "hostile" activities. The punitive power of the state has not been reduced, but strengthened instead. This trend originated in the Soviet Union with a large-scale extension of the death penalty. It was promptly extended to the captive countries.

The harshness of the laws directed against dissenters may be illustrated by Article 209 of the Romanian Penal Code, which provides that anybody who in the company of friends is heard expressing the slightest unfavorable opinion about the regime could be sentenced up to "25 years of hard labor and 5 to 10 years civic degradation."

CONCLUSIONS

The ACEN Report on the Situation in East-Central Europe (ACEN Doc. 276 (VIII) Sp.S.V.), maintained that the developments in the captive European nations did not support the theory of the "liberalization process" in East-Central Europe. The Report stated instead that, "the trends overwhelmingly point to the increase of repression, to the strengthening of the Soviet grip and the acceleration of the process of integration into the Soviet Empire."

The above findings are fully borne out by the events in East-Central Europe since the publication of the Report on 20 October, 1961.

These events form a paradoxical pattern. A glance at the developments in captive Europe during the last twelve months would suggest a decisive weakening of Communist rule and a rise of the morale of the captive populations. After all, since October, 1961, Communist parties were subjected to divisive strains, Communist dogma was further undermined by the revelations of the XXII Congress, a severe food problem is haunting the Soviet Empire. But in reality, the Communist regimes have not been much weakened, and the morale of the captive peoples is at an all time low. The reason for this state of affairs is the absence of a forward-seeing Western policy toward East-Central Europe and the failure of the free world to associate themselves with the freedom aspirations of the captive peoples. This failure has more than offset the defeats which the Communist system has suffered since October, 1961. The captive peoples are becoming increasingly convinced that the West is doomed to reacting to the Soviet initiatives and is not able to undertake initiatives of its own to weaken world communism and to advance the cause of freedom.

If the present low level of hope and faith in the West among the captive peoples were allowed to drift toward passivity, or even hostility, Soviet imperialism alone would benefit from it. Therefore a reversal of this present trend is immediately called for.

This reversal should begin with the realization in the West that even if genuine "liberalizing" features were temporarily introduced in captive East-Central Europe, they could never be a substitute for freedom and national independence. While it is true that the Soviet Union, like all tyrannies, carries within itself seeds of self-destruction, the disintegration of the Soviet colonial empire from within might take generations. Meanwhile, if the West fails to deny the Soviet Union further political and diplomatic successes, the impression will be strengthened in the Soviet Empire that the Communist system will inherit the future. In turn, this would slow down

the disintegration process even further, because the Soviet regime would balance its failures and weaknesses by victories on the world scene and by a growing fatalism of the people it holds captive.

The West can achieve the reversal of this trend, which favors Soviet imperialism, by adopting a purposeful and forward-looking policy of self-determination for East-Central Europe, based on the wartime and postwar international agreements, Western pledges and commitments, and the United Nations Charter. In some Western quarters the reluctance to adopt such a policy is explained by the desire not to aggravate the present international tension. But it is exactly the growing tendency in the West to accept the *status quo* in Europe that aggravates the international tension by encouraging Soviet aggressiveness and by weakening the deterrent effect of the captive peoples' spirit of resistance.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations has constantly taken the stand that the struggle to prevent any further extension of Soviet power in Europe cannot be separated from the struggle for the recovery of freedom in Eastern Europe. The developments surveyed in this Report lend added weight to this stand and strengthen our conviction that the Western Powers will draw the necessary conclusions from the present situation in East-Central Europe.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Lithuania.)

HUNGARY—SIX YEARS AFTER THE 1956 FREEDOM REVOLUTION

Report presented in the 101st Plenary Meeting, on October 23, 1962

ACEN Doc. 323 (IX) Gen.

Six years ago, on October 23, revolution broke out in Hungary against the Communist reign of terror. The regime proved so weak that it collapsed within a few hours. The Soviet Red Army intervened immediately and the Revolution became a national fight for freedom.

In a week's struggle the Hungarian people won their freedom and established a legal government headed by Imre Nagy. Democratic parties began functioning again, order was re-established, and preparations were made to hold free elections and to rebuild the country.

Seeing the achievements of the Revolution, the Soviet Union attacked on November 4, 1956, with fresh forces and crushed Hungary's freedom in a bloody struggle. It set up a puppet government on Hungarian soil, at the head of which it placed the renegade of the Revolution, the opportunist Janos Kadar.

In the course of six years, the United Nations have adopted fourteen resolutions calling upon the Soviet Union and its puppet government to give back to the Hungarian people their right to self-government and withdraw the Soviet occupation forces. But the Soviet Union ignored these resolutions.

Three years after the Soviet intervention Kadar declared at a meeting in the Soviet Union he attended in the company of Khrushchev: "About three years ago I was here, at a time when the Hungarian people were facing great trouble. We came in order to ask for brotherly help from the Soviet people. We received that help and by means of it defeated the counterrevolution." (*Nepszabadsag*, December 8, 1959.)

However, two days before Kadar went to ask for "help" from the Soviet Union, he had stood before the radio as a minister in Imre Nagy's Cabinet and called the Revolution: "The glorious uprising of our people . . . (of which) the ideological and organizational leaders and preparers were the Hungarian Communist writers, journalists, university students, the youth of the Petofi Club, and thousands and thousands of workers and peasants."

Kadar had concluded: "Our people proved with their blood that they support the government's demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. We don't want dependence any more. We don't want the country to become a battlefield. We speak to every honest patriot: let us join forces for the triumph of Hungarian independence, of Hungarian freedom!" (Radio Budapest, November 1, 1956.)

I

THE FIRST PHASE: LIQUIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION

The invading Soviet armed forces, which were used to liquidate the Hungarian people's resistance, followed the pattern of Communist dialectics.

The revolutionary armed resistance was broken first; then the organs brought to life by the Revolution were dissolved one after another, starting with the revolutionary councils and committees, continuing with the reborn democratic parties, the Writers' Association, the associations of the intelligentsia, the students' organizations, and, finally, the church leaders appointed during the Revolution.

In 1957 a relentless liquidation of the Revolution by means of terror was initiated. According to the Hungarian Chief Prosecutor, 3,012 persons were sentenced in that year. The purge went on for three months with the active cooperation of the Soviet Army; later on it was carried out by the reorganized police and courts.

After the execution of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter (June, 1958), all news about the trials, sentences, and executions was blacked out, when the regime saw that the free world was recording these fearful statistics of terror in Hungary.

According to the most modest data, the number of those executed reached 2,000. Diplomatic sources in Hungary reported that at the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1960, around 150 persons were sentenced to death—about ten of them under the age of 18.

Kadar said in September, 1959, that "what the 'heroes' of 1956 did, has not yet been paid back. The settlement of quite a few bills is still open and we will settle accounts."

Held in contempt by the people it controls, the Hungarian Communist Party, as reconstituted after the 1956 Revolution, hardly even pretends that it has any ideological influence on the population.

When Kadar was put in power by the Soviet Red Army, only the most incorrigible Stalinists, AVH-henchmen, police and army officers joined him from among the previous 900,000 Communist Party members. According to official statistics, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party had only 100,000 members at the beginning of 1957. By 1959, the Party's membership rose to over 400,000 while the leadership within the Party, in the state administration, in the armed forces and in the economic management was almost exclusively in the hands of Rakosi-trained dogmatist sectarians. It was with their assistance that Kadar liquidated, without mercy, all the traces of the Revolution and went through with the collectivization of the peasantry.

Kadar retained the supreme leadership for himself and followed Khrushchev's policy in all its aspects, including the "struggle on two fronts": against the revisionists and dogmatists. As the emphasis was, at that time, on the revisionists i.e. the followers of Imre Nagy, the dogmatists had great hopes in Kadar and considered his condemnation of sectarian views as mere propaganda.

THE SECOND PHASE: LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANTRY

By the end of 1958 Kadar managed to liquidate the traces of the Revolution, revisionism was also broken. The execution of Imre Nagy, Pal Maleter and their aides was intended to be a warning directed especially toward the Communists: this is how the Party is resolved to deal with anyone who dares to turn, for whatever motives, against the omnipotence and power monopoly of the Party.

The last revisionist attempt was to raise some objection to the terroristic implementation of the reemerging plan of collectivization. In the years 1957 and 1958, Kadar followed Imre Nagy's agrarian policy in order to protect his rear, while he was engaged in the liquidation of the "revolutionary nuclei;" i.e., the liquidation of the remnants of the organizations of the intellectuals, of the students and of the workers in the cities and provincial towns. For this obvious reason he did not reinstate the system of compulsory deliveries to the State, abolished during the Revolution, did not push the issue of collectivization, and permitted the free marketing of agricultural produce. This policy had its favorable results: the peasants were prosperous and the markets were full of agricultural produce.

Two years after the Revolution, however, Kadar considered the time opportune to hold a Communist-type single-list "election" in November, 1958. There was no possibility of choice for the electorate, but the opinion of the peasantry was well formulated by a peasant who said: "Long Live Kadar, but only as long as we are permitted to cultivate our land ourselves."

In December, 1959, the dogmatists hoped to enforce collectivization through harsh economic measures aimed at the ruining of the independent peasants. The revisionists, however, wished to collectivize the peasantry in gradual stages, at a rate which would not have endangered the country's economy to such an extent. The center group, which rallied around Kadar, resolved—upon pressure applied from Moscow—to proceed with a quick collectivization. Nevertheless, learning from the mistakes of earlier collectivization drives in the early fifties, during Rakosi's rule, they put aside the means of class warfare and first tried to "convince" the well-to-do peasants, the key persons in the villages, thinking that their entry into the collectives would break the resistance of the rest of the peasantry. The terror methods were in the beginning mainly psychological and turned into physical terror only when they failed to achieve the required results. In this collectivization drive the Party skilfully exploited the lethargy that resulted from the crushing of the Revolution by a foreign power, the Soviet Union, and from the hopelessness for any help from the West. The events of 1956 proved that an open Revolution could lead only to bloodshed. One of the typical methods used was to round up the key figures in the villages and to lock them up, while word was spread in the villages that they had been shot or that eye-witnesses saw their bodies, beaten to death, in the fields, etc.

Kadar's staunchest supporters in this latest collectivization drive were the dogmatist-Stalinists in the Party's leadership.

During the Revolution, almost all collective farms were dissolved. By a great leap forward in early 1959 the regime tried to make up for the large-scale dissolution of

farm collectives. The collective sector rose from 14.6 to 36.6 percent in 1959, to almost 75 percent in 1960, and to 95.6 percent in May, 1961. The collectivization campaign was carried out by violence and brutality in an atmosphere of fear and despair.

The individual farmers were taxed out of existence. The countryside was infiltrated with brigades of Party recruiters and cadres to manage the collectives; young peasants were fleeing to the cities in droves.

Ever since the first wave of collectivization, agricultural production has been disrupted and the markets, previously well stocked, are showing the effects. In the cities there are recurring shortages of meat, bread, vegetables and fruit. One woman from Budapest recently wrote: "When poultry is available, the market looks like boxing rings. It is impossible to plan a meal in advance."

Mechanization is not adequate to compensate for the rural manpower shortage, and most of the new collectives are disorganized and lack sufficient capital. Unofficial accounts of conditions in the countryside refer to constant delays and quarrels on the kolkhozes and claim that the resistance to collectivization is spurred by the low incomes of long-standing kolkhoz members.

Some of the young people who fled to the cities send money back home to help support their families. They insist that the older peasants do not encourage them to stay on the farms because they see no future in collectivized agriculture.

A typical report from a collectivized community reads as follows: "The village has changed since February. The dispossessed farmers are embittered and former abstainers now drink daily. Family squabbles are the order of the day." Regardless of peasant resistance and past experience, the regime evidently believes it can make collectivization work.

Industrial Workers' Norms are Raised

Hungary finished her Three-Year Plan in 1960, and began a new Five-Year Plan in 1961. While official statements on the speedup emphasize that Hungary's future industrial development must be in accordance with the nation's own resources and capabilities, it is clear that any such development presupposes an increased effort on the part of the people.

Since 1959, the regime has revived the old Stalinist devices of work brigades and labor competitions to step up production, and lately there has been a movement to increase workers' norms. The new plan in fact involves a 37-40 percent increase in labor productivity, which means that about two-thirds of the total planned increase in industrial production is to come from a greater output per worker.

Articles in the Communist press have hinted at a large-scale resistance to this action, not only by workers but by managers as well. The workers and even numerous Party organizations were visibly concerned with the raise of norms. Generally, they feared a cut in wages. The plant managers were reluctant to carry it out. *Nepszava*, the trade union daily (August 7, 1960), threatened them "Prevailing laws and rules are being violated by those plant managers who fail to carry out a change of norms made necessary by new procedures and technology."

Since there was strong resistance in the plants, the trade unions mobilized all their forces. Meetings were held in every plant to appease the workers. The main argument used was that raised norms did not mean a loss in wages, and that the only demand was that all time be used for production. Plant Party organs also

organized meetings "to exploit fully working hours and strengthen work discipline . . . (by) 'enlightening' the workers politically." (*Kisalföld*, September 8, 1960).

Trade unions in a Communist state do not function to protect the interests of the workers, but rather serve to exploit the workers in the interests of the State. The eighth meeting of the Hungarian Trade Unions' National Council devoted its entire agenda to this problem.

The Communist regime keeps refuting the talk about loss of income, of "true and real norms" and recovering "lost time." The government would like everybody to believe that "such a readjustment of norms will halt a drop of income and will, eventually through increased production, increase the income according to schedule." (*Nepszabadság*, September 20, 1960).

An earlier report of the same Party organ discloses that factory workers are generally displeased. One machinist said: "Why don't you tell the truth, all this noise is made because it's the money that matters. We must work more if we want to earn the same as before." (*Nepszabadság*, August 4, 1960).

Subsequently, a struggle has developed between the Party and the workers. The Party's newspaper demanded "strong action" against the opposition and "spokesmen for the backward strata":

We frequently come across the following remark made by factory managers: "It is impossible to keep order and discipline, for our sole instrument is propaganda. One can shout one's lungs out yet no one listens . . ." Who on earth asks the works manager only to make propaganda and to implore?

He should demand! He should confront the confirmed trouble-makers and offenders of work discipline with legal measures: putting them into a lower category, giving them another assignment or dismissing them.

Apparently, severity is unpopular. It might pose temporary problems of anger and sulkiness, or uninvited pettyfoggers might talk in favor of work shirkers. However, the voice of these elements should not be confounded with that of the working class. (*Nepszabadság*, April 9, 1961).

A new regime decree (No. 22-1961. VI. 9, 1961) put into effect on July 1, 1961, made permanent the increase of industrial norms begun in the summer of 1960. In essence the new decree authorizes frequently repeated, almost automatic enterprise norms, and puts the factory director in charge of carrying out the changes. The probable purpose is to avoid centrally decreed and forcefully carried out norm-raising campaigns in the future so as to increase norms in enterprises at different times.

For the time being only one consequence of the rise of norms is quite clear: the reduction of workers' wages.

THE THIRD PHASE: UNFOLDING OF A "NEW POLICY"

While collectivization was on the way, Kadar came to the realization that he performed an operation which—although successful from an ideological point of view—might cause the death of the patient. The peasantry, seeing no possibility for resistance, fell into lethargy and passivity. The younger people were leaving the villages and those who stayed behind did not work. Discord broke out among the various peasant groups forced into one huge mass. Agricultural production fell year after year.

Economic conditions deteriorated in the country. The repayment of loans granted in 1957 had to be started in 1960. The loss in agricultural exports had to be supplemented by the export of industrial products to maintain and even to increase the country's industrial production which is, again, based on the import of raw materials.

These increased tasks had to be solved with a bitter and uncooperative population. New concessions had to be made to appease the nation. A new policy began to unfold, marked by the elimination of Stalinist views and methods, the liquidation of the prerogatives of the Party members, the appointment into leading positions of non-member experts, the liberation of scientific research from ideological control, material incentives to the leading strata of intellectuals, etc.

After the waning of the "counter-revolution" Kadar realized that a country of 10 million inhabitants could not be efficiently governed with 400,000 Party members. He could not rely on his Communist comrades alone, most of whom were dogmatists, sectarians and pupils of Matyas Rakosi. He also had to rid himself of any remnants of Stalinist thinking, i.e., that the Party members were "exceptional" and "first-class citizens" enjoying special privileges, in order to avoid the recurrence of the failure in 1951-1953 caused by the passive resistance of the people and the anarchy within the Party itself. Such a recurrence of the Stalinist mistakes would have made the future of the regime itself uncertain, and the complete separation of the people and the Party would have led to a new tension, liable to erupt again as it did in 1956.

Kadar probably saw these consequences and, therefore, demoted the opponents of his "two front policy" from their leading positions as well as adapted Party political education and propaganda to the new conditions.

Nevertheless, the demotion of Kadar's opponents did not solve the problems involved, since he failed to change their minds as well. When these demoted officials were placed into managerial positions in the country's economy, they met other Party members who also opposed Kadar's policy. Thus, their demotion strengthened their position and increased their economic importance. They slowly emerged as a kind of "mafia" waiting for the moment to regain their former positions and their power. Sometimes they seemed to support the Party leadership, although, more often, they raised their voice against its policy. They did not learn the lesson taught by the Revolution and failed to reach the logical conclusions thereof. For them the Revolution meant that "reins must be held shorter". They passionately studied the views of the dogmatists, and supported Mao Tse-tung in the ideological struggle against Khrushchev. They spread the "good news and symptoms" of Khrushchev's ouster, as they realized soon enough that Kadar could not be removed while Khrushchev remained in power. They, nevertheless, were confident that the time would come for their return to power and that Kadar would be put behind bars for "revisionism." They even discussed Kadar's active role in and during the Revolution.

Kadar tried to "re-educate" these elements but with little or no results. Not even the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could exercise a decisive influence on these circles. The majority of the Party organizations remained stubborn. They were afraid of the "new policy" which, they feared, might lead to their complete elimination from power. Kadar hoped to reassure the wavering members by stating that those who repented their mistakes and faults may regain their leading positions. The severest reprisal against the fiercest opponents was merely their expulsion from the Party, in order to warn others not to follow their example.

The question, however, arises: are these converts to be trusted? Would the followers of Rakosi—who remained faithful to him until his downfall—prove to be reliable in a critical situation? Kadar's personal doubt in these people led to the removal of the middle and lower cadres before the Party's Congress to be held this November. The vacancies were filled with young Communists who started their political career under Kadar in the post-revolutionary period.

The personal element plays an important role in Kadar's attitude and policy. He had fallen victim to Rakosi's despotism and, like other leading Communists, he was also removed from a top-level position to suffer torture at the hands of the AVH. He was Rajk's closest friend and the god-father of Rajk's only son. This friendship, however, did not prevent him from inducing Rajk to play a "role" in a show-trial as required by the Party for a promised, but never given, immunity. Most of the old Communists would never forget Kadar's intervention in the Rajk case. The followers of Imre Nagy reproach him for betraying the Revolution and for the execution of the person who released him from Rakosi's prison. The Stalinists accuse him for his role in the Revolution. It is, therefore, obvious that Kadar elevated and put into power people who were closely linked with him in the illegal Communist Party or who went through similar experiences.

The secret of Kadar's success, however, is that Khrushchev favors him more than any other East-European Communist leader. This in itself is ample assurance for his stay in power while Khrushchev remains in power in the Soviet Union.

II

HUNGARY IS A SOVIET-TYPE COLONY

Despite the fact that the serious economic and political situation in Hungary, as well as the lessons of the Revolution and anti-Stalinism, which became a weapon to consolidate the Kadar regime, forced Kadar to grant some concessions, not a single demand for which the Hungarian people unanimously and spontaneously rose up in 1956, was fulfilled. The revolutionary demands were:

- (a) Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary
- (b) Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, neutrality of Hungary
- (c) Guarantee of basic human rights
- (d) Free elections under United Nations supervision
- (e) Abolition of the country's economic exploitation.

These demands aimed at the liquidation of the country's colonial and puppet status. Soviet colonialism differs from the classical forms of colonialism of the 19th and earliest centuries inasmuch as it administers the subjugated countries through mercenaries recruited in the respective countries. The maintenance of colonial rule, however, is assured by the omnipresence of Soviet occupation forces.

Soviet Army Occupation

Although the Red Army is gradually disappearing from the surface of Hungarian life, the units around Budapest, even after being reduced in 1957, amount to 50,000 to 80,000 men, according to the most conservative estimates. This includes one tank division and a number of other mechanized infantry units.

The capital is completely encircled by a ring of mobile forces; outside the capital Soviet troops are strung along the Danube River. In addition, directly across Hungary's borders, there is a massive concentration of Soviet forces in the Ukraine.

In Romania, the Soviet Union has built up a major communications and supply network. All airfield and ammunition dumps in Hungary remain in Soviet hands despite the reconstruction, under the strictest control, of the Hungarian army, whose strength is now estimated at 150,000 men. The main railroad junctions and communication centres are also under direct Soviet control.

Kadar and Khrushchev have promised the withdrawal of Red Army troops many times, but even if this takes place the fact remains that mechanized Soviet troops could cross the border again and arrive in Budapest within two hours.

The Five-Year Plan was modified in September, 1961, and a greater share of the national income was allocated to cover the country's defense expenditures. While Hungary's only window toward the West faces neutral Austria, the percentage of the national income allocated for defense purposes is at the 1952-1953 peak level. The regime attempted to justify these defense expenditures by references to the "Berlin crisis," "the revanchist policy of West Germany," "the aggressive intentions of the NATO Powers." Any resistance to Khrushchev's intention to incorporate West Berlin into the Soviet empire is, therefore, regarded as a "serious threat" to Hungary.

The people of Hungary, however, fully realize that these huge military expenditures are but the latest form of Soviet imperialist exploitation of the country.

Colonial Exploitation

The Hungarian puppet regime's primary aim has been to carry out the Communist program as envisioned by the USSR.

Recent travellers to Hungary claim that the Revolution forced the Soviets to abandon their more obvious methods of plundering Hungary, although exploitation still exists.

During a visit to Hungary in November, 1959, Premier Khrushchev tried to allay anti-Soviet sentiments by his ebullient presence. Attempting to sound the note of "Soviet-Hungarian brotherhood," Khrushchev made inept references to the Russian part in suppressing the Hungarian Revolution in 1848, and compounded the blunder by referring to the revolutionaries as a "small handful of reactionaries."

His efforts notwithstanding, Khrushchev is the most hated man in Hungary today, for the nation is a Soviet colony held in check by a puppet government and Soviet troops.

In general, the full facts of Hungarian-Soviet trade relations have not been made public. During the uprising, the Hungarian rebels attempted to expose and put an end to Soviet economic exploitation by demanding that the price lists of Hungarian goods exported to the USSR be made public.

The Kadar regime adamantly called such demands "counter-revolutionary" and to this day has maintained an unbroken silence on this subject. Available information on the prices of Hungarian imports from the USSR provides evidence, however, that Hungary—like the other satellites—has disadvantageous terms of trade with the USSR.

In 1958, Hungary's total imports from the USSR were valued at \$200,500,000. Thirty-four of the items imported according to the official Soviet statistics—and

valued at \$160,000,000 or 80 percent of the total—were items that were also sold by the USSR on the free world market. Hungary paid \$24,375,000 more for these 34 items than did the other purchasers.

Hungarian Uranium: Soviet Property

Details of the Soviet share of ownership of the Hungarian uranium mines have not been made public in spite of loud protests against this type of Soviet exploitation at the time of the Revolution.

Since 1958, the mining area has been kept under tight security guard reminiscent of the Stalinist era. Rumors circulating in the country assert that exclusive rights to the mines and the use of Hungarian uranium ore have been sold to the USSR for a period of twenty-five or fifty years at a scandalously low price.

The only official statement on the subject during the last three years was published in the Party's theoretical review *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, on May, 1960:

Since the start of work connected with uranium, the Soviet government has given us many-sided and effective help. In geological prospecting, in surveying for uranium, and in organizing mining works, we owe a great deal to the qualified work of Soviet experts who, hand in hand with Hungarian experts, are laying the foundations of this . . . new branch of our industry.

But over and above expert and organizational help, the USSR made it possible to realize the large-scale investments required for setting up the uranium industry by large-scale, interest-free credits and by the delivery of installations. In view of the difficult position of our people's economy at the time, we would have been unable—and are still unable—to make these large investments ourselves.

In addition, the USSR undertook to purchase from us, at a price higher than that prevailing on the world market, the uranium ore exceeding the requirements of the Hungarian people's economy.

In spite of the fact that all other mining is included in statistical figures and the budget, the dates and figures of uranium mining are not available. This means that the Hungarian uranium mines are, in fact, Soviet property.

Anti-Religious Campaign

Communism considers religion one of its greatest enemies. Although the practice of religion is theoretically free in Hungary, it involves great disadvantages to the practitioners. People in high positions are threatened with transfer, demotion or dismissal. Young people, who practice religion, find it impossible to pursue their studies, no matter how high their school marks.

In addition, the regime began a new drive against the Catholic Church in December, 1960. Within three months it arrested about 700 Jesuit, Cistercian and parish priests and 500 laymen closely associated with church activities. Archbishop Grosz, who spent more than four years in prison during the Stalinist era and was the religious head of the Church (he died in October, 1961, at the age of 74), asked Kadar in a letter:

These men have been associated with me for several years, and I personally stand for everything they have done. If these arrested priests are guilty, then I must be guilty, too. Please take me into custody together with my friends.

Although the majority of those arrested was subsequently released, many were sentenced to long prison terms.

The most important Communist task is to destroy the influence of religion on youth. They have launched a large-scale drive to hamper religious instruction and to promote atheistic education in all schools. A new decree permits the State to place a parent under police supervision if "he does not assure the child's education."

In this way the state can prevent parents from counteracting the work of re-education by the schools and Communist youth organizations. Yet it appears from the regime's press that Communist efforts have so far met with little success. It is precisely for this reason that the government is preparing for an even more systematic and all-embracing attack.

In its propaganda directed toward the outside world the regime stresses that the Churches receive aid from the State. As is well known, the State confiscated all Church property, all educational institutions, mission houses and monasteries, museums and libraries. Whatever aid the State has given to the Churches, constitutes but a small percentage of the seizures and damages thus inflicted. In return for this "State aid" the Churches are requested to help the State in the abolition of the religious education of the youth, in the abandonment of the missionary work of the Churches, and to make never ceasing public statements about the existence of religious freedom in Hungary.

The intention of the regime is quite clear: to confine religion within the church walls; to tarnish the clergy with its participation in the so-called peace-movement; to make the people disinterested in religion; and to prevent anyone, who still dares to retain his ties with the Churches, from advancing in the public life.

Culture and Youth

Whatever headway the Party may have made economically, it has advanced very little on the cultural scene in the past five years. In science, literature and the arts, manifestations of hostility against the purposes of the regime continue.

This fact is admitted by the frequent criticism in the press of the "lack of ideological content" in artistic and intellectual work. Many writers, newspapermen, and artists are still in prison today because they took part in the 1956 Revolution.

From numerous reports it appears that the Party's main efforts in the ideological field are directed toward the very young—despite the glaring example of the failure of such indoctrination provided by the Revolution.

But there is no choice: The Party can hope for very little from those who were totally disillusioned by the bloody suppression of 1956 and who today are trying to live as best they can in a situation over which they have little control.

Terror in Disguise

Foreigners, or Hungarians who left the country a long time ago, are not able to look behind the facade during their short visits which are confined mainly to Budapest or to the Balaton resort region. These visitors are misled by the charm and dynamism of the life in the capital or at the resort places. This charm and dynamism, however, have nothing to do with the Communist system, but are results of the enormous will-power of the Hungarian people who do not want to fall behind the West in clothing, fashion, culture and technical civilization. Such visitors fail to realize that the only difference between the Rakosi and Kadar regimes is in the name of the Secret Police: formerly it was the AVO, now it is called State Security Organs. They form an independent body within the Police. It may be that

the persons summoned before the State Security Organs are not beaten to death or spirited away for ever; they are merely intimidated, and while it may also be true that they are offered coffee and some cigarettes, the fear still persists within them.

The reconstruction of the informer and spy system within the country is going on. Its methods have become more refined and subtle, with psychology used more than physical intimidation, but it is nonetheless effective. Relaxation of control is strictly "controlled" and is limited to criticism from within.

New forms of police and armed units were organized by the Kadar regime. These are the workers' guards, the volunteer police and the volunteer border guards. Automatic weapons and strict military training have made the workers' guard an emergency force poised to strike in the event of any disturbance and to suppress any move that may lead to the events of 1956. The volunteer border guards help in the rounding up of prospective escapees, who still attempt to cross the border to freedom despite the manifold barbed wire fences and mine fields along Hungary's Western border.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Sandor Kiss, Hungary.)

THE FATE OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE COMMUNIST-RULED COUNTRIES

**Report presented in the 102nd Plenary Meeting,
on October 23, 1962**

ACEN Doc. 324 (IX) Inf.

Immediately upon the establishment of Soviet and Communist regimes in East-Central European countries, these regimes initiated a rule of terror and lawlessness to eliminate and liquidate their real or potential political and class enemies. In spite of the fact that these regimes formally enacted constitutions and laws, that they maintained courts and other legal institutions, justice, law and the courts in the Soviet and Communist-dominated countries have been perverted into instruments of arbitrary political power. According to Article 97 of the Czechoslovak Communist Constitution of July 9, 1960, the aim of the courts of justice is to protect "the Socialist State and its social system" and "to educate the citizens to be devoted to the country and the Socialist cause." An official interpretation of Part 22, paragraph 2 of the Bulgarian Criminal Code says that the Communist legislature "has as one of its goals to make it difficult for the enemies of the regime to commit crimes."

The Communist regimes do not respect fundamental human rights and freedoms as generally accepted by civilized society and set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, particularly those providing that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security; that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; that all people are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to equal protection of the law; that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating his inalienable rights; that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or deportation; that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and

public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; that everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty and that no one shall be held for any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law. All these principles have been and are being violated every day by Soviet and Communist rulers in their treatment of actual, potential or imagined political opponents.

In order to secure its forcibly imposed rule of an insignificant minority over the will of the overwhelming majority and to crush any possible opposition against the regime, the Soviet and Communist despots have built up their rule on a foundation of concentration camps, prisons, deportations and other means of oppression. Thousands upon thousands of innocent men and women have been jailed, tortured, sentenced to death or long terms of imprisonment in secret trials, banished from their houses and domiciles or deported abroad; their property was confiscated by an unappealable decision of the executive branch of the Soviet or Communist governments. The fate of the political prisoners, including respected national leaders and outstanding political, spiritual and cultural figures behind the Iron Curtain, is one of the darkest chapters of this century's history. Due to the suppression of the freedom of information and distortions by Communist propaganda, no accurate statistical data is available on the number of prisoners, their punishment, the concentration or forced labor camps and prisons. However, even the fragmentary facts at our disposal eloquently illustrate the ordeal of political prisoners under Soviet and Communist domination.

The people of the Baltic States and of former Finnish, German, Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian territories annexed by the Soviet Union, have suffered most in this respect, particularly during World War II and the Stalin post-war era. During the Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1940-1941, over 18,000 persons were deported or arrested; at least 1,950 bodies of those arrested were later found in mass graves in Estonia alone. Under the disguise of a mobilization, over 33,000 young men were deported to Soviet Arctic slave labor camps where thousands of them perished. Since 1945, over 50,000 Estonians were either arrested or deported mainly in connection with the collectivization of agriculture. At the same time, 34,000 persons were put in prisons and concentration camps in Latvia. Since 1945, an additional 187,000 Latvians have been imprisoned and deported to Siberia. In the same period, 3,000 Lithuanians were jailed, over 12,000 sent to forced labor camps and 34,260 deported to Siberia. Since 1944, 15,000 more Lithuanians have been imprisoned, 130-150,000 sent to slave labor camps, and 350,000 deported to Siberia and other remote regions of the USSR.

However, forced labor camps were not limited to the Soviet Union alone, and were established in other Communist ruled countries as well. In Albania, at the end of 1944, about 15,000 persons were interned in numerous forced labor camps. In 1949, there were 46 camps in Bulgaria. Over 450,000 democratic Bulgarians were placed in the slave labor camps. Czechoslovakia under Communist rule established 124 similar camps attached to mines, especially to uranium and coal mines. About 250,000 persons were condemned to work there. There were 59 forced labor camps in Hungary, until 1952, with about 130,000 internees. In 1952, there were 34 forced labor camps in Poland with an undisclosed number of inmates. Also in 1952, there were 96 similar camps in Romania and today it is in this country that the most infamous forced labor camps are located. We refer to the labor colonies in 22 gold mines in the Brad area (Hunedoara Region) in which close to 20,000 political and "economic" offenders constitute 80 percent of the labor force, and in

the reed cutting region of the Danube Delta. In the latter, approximately 25,000 inmates are compelled to work in knee and often waist-deep water without protective clothing or footwear. The high rate of mortality in these camps makes them into veritable places of extermination. These camps were established as a means of political coercion or so-called re-education of those opposed to Communist governments. It was sufficient for a person to manifest or to intend to manifest his opposition to the Communist regime in order to be subjected to penalties accompanied by forced or corrective labor.

Forced labor camps have become a more or less transitory institution in several captive nations. Prisons, on the other hand, have been and remain a permanent instrument of political terror and persecution. About 20,000 persons were imprisoned after the establishment of the Communist regime in Albania, in 1944. More than 60,000 have been jailed in Bulgaria. In 1949-50, thousands of Czechoslovak patriots were persecuted for political reasons; 45 of them were sentenced to death. Similarly innumerable Estonians, Hungarians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Romanians have been and are suffering in Communist penitentiaries for their convictions, past political activities, or their former role in the national life. Poland provides the only exception in this respect. Many political prisoners have not been able to survive the barbarous methods of Communist investigation or the inhuman conditions prevalent in the Communist prisons, and have died there. Others have been released in a ruinous state of health after the expiration of their prison terms.

The lists of political prisoners in East-Central Europe include national political, religious and cultural leaders of international reputation, as well as well-known freedom fighters who symbolized the traditional democratic aspirations of their respective nations. Here are but a few of them:

Albania. The former Premier Koco Kotta; two former Head Muftis of the Albanian Moslem Church, Dr. Behxhet Shapati and Hafiz Sherif Langu; two former Roman Catholic Archbishops of Albania, Msgr. Vincenc Prendushi and Msgr. Gasper Thaci; Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Albania, Vissarion Xhuvani. All of them died in Communist prisons.

Bulgaria. The leaders of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Nicola Petkov, was executed on September 23, 1947. The leaders of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, Krustiu Pastuhkov, died in a Communist prison. The leader of the Bulgarian Democratic Party, Nicola Mushanov, died shortly after his release from an illness contracted in prison. Another leader of the same party and former Bulgarian Prime Minister, Alexander Guirguinov, died in a Communist concentration camp.

Czechoslovakia. The former Chairman of the Czechoslovak Republican (Agrarian) Party and former Prime Minister, Rudolf Beran, died in prison. The former Chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party, Msgr. Dr. Jan Sramek, died in Communist confinement. The former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, Senator Vojtech Dundr, died in prison. Almost the entire Czechoslovak Roman Catholic hierarchy has been destroyed by the Communist government. The Archbishop of Prague and Primate of Bohemia, Msgr. Dr. Josef Beran, was banished, deported and is still held prisoner. Bishops Msgr. Pavol Gojdic and Msgr. Michal Buzalka died in prison.

Estonia. Four former Presidents of the Estonian Independent Republic—Konstantin Pats, Jaan Tonisson, Jaan Teemant and Friedrich Akel—and Juhan Laidoner, former Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian armed forces, were arrested and disappeared without trace in Soviet prisons.

Hungary. Istvan Bethlen, former Hungarian Prime Minister; Bela Kovacs, former Secretary General of the Hungarian Smallholders Party; Bela Zsedenyi, Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament; both highest Roman Catholic dignitaries of Hungary, the Archbishop Primate Jozsef Mindszenty and Archbishop Jozsef Grosz; Protestant Bishop Lajos Ordass and Moderator of the Lutheran Church, Albert Radvanszky were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms. After the 1956 Revolution, numerous prominent political and military leaders, as well as a great many Hungarian patriots were either sentenced to death and executed, or condemned for life or long prison terms.

Latvia. The President of the Republic, Karlis Ulmanis; General Krisjanis Berkis, Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian Army; Professor Dr. Janis Auskaps, Rector of the Latvian University; Professor Dr. Edgars Rumba, Dean of the Latvian Ev. Lutheran Church; Roman Catholic Dean Jazeps Pudans; Rudols Lindins, Editor, Social Democratic Party; Margers Skujenieks, Prime Minister, Liberal Party; Arveds Berg, Editor, leader of the Conservative Party—all died as deportees.

Lithuania. The leader of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party and former Deputy Prime Minister, Kazys Bizauskas; former Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament, Vytautas Petrulis; Roman Catholic Bishop Vincentas Borisevicius—all were arrested and executed by the Soviets. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Vilnius, Mectislovas Reinys, was arrested and died in prison. Former Prime Minister and a well-known Lithuanian scientist, Professor Pranas Dovydaitis, was deported to Siberia where he died.

Poland. In 1945 and 1946, the leader of the Polish underground government, Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, Christian Labour Party, and his deputy, Stanislaw Jasiukowicz, National Party, were murdered by the Soviets; the Chief of the Polish Home Army, General Leopold Okulicki, died in a Soviet prison; former President of the Polish Council of National Unity in the underground movement and leader of the Polish Socialist Party, Kazimierz Puzak, the leader of the Polish Christian Labor Party, Reverend Zygmunt Kaczynski; and a leading personality of the Polish Peasant Party, Stanislaw Tabisz, died in prison; Boleslaw Scibiorek and Wladyslaw Kojder, prominent members of the Polish Peasant Party, were murdered.

Romania. The list of former leading personalities in Romania's public life, imprisoned by the Communist regime, runs into many thousands. A great many of them died in jail, others perished later because of tortures and the inhuman treatment endured in prison, while still others, released from prison, live under house arrest. The most prominent victims, who found their death in prison, include: Iuliu Maniu, former President of the National Peasant Party and Prime Minister of Romania; Constantin I. C. Bratianu, former President of the National Liberal Party; George Bratianu, former member of the National Liberal Party, member of the Romanian Academy; Constantin Titel Petrescu, former President of the Socialist-Democratic Party, who died after his release from prison; M. Romniceanu, former Minister; Istrati Micescu, lawyer, former Minister; Mircea Vulcanescu, writer, philosopher, former Minister; Constantin Busila, engineer, former Minister; General Macici, Ion Bujoi, engineer, former Minister; Radu Portocala, former Minister.

In 1948, the Romanian Catholic Church of the Byzantine rite was forcibly suppressed, all its bishops and canons and several hundreds of its clergy have been thrown in jail, where a great number of them died. Among them are: Bishop Ion Suciu, Metropolitan of the Church; Vasile Aftenie, Auxiliary Bishop of Blaj; Ion Balan, Bishop of Lugoj; Valeriu Traian Frentiu, Bishop of Oradea Mare. The two remaining bishops of this Church—Iuliu Hossu, Bishop of Cluj, and Alex Rusu of Baia Mare—

are still in prison. Several Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church have also been imprisoned and at least two of them died in jail: Metropolitan Alexander Cisar of Bucharest and Augustin Pacha, Bishop of Timisoara.

Out of the countless names of those still detained in prison, a small fraction is listed as follows: Ion Mihalache, former Vice-President of the National Peasant Party; former Ministers: Aurel Leucutia, Ghita Pop, Romul Pop, Ion Lugojanu, Emil Hateganu, Aurelian Benteoiu, Bebe Bratianu. Also: Ilie Lazar, former Member of Parliament; Zaharia Boila, former Member of Parliament, journalist; N. Penescu, former Secretary General of the National Peasant Party; H. Aznavorian, former Member of Parliament; V. Pogoneanu, former diplomat; I. Burillianu, former Governor of the National Bank; General Aldea; Constantin Noica, philosopher, writer; Zenobie Paclisanu, historian, member of the Romanian Academy; E. Margineanu, Professor, Cluj University; Liviu Nasta, journalist; Paul Zarifopol, writer, essayist.

Despite the fact that already 14-22 years have passed since the establishment of the Soviet and Communist rule over the captive European nations, Communist prisons are still full of political prisoners, convicted of alleged political or economic crimes. No valid reason exists for holding these people in prison, for banishing them from their homes, or for their deportation from their homelands. By the denial of fundamental human rights, as well as by mass political persecution of innumerable thousands of innocent people behind the Iron Curtain, the Soviet and Communist governments are not only blatantly trampling underfoot the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also perpetrating genocide and sapping at the very foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the whole world.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions must be highly commended for its statement to the 17th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, submitted on September 24, 1962, concerning political prisoners, particularly for its suggestion that a convention on the rights of political prisoners, comparable with the Geneva Convention which protects prisoners of war, should be adopted. The ICFTU rightly proposed that such a convention should "(1) define the category of prisoners concerned, independently of an individual country's definition of political prisoners; (2) cover all aspects of the condition of the political prisoners: arrest, prosecution, trial, carrying out of the sentence, and the situation after release; (3) provide for some international machinery of surveillance and enforcement."

The Assembly of Captive European Nations condemns the inhuman treatment of ideological and political opponents by the Soviet and Communist governments and appeals to the United Nations and the free world to take necessary steps in order to release all victims of Soviet and Communist oppression, as well as to adopt a convention on the rights of political prisoners, as proposed by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Jozef Lettrich, Czechoslovakia.)

DENIAL OF POLITICAL RIGHTS IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Report adopted in the 103rd Plenary Meeting, on December 10, 1962

ACEN Doc. 330 (IX) Soc.

On this 10th of December, as during all the previous anniversaries of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations, the Assembly

of Captive European Nations again raises its voice on behalf of their compatriots in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The Assembly protests against their enslavement by the Communist regimes, imposed and maintained by the armed forces and agents of the Soviet Union, and calls once more the attention of the peoples of the free world to the flagrant violation or outright denial of human rights to the peoples of these countries.

The subjugation of the nine once sovereign nations of East-Central Europe by the use of force and fraud, in violation of international law and obligations under the United Nations Charter, has created a situation in which the Communist regimes are keeping these nations in bondage, are depriving their peoples of the fundamental rights and freedoms, and are subjecting them to political oppression and economic exploitation.

The captive European nations are ruled by totalitarian regimes that disregard human rights, personal and political freedoms, and the will of nations to elect governments of their own choosing.

Universal recognition and observance of human rights and freedoms are pre-requisites for the establishment of justice and peace in the world. Therefore, the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be enforceable and protected by law. To implement the principles of the Universal Declaration, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is preparing legal documents in the form of two covenants, one on the Civil and Political Rights and the other on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; after over ten years of discussion the documents are nearing their completion and there is hope that they will be ready for signature soon.

In the absence of any international machinery to enforce the application of principles of the Universal Declaration the violation of these principles in the countries of East-Central Europe goes on unchallenged. The peoples of the captive nations continue being deprived of the basic right of self-determination and, as a consequence, of almost all the other human rights. The most important of these rights are the political rights, for they provide the means of attaining all the other rights and freedoms.

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration defines the political rights as follows:

- (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
- (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

In addition to the above rights, the Declaration also sets forth certain related civil and political rights, such as the right to nationality, to freedom of opinion and expression, and to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

All the above-mentioned rights are theoretically granted and guaranteed by the Constitutions introduced by the Communists in the countries of East-Central Europe and patterned on the Constitution of the Soviet Union. Discrimination in political right originates either in law or in practice. Our primary concern is with the latter for the *de facto* discrimination in the exercise of political rights occurs by acts outside the law or even contrary to the law. *De facto* discrimination of an indirect character occurs due to restrictions of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, to

freedom of peaceful assembly and association; use of coercion and intimidation; absence in elections of any candidates other than those officially nominated by the Communist Party or Communist-sponsored and directed organizations.

The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, conscious of the delay in the preparation of the covenants which are to implement the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration, and desirous to fill in the gap created by this situation, has adopted 15 general principles on freedom and non-discrimination in matters of political rights, as well as a resolution which seeks to encourage the governments to use the principles for their guidance and continue their efforts "to eliminate all discrimination in the matter of political rights." The principles and the resolution were adopted unanimously, with the participation of the representatives of the Communist-dominated countries.

Let us examine these principles and see how they are applied in the captive European countries.

The preamble says, among others:

"Since the interests of the many are often disregarded when political power is in the hands of the few, the right of everyone to take part in the government of his country is the condition indispensable for the effective enjoyment by all of other human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights;

"the exercise of political rights is directly linked to the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association;

"these rights can only be effectively guaranteed in a world in which the principles of the Charter, especially the principle of self-determination and the principles enshrined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, shall have full application."

The wording and meaning of the preamble can be applied to the situation in the countries of East-Central Europe, where political power is in the hands of the few—the Communist Party officials. In all these countries the entire state structure forms a pyramid controlled by and directed from the top by the Presidium of the Communist Party. According to Article 4 of the Czechoslovak Constitution, the Communist Party is a "leading force in society and the state." Similar provisions are to be found in the Constitutions of other countries. During the third congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (Communist), held in March, 1959, the following statement was made: "Leading all organs of the People's Government, the Party must not for one moment take its hands off the tiller and weaken its political control . . . it must set the course for the activities in all spheres of state, social and economic life." Statements of this kind establish the fact that the political power in these countries is in the hands of a minority.

The 15 principles are as follows:

- (1) All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they determine *freely* their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations is looking forward to a speedy application of this principle to the captive European countries with the help and support of the United Nations.

- (2) Every national of a country is entitled within that country to full and equal political rights without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language,

religion, *political or other opinion*, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, etc.

Under the Communist rule, the right to political opinion other than that approved by the Communist Party and creed, is expressly denied, all opposition to the government is suppressed and even treated as subversion and, therefore, criminal.

(3) Freedom of opinion and association.

This freedom is denied in East-Central Europe.

(4) Universality of suffrage.

The principle, guaranteed in all the Constitutions, is generally observed.

(5) Equality of suffrage.

The principle is also mostly observed. However, it must be emphasized that this principle, as formulated in Article 5, refers only to the right to vote and ignores the right to be elected—in this respect the rights of nationals are severely restricted. Although the provisions of the Constitutions may say that he who has the right to vote is also eligible, certain procedural elements are calculated to prevent the free expression of the will of the population, such as procedures for presentation and nomination of candidates. By the provisions of the electoral law the right of nomination of candidates is reserved to political, social and other mass organizations approved by the government or the Party. In this way, the list of candidates are *de facto* prepared by the Communist Party and, as a result, the voter is confronted with only a single list of candidates. The outcome of the elections is a foregone conclusion and does not represent in any way "the will of the people". The political parties allowed to take part in the elections are the Communist Party and one or two Communist-controlled puppet parties, allegedly representing the peasantry or some counterfeit "democrats". In Hungary and the Baltic States there is one Party only.

(6) Secrecy of the vote.

The principle is formally observed although great pressure by the authorities and the Party is exercised to combat absenteeism, thus violating the principle of secrecy.

(7) Periodic elections.

This is observed to preserve the facade of democratic pretence.

(8) Genuine character of elections and other public consultation.

As there is no choice of candidates, no freedom for the peaceful expression of political opposition, no freedom of organization and free functioning of political parties and no freedom in presenting candidates for election, the elections as now conducted in the countries of East-Central Europe can never be considered "genuine".

(9) and (10) deal with access to elective public office and non-elective public office.

Equality and non-discrimination are impossible under totalitarian regimes.

(11) and (12) Measures are enumerated which shall not be considered discriminatory and limitations to rights and freedoms which should be determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due respect for the rights and freedoms of others and meeting requirement of public order.

(13) States that the rights and freedoms proclaimed above can best be guaranteed by fundamental laws.

Such guarantees are meaningless in Communist-ruled countries, where practice runs counter to theoretical law.

(14) and (15) Recourse to independent tribunals.

This is purely theoretical.

The adoption of the 15 principles and the resolution by the United Nations is most welcome and may inspire the hope that it would open the way for further practical steps to be undertaken by the United Nations in order to promote the restoration of human rights to the nations now subjugated by Communist regimes.

The provisions contained in the 15 principles may be of practical value during the interval of time until the covenants will become international instruments for the implementation of the principles of the Universal Declaration.

It is to be noted with satisfaction that the preparation of the covenants has made great progress.

The preamble to both covenants and most of the Articles have been adopted by the Third Committee, and the remaining four Articles for both are under discussion at the time of writing this report. There is a possibility that they might also be adopted by the present session, in which case they would be put on the agenda of the next General Assembly. That would constitute an excellent progress after twelve years of discussion on this matter.

In conclusion of this report on the denial of the fundamental political rights to the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, a draft appeal to the United Nations is enclosed.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Boleslaw Biega, Poland.)

TRADE BETWEEN THE FREE WORLD AND THE SOVIET-DOMINATED AREA

Statement adopted in the 104th Plenary Meeting, on December 10, 1962

ACEN Doc. 332 (IX) Gen.

The process of Western European economic integration has increasingly focused the world's attention to the question of trade between the free world and the Soviet-dominated area. In this connection the Assembly of Captive European Nations considers appropriate to present the following facts and observations.

(1) The paramount fact in the Soviet—Free World relations is the basic resolve of the Soviet leaders, and of the regimes of countries dominated by the Soviet Union, to introduce Communist rule everywhere. This main goal has been proclaimed again and again. It is expected to be attained either by peaceful means or through “revolutionary” overthrow of free governments, i.e., by force.

There is not one instance in the past history of communism where its leaders have been able to assume power by peaceful means, without direct resort to force or threat of force.

(2) In contrast to the free nations where the ultimate aim of all economic activity is the welfare of the people, the Soviet regime considers the primary target of all its economic activities the development of power and military potential. This power is to be used—as a leverage if possible, physically if necessary—for extending the area under Soviet control. The latest authoritative declaration to this effect can be found in the “Communique about consultations of the representatives of the Communist and Workers Parties of member-countries of the Council of Mutual Economic

Assistance (COMECON)" published in June, 1962. It says, among other things, that "the successes of socialist countries in the world development of economy . . . create the most favorable conditions for revolutionary and national-liberation movements. . ."

(3) The advantages accruing from mutual trade to the economies of the free world and of the Soviet area are considerable, especially to the latter. For example, the development of prototypes of individual machines and entire factories may cost to the Soviet Union many times more than the regular price for this equipment on Western markets. The additional resources resulting from that trade to both sides constitute integral parts of all their other resources and have to be considered in the framework of general trends of the economic development in the Soviet-dominated area and in the free countries.

The most important indicators of the use to which the accruing material and labor resources are being put in individual countries are the relative rates of growth of producer goods industry (representing basically the heavy industry and military potential) on the one hand, and the production of consumer goods on the other hand. Condensed to bare essentials, information contained in the United Nations, United States, and Soviet official publications and statements reveals the following important trends in individual countries during the last years:

- (a) In the *United States*, a strong propensity to favor the consumer goods industry is obvious. From 1956-1960 the average yearly growth rate of the consumer goods output exceeded that of manufacturing of equipment (including defense) by 39 percent, and of the production of various materials by 93 percent.
- (b) In *France, West Germany and the United Kingdom*, countries which constitute the backbone of the European NATO forces, the output increase rates have been well balanced between the producer and consumer goods with a slight balance in favor of the consumer goods. During the years 1960-1961, with an average yearly increase of 6.0 percent in consumer goods and 5.75 percent in capital goods output, the compounded average yearly growth rate of consumer goods output of these three countries exceeded the growth rate of capital goods production by 4 percent.
- (c) Official Soviet data indicate that in only three years—in 1937, 1945 and 1946—has the growth rate of consumer goods output been higher in the Soviet Union than that of producer goods. The average growth rate of producer goods output exceeded that of the consumer goods during the years 1928 (the first year of the first Five-Year Plan) through 1940 by 70 percent. This brought down the share of the consumer goods in the total of Soviet industrial production from 60.5 percent in 1928 to 38.8 percent in 1940. This period also included the tragic years of the early 1930's when, according to J. V. Stalin's statement to Sir Winston Churchill, ten million Soviet citizens perished from hunger.

In October, 1961, when Nikita Khrushchev presented the twenty-year program to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he recalled the 70 percent excess of the yearly increase rate of producer goods output over that of the consumer goods production of the years 1928-1940. As the most important alleged change in the future policy of development of Soviet economy, the Plan stipulated an excess of only 20 percent in the rate of increase of the output of producer goods over that of consumer goods. This was approved by the Party Congress.

In proposing the new 20 percent excess rate, Mr. Khrushchev did not compare this rate with the average excess rate of the years immediately preceding

the adoption of the long-range Party program. During the 1951-1960 ten-year period, the excess of growth rate of producer goods over that of consumer goods output had already dropped to a yearly average of 23 percent. This rate had provided for a very slow improvement in the living standard, an improvement designed as a necessary incentive for further advances in production. It nevertheless enabled the Soviet Union to develop various kinds of new armaments, above all the rocket arms, which culminated in the orbiting of the first sputnik in the fall of 1957. By avoiding comparison between the planned 20 percent rate and the more recent rate of 23 percent, and comparing it instead with the pre-war excess rate of 70 percent, the Soviet Premier quite obviously intended to imply that from now on far more attention will be given to the satisfaction of the needs of Soviet consumers.

In fact, as has so often happened before with official declarations about the raising of the Soviet standard of living, the actual development of Soviet industry went in the opposite direction.

In his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on November 19, 1962, Mr. Khrushchev revealed some figures about the Soviet industrial production. These figures indicate that during the first four years, 1959-1962, of the current Seven-Year Plan, the average growth rate of producer goods output will exceed the growth rate of the consumer goods production by 43 percent. Still more pronounced is the new factual trend for a very strong preference of producer goods during the years 1961 and 1962 which also constitute the first two years of the twenty-year program. During these two years, according to calculations based on Khrushchev's figures, the average yearly growth rate of producer goods output will exceed that of the consumer goods output by 58 percent instead of only 20 percent—as promised by the Party program or 23 percent indicated by Soviet statistics for the preceding ten years.

Still another fact about the Soviet economy requires attention. According to the figures given by Mr. Khrushchev in presenting the twenty-year program, in October, 1961, the share of consumer goods in the total of Soviet industrial output was scheduled to drop to 25.8-26.0 percent in the year 1980 only. In fact, this particular target of the program will already be reached during the first two years of the implementation of that program and only one year after its proclamation. According to preliminary calculations the share of consumer goods will drop indeed to 26 percent of the total Soviet industrial output in 1962, as a result of the excessive promotion of producer goods output in 1961 and 1962.

If the relationship between the increase rates of producer and consumer goods output of the first two years of the twenty-year program will be maintained until the end of that period, the share of consumer goods in the total of Soviet industrial production in 1980 will be less than 16 percent.

(4) Information is also available about the relative increase rates of the producer and consumer goods industry in three captive European countries.

In *Hungary*, during the years 1959-1961, the average yearly growth rate of producer goods output exceeded the growth rate of consumer goods production by 41 percent.

In *Poland*, the average yearly growth rate of the producer goods output during these years was higher than that of consumer goods output by 81 percent.

For *Romania*, the respective figure was 77 percent for the years 1959 and 1961, also in favor of the producer goods output.

(5) It is evident from the situation described above, especially from the very small share of consumer goods output in the total of Soviet industry, that in the case of a future armed conflict, initiated by the Soviet Union, only minor adjustments have to be made in the sector of the consumer goods industry in order to set the economy of the entire Soviet area on a full war-time basis.

(6) It is up to the free world to decide whether it is in its basic interests to support trade which, although adding a small fraction to the living standard of the free world, renders at the same time considerable assistance in the building up of the war-type economy of a Soviet empire whose repeatedly proclaimed aim is to destroy the free institutions of its trading partners.

(7) In considering this problem, some further pertinent facts should be considered:

- (a) It is erroneous to assume that the captive peoples in the Soviet area would wish their countries to have trade with the free world if they knew the real purposes toward which the profits from that trade are directed through intricate economic channels. The peoples under Soviet domination do not strive to overthrow the governments of the free countries. Their primary aim is their own freedom for which there is hope if freedom survives elsewhere. Their secondary aim is to secure such changes in the present economic policy of their countries which would end their unwilling contribution to the increase of the military potential of the Soviet Union and leave them a fair share of the overall production.
- (b) Trade between the free world and the Soviet area does not work by its very nature for a rapprochement between ordinary people on both sides. It works for an intercourse between businessmen from the free world and high officials of the Party and Government in the Soviet area. And while the people in the Soviet area are most probably lenient toward the lower and middle echelons of the Party and Government, they would vote out of office—in any free elections—the higher officials.
- (c) In any long-range build-up of military potential by an aggressive regime, there are no such things as “non-strategic” equipment and materials which the future victim of aggression may sell to the aggressor at present without contributing to the success of such aggression tomorrow. Every transaction in which a future aggressor imports goods and pays for these imports with his own goods costing him less than would cost the imported goods were he to manufacture them himself, is a contribution to the future war efforts of the aggressor.
- (d) Any special agreements designed to lower tariffs between the free trade countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the state monopolies of the Soviet area would be, by the very nature of the latter, one-sided obligations on the part of the EEC. Neither tariff agreements nor other actions EEC may undertake, including even the abandonment of its integration plans, would induce the Communist regimes to give up or scale down their efforts of economic integration which are aimed primarily at increasing productivity. The fact is that a yearly increase of only about 1.5 percent in productivity in the captive countries (resulting from integration) would not only pay for any possible differentials in customs tariffs, but would equal the total value of the present exports of the captive countries to the countries of the European Economic Community.
- (e) The economy of the captive European countries is burdened with credits, aid and under-priced exports to the under-developed countries, all of which are

designed to promote the political penetration of these countries by the Soviet Union and not to serve the economic interests of the captive or under-developed countries directly involved.

(8) The captive nations of East-Central Europe have no voice in the conduct of their countries' economy in general or in matters of foreign trade in particular. They would certainly appreciate any assistance the free world could render toward an increase of the "controlled consumption" doled out to them at present. This cannot be accomplished by trading with the Soviet-controlled area or by granting aid or credits to countries integrated in the Soviet economic empire. It can only stem from a politically-motivated trade and aid policy on the part of the West. In generating internal pressures in the Soviet Union and in the captive countries, such policy would compel the Communist rulers to allocate a larger share of the production to consumer goods at the expense of the military build-up.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Aleksander Kutt, Estonia.)

SUPPLEMENTARY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT TRADE BETWEEN THE FREE WORLD AND THE SOVIET-DOMINATED AREA

(Ref: ACEN Doc. 332 (IX) Gen., December 12, 1962)

ACEN Doc. 334 (IX) Econ.

(1) According to some Soviet assurances, the purpose of East-West trade is the promotion of world peace. Other Soviet declarations, and facts about Soviet economic trends, indicate that in this case peace must mean *Pax Sovietica* imposed on the world after the overthrow of free governments through Soviet power which the East-West trade helps to accumulate.

On the side of the free world, the admitted primary purpose of trade with the Soviet area is legitimate profit. More often than not the protection of interests of the captive peoples has been forwarded as a supporting motive. A closer look reveals, however, that the profits of the free world from trade with the Soviet area are wrought with danger, and the supposed protection of the interests of the captive nations through trade is illusory, if not worse.

(2) Once any free country comes to depend on certain exports to a Communist country, the latter acquires a political power which it will not be reluctant to use when doing so would bring political benefits. By placing large orders and then terminating purchases, unemployment troubles with possible political consequences can be created. Examples:

- (a) By refusing to negotiate a new trade agreement with Finland the Soviet Union caused the resignation on December 4, 1958, of the majority government of K. A. Fagerholm and its replacement by a minority government acceptable to the Soviet Union.
- (b) During the serious economic crisis of the early 1930's, the Soviet Union, although its economy could not and was not affected by this crisis, reduced precipitously purchases from countries where it hoped that such reductions may cause political disturbances. Thus, the Soviet imports from Estonia were reduced from the average of 3.8 million kroons in the two preceding years to only 188 thousand kroons in 1933 or over twenty times. Estonia, trying to show her good will, imported from the Soviet Union in that year goods to the value of 2.1 million kroons.

(3) Western exporters compete with each other in selling goods to the Soviet orbit state monopolies. The result is a stronger bargaining position of these government agencies. In some instances this applies also to Western importers *vis-a-vis* Communist exporting monopolies especially with regard to trade with the Soviet Union. A case in point is the price of Soviet oil.

It is true that, for example, in 1959 and 1960 (and probably also in 1961 and 1962) the Soviet f.o.b. prices of crude oil charged to Western Europe were 2 and 15 percent respectively lower than the f.o.b. prices of Iraqi crude oil. But not always have the Soviet prices been lower. As can be seen from the table below, the Soviet Union managed to get prices for crude oil exports to Western Europe which were, in 1956, 1957 and 1958, respectively 10, 24 and 2 percent higher than the prices for Iraqi crude oil.

YEARLY AVERAGE F.O.B. PRICES OF IRAQI CRUDE OIL,
AND OF USSR CRUDE OIL SALES TO WESTERN EUROPE AND
THE CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (CEC), IN DOLLARS
PER METRIC TON, AND INDICES⁽¹⁾

Year	Iraqi crude oil ⁽²⁾		USSR sales to W. Europe		USSR sales to CEC		
	Price	Ind.	Price	Ind.	Price	Ind.	(Ind. price to Western Europe = 100)
1956	14.80	100	16.21	110	21.78	147	(134)
1957	15.64	100	19.34	124	22.66	145	(117)
1958	15.38	100	15.62	102	21.59	140	(138)
1959	14.19	100	13.88	98	22.06	155	(159)
1960	13.79	100	11.70	85	21.99	159	(188)
1961	...		10.19	...	21.78	...	(214)

(4) The stronger the power of the Soviet Union the less there is hope for the captive nations for freedom which is their primary interest. Profits from Western trade both with the Soviet Union and the satellite governments contribute to the Soviet overall strength. Therefore, that trade is against the foremost interests of the captive peoples.

(5) The captive European nations have not to choose between freedom and a a better living as a poor substitute. Freedom would mean for them also a much higher living standard. For the real incomes in the Soviet area will increase an estimated one-and-a-half to three times, depending on the country, if a reasonable balance would be established between the present huge investments and military expenditures, on the one hand, and the consumer's share in overall output, on the other. This fact becomes apparent if the respective analyses take into account the different purchasing powers of monies used for investments, military purposes and for consumer goods.

(1) Compiled from: "Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960", United Nations, pp. 294 and 296; "Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR," Vneshtorgizdal, Moscow, yearbooks for 1956-1961.

(2) The f.o.b. prices of Iranian crude oil in the years 1956-1958 were as follows: 1956—\$14.80; 1957—\$14.96; 1958—\$14.83 making an average of \$14.87. During these years the average price of the Iraqi crude oil was \$15.27 per metric ton.

(6) Any hopes that the feeding of additional resources to the Soviet area through foreign trade may result in using at least a fraction of these resources for improving the living standard of the people are highly questionable. As a general rule, the real incomes in the Soviet area are raised from year to year by a certain average small amount in order not to impair the people's willingness to work. Available information indicates that any additional resources are not supposed to supplement the planned average increases of real incomes of the population. Thus, for example, in Poland the taxes on farm land were increased following a good harvest in 1961 in order to drain off the increased purchasing power of farmers; in the Soviet Union the Party leadership even reduced the living standard by raising the prices of a number of food items in June, 1962, in order to support the increase rates on investments and military expenditures, etc.

(7) In connection with the Soviet foreign trade price discrimination against the captive countries, opinions have been put forward that if the Western trade with the captive countries will be expanded, the volume of their trade with the Soviet Union will be so much less. The narrower channel, it is hoped, would jeopardize the Soviet price discrimination and, therefore, an expanded trade with the West would be in the interests of the captive peoples.

Apart from the fact that the amounts supposedly saved through squeezing the volume of the Soviet-captive countries trade would only be used for the growth of Soviet power in the captive countries instead of on the territory of the Soviet Union proper, these hopes do not take into account another practical situation.

As can be seen from the table in paragraph 3, the Soviet Union charged to the captive countries, in 1961, for crude oil a 114 percent higher price than to Western Europe. At the same time, according to Soviet data, the overcharge on all other comparable commodities, except crude oil, coal and coke, was 30.5 percent. There appears to be nothing which could prevent the Soviet Union from charging, in case of a smaller trade volume, also for these other commodities an over one hundred percent high price, or at least a price about sixty percent higher than the world price (see in table the Soviet overcharge on crude oil in 1960 in relation to the Iraqi crude oil price). The amount of Soviet price discrimination caused through a shrunken trade volume can be thus restored by doubling or trebling the percentage of price discrimination.

(8) Another opinion holds that if the Soviet grip on the economies of the captive countries would be relaxed through increased integration of these countries' economies with those of the free world, the captive countries would also be rendered more politically independent of the Soviet Union. Therefore, more trade between the free world and the captive countries is indicated.

These speculations not only confuse the captive countries with the satellite regimes politically dependent on the Soviet government, but they also proceed from the wrong presumption that the Soviet Union may use sanctions against a captive country's economy in order to preserve the subordination of its satellite regime. The Soviet Union will not harm the economy of a captive country which it considers a part of its own strength in the "socialist camp." Instead, in case of differences of opinion in serious matters, and if persuasion does not work, the satellite government will be changed through political means. In this regard the special case of mainland China and Albania does not disprove other past experiences in Soviet practices.

There is also no proof that the satellite regimes would prefer more dependence from the free world than from the Soviet Union. There is, on the contrary, enough

proof that they are fully aware that their power is a function of Soviet power. To expect that in the question of foreign trade they will act contrary to this attitude would be tantamount to the assumption that these regimes are not able to understand the consequences of their respective action.

(9) If any free country should decide to discontinue trade with the Soviet area in view of the accumulating danger inherent in this trade for the free world, and because this trade works against the freedom aspirations of the captive peoples, it is of great importance that the reasons for such action be fully explained to the captive peoples as well as to the Party leaders in the Soviet area. This information should reach the largest possible number of all interested persons.

At the same time, the respective explanatory statements should include the assurance that trade relations will be resumed with any government, including that of the Soviet Union, if and when these governments present satisfactory proof that such changes have been introduced in the development of their country's economy which grant to the people a fair share of what they produce.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Aleksander Kutt, Estonia.)

PRICES AND THE BALANCE SHEET IN SOVIET-CAPTIVE COUNTRIES TRADE IN 1961

Report presented to ACEN General Committee, on April 8, 1963

ACEN Doc. 343 (IX) Econ.

This report is the third in an annual series presenting a short analysis, with tables, of the trade of Soviet-captive countries. As before, the report has been prepared in connection with the publishing of a successive Soviet foreign trade yearbook.

The 1961 Yearbook of Soviet Foreign Trade

The latest yearbook of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade published last September discloses that, similar to previous years, in 1961 the Soviet Union had over-priced its exports to the captive European countries, and underpaid for its imports from these countries as compared with prices in Soviet trade with Western Europe.

The yearbook presents data on Soviet trade with 70 countries. Among them are 17 countries of Western Europe and seven countries of East-Central Europe dominated by the Soviet Union, viz., Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. It does not contain information about shipments of goods between the Soviet Union and the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—countries which the Soviet Union considers a formal part of its own territory.

As for the preceding years since 1955, the data includes values as well as weights or volumes of individual commodities exported to or imported from individual countries by the Soviet Union. This information allows a comparison to be made between the prices in Soviet trade with the captive countries and the prices in its trade with Western Europe, an area closest to the captive countries.

Nominally, the 1961 Soviet exports to the captive countries reached \$3,420 million and imports from these countries \$3,066 million showing a balance of \$354 million of

Soviet exports over imports (ruble values converted into dollars at the rate of \$1 equal to 0.9 rubles, a rate generally accepted for Soviet foreign trade transactions). At the same time information about prices contained in the yearbook reveals that the captive countries must have suffered a loss of \$929 million on Soviet exports to these countries through Soviet price discrimination. For the same reason their loss on goods shipped to the Soviet Union amounted to \$394 million.

Thus, using its dominant position the Soviet Union inflicted a total loss of \$1,323 million on the captive countries in 1961 alone. This reverses the nominally active Soviet trade balance with the captive countries. It appears that, at prices prevailing in Soviet trade with Western Europe, the Soviet Union imported more goods from captive countries than it exported, to the value of \$969 million.

During the period 1955-1960 similar losses of the captive countries amounted to \$5,028 million. Together with the Soviet gain in 1961 the losses of the captive countries through Soviet price discrimination have, thus, reached about \$6,350 million by the end of 1961.

It seems only fair to call attention here to the fact that, during 1962, some Western observers have maintained that the losses of the captive countries in their trade with the Soviet Union may be largely only "paper" losses. These analysts allege that there is a strong tendency in the West to pay prices for Soviet goods which are considerably below the world market prices and, conversely, to charge prices for goods sold to the Soviet Union which are far above world prices. Therefore, the claimed disparities between prices in Soviet trade with the captive countries and that with Western Europe may in reality indicate not so much the losses to the captive countries from their trade with the Soviet Union than losses to the Soviets from their trade with Western Europe.

However, as can be seen from another part of this report these views are not supported by facts. In cases where the quality and other characteristics of goods are closely comparable, Soviet goods command on Western markets prices which are, on an average, equal to the prices of Western goods. On other occasions when the prices paid by Western Europe for Soviet goods may have been below the price level prevailing in Western Europe, the reason obviously must have been either the inferior quality or different properties of the Soviet goods. An exception here is the crude oil price during the last few years which will also be discussed later.

Price Discrimination in Soviet Exports

Out of 62 physically comparable sample commodities which the Soviet Union exported in 1961 both to Western Europe and to the captive countries, 51 were sold to the captive countries at higher prices than to Western Europe. For the rest the captive countries paid a lower price. Together, these 62 commodities represented 58.7 percent of the total value of Soviet exports to the captive countries.

As can be seen from Table 3 below, the net overcharge to the captive countries in 1961, as compared with prices obtained by the Soviet Union from Western Europe, was 37.3 percent. The fact that there were more commodities on which the captive countries were overcharged than commodities on which they were undercharged, was not the only reason for this high percentage. There were two more reasons. On the 51 commodities for which the Soviet Union had the captive countries pay more, the average overcharge was 39.0 percent, whereas the undercharge on the 11 commodities sold at lower prices to the captive countries was only 21.5 percent. In addition, and more important, the average value of commodities sold to the captive countries at lower prices was only 2.9 million rubles while the

average value of the items overpriced to the captive countries was 34.8 million rubles, i.e., 12 times more.

The Soviet overcharges to the captive countries reached from a low of 3 percent (iron ore and calcinated soda) to a high of 114 percent (crude oil) and 188 percent (cotton fabrics).

Of all individual items, rolled ferrous metals with a 67 percent overpricing to the captive countries produced the largest single amount (133 million rubles) in overcharges, followed by crude oil (73 million rubles) and cotton fiber (46 million rubles).

On a number of commodities sold to the captive countries, the Soviet overpricing increased in 1961, on others it decreased. For example, the overcharge on crude oil in 1960 was 88 percent and it rose to 114 percent in 1961. On gasoline the overcharge increased from 36 percent in 1960 to 60 percent in 1961; on lead from 35 to 55 percent; on sulphur from 84 to 104 percent. An undercharge of 7 percent on iron ore in 1960 turned into an overcharge of 3 percent in 1961.

The following more important changes may be mentioned in connection with the decrease in overcharges: the overpricing on coal dropped from 77 percent in 1960 to 64 percent in 1961; on coke from 66 to 62 percent; on pig iron from 39 to 36 percent; on cotton fiber from 30 percent to 28 percent.

On balance the Soviet price discrimination on comparable sample commodities covering 58.7 percent of Soviet exports to the captive countries amounted to 490.3 export rubles, or \$544.8 million.

There is no reason to assume that the discrimination against the captive countries was less on goods which cannot be compared (viz. machinery and equipment insufficiently described in the Soviet yearbook) than on goods which are comparable. Extending the loss on comparable goods to all Soviet exports to the captive countries, it appears that the Soviet overcharge must have reached in 1961 about \$929 million (as against \$753 million in 1960).

Price Discrimination in Soviet Imports

Machinery and equipment from the captive countries cannot be compared with types supplied by Western Europe because of insufficient specifications. However, they constituted 41 percent (\$1,245 million) of all Soviet imports from the captive countries (as against 13 percent of Soviet exports to the captive countries) and 46 percent (\$443 million) of all Soviet imports from Western Europe. In addition, many of the other goods imported by the Soviet Union from Western Europe were not imported from the captive countries and vice versa. Because of this situation the number of sample commodities available for comparison in Soviet imports is reduced to 22. They cover only 11.2 percent of all Soviet imports from the captive countries.

In contrast to Soviet exports to Eastern Europe where over 80 percent of all sample commodities indicated a loss to the captive countries, in imports the Soviet Union paid higher prices to the captive countries than to Western Europe for 14 out of 22 commodities.

Yet again, as was the case in Soviet exports, the average value of import commodities which brought a comparative price loss to the captive countries was considerably higher than the value of those commodities which brought a gain.

The average value of eight sample commodities for which the Soviet Union underpaid the captive countries was 28.8 million rubles, five times higher than the average

value, 5.7 million rubles, of overpaid commodities. The rate of underpayment was 23.6 percent and the rate of overpayment 18.1 percent in relation to prices paid to the captive countries.

On balance the captive countries suffered in 1961 only a loss of 39.9 million rubles on import sample commodities, or 11.4 percent in relation to prices paid to Western Europe compared with 22.6 percent in the preceding year.

A major factor in the appreciable decrease of the underpayment rate is the termination, in 1961, of Soviet imports of sawn hardwood from Western Europe. In 1960, the underpayment to the captive countries on this commodity was over 11.7 million rubles, an amount which does not figure in the 1961 calculations because the prices were technically not comparable. Real improvements for the captive countries were, however, the diminishing of underpayment on raw tobacco from 59 percent to 27 percent and on wool fabrics from 82 to 63 percent.

Extrapolating the loss of the captive countries on sample commodities to all Soviet imports from these countries, and converting rubles into dollars, it appears that the total loss of the captive countries on Soviet imports in 1961 must have amounted to approximately \$394 million.

Can Prices in Soviet Trade with the West serve for Measuring the Captive Countries' Losses?

Early in August of 1962, after the Western press had given considerable publicity to Soviet discriminatory trade practices against the captive countries, Mr. W. Gomulka of Poland took up the subject in a speech in Gdansk. He stated, reportedly in order to dispel the respective suspicions, that the prices the Soviet Union pays or charges to Poland—and by implication also to other captive countries—represent the “stable world market prices” over a several years period.

This statement appears to conform partly with the views of some Western observers. These observers look for the explanation of differentials in the prices less in the fact that the Soviet Union charges prices to the captive countries over and above the world prices than in alleged price discounts which the Soviet Union professedly is *compelled* to grant to Western Europe. However, no proof in actual facts or figures has been presented to support these opinions.

A comparison of 1959 and 1960 prices in Western Europe of ten important commodities with prices on Soviet goods in trade with Western Europe (in one case with the free world), and with the captive countries, is presented in Table 10. Eight of these commodities constituted over 20 percent of all Soviet exports to Western Europe.

The price patterns emerging from data in the United Nations and Soviet official publications contradict the allegations both of Mr. Gomulka and the respective Western observers. They prove that Soviet goods exported to Western Europe, which are qualitatively close to Western goods, command prices about equal to prices prevailing in Western European trade. Therefore, any price gaps to the detriment of the captive countries cannot be reflections of Soviet price discounts to Western Europe. They reflect Soviet overcharges to the captive countries over and above the free market prices.

The particulars are partly as follows:

During the two years 1959-1960, the French wheat exports amounted to 2.2 million tons, an amount about equal to Soviet wheat exports to Western Europe. The average

f.o.b. price obtained by France was \$62.6 a ton. The Soviet Union received from Western Europe \$63.2 per ton f.o.b. in spite of the obviously longer transport. The captive countries had to pay \$74.3.

Refined sugar exports from England during that period amounted to over one million tons at an average price of \$104.5 per ton f.o.b. The Soviet exports to the free world were over 400,000 tons, the price \$103.8 f.o.b. The Soviet price to Albania and some Communist-dominated Asian countries averaged \$133.0 f.o.b.

England exported nearly three million tons of *coke* at \$15.4 per ton f.o.b. The Soviet coke exports to Western Europe amounted to 800,000 tons at an average price of \$16.3 f.o.b., or 6 percent more. The Soviet price for the captive countries was \$26.2 per ton f.o.b. or 70 percent more than the f.o.b. price of English coke.

Some Soviet f.o.b. export prices are compared with Western Europe's c.i.f. import prices.

Aside from Soviet dumping prices on oil, the most disadvantageous for the Soviet Union was the price for *aluminum*. During the period under consideration, France, Western Germany and England imported 948,000 tons of aluminum (of that 26,000 tons from the Soviet Union) at \$508 per ton c.i.f. The Soviet aluminum exports to Western Europe amounted to 49,000 tons at \$463 per ton f.o.b. which was 9 percent less than the c.i.f. price of the three Western countries. However, the addition of freight and insurance costs to the Soviet f.o.b. price would bring it fairly close to the Western European c.i.f. price.

Zinc imports of France, West Germany and England amounted to 678,000 tons (of that 38,000 tons from the Soviet Union) at \$246 per ton c.i.f. Soviet zinc was sold to Western Europe at \$240 per ton f.o.b. The \$6 per ton differential between these prices could have hardly covered the freight and insurance costs of Soviet zinc.

Lead imports of France, West Germany and England reached 657,000 tons (6,000 tons of Soviet lead) at \$208 per ton c.i.f. The Soviet f.o.b. price for Western Europe was \$196. Again, the \$12 differential may not have covered the freight and insurance costs. The captive countries were charged \$267 f.o.b. or 36 percent more.

Copper has been reported to be the strategic commodity in embargo lists for which the Soviet Union allegedly has been compelled to pay, during the past years, prices far above the free market prices. These reports may have made amusing reading in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade.

During the years 1959-1960, France, West Germany and England imported over two million tons of copper at \$654 per ton c.i.f. At the same time, they sold over 79,000 tons to the Soviet Union at \$667 per ton f.o.b. The price differential of only \$13 per ton, or 2 percent, between the c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices in Western European ports suggest that, notwithstanding the embargo lists, there must have been rather a great eagerness to sell copper to the Soviet Union and not reluctance (according to the United Nations information, alone the expense in England of placing metal in warehouses is approximately \$4.2 per long ton).

Crude oil and oil products appear to be the only commodities in which the Soviet Union has encountered sales resistance in Western Europe. During the last years it has been compelled to offer crude oil to the West at prices below the free market prices. But this has not always been the case even with oil.

Measured against the f.o.b. prices of Iraqi crude oil as examples of free market prices, the Soviet f.o.b. prices for Western Europe were in 1956, 1957 and 1958 respectively 10, 24 and 2 percent *higher*. Simultaneously, the Soviet crude oil exports to Western Europe increased from 865,000 tons in 1956 to over 2.1 million tons in 1958.

The turning point came in 1959 when the Soviet Union more than doubled its crude oil exports to Western Europe as compared with the year before, to over 4.8 million tons. In connection with this the Soviet price had to be *reduced* 2 percent below the Iraqi price. A further drop of the Soviet price, to 15 percent below the Iraqi price, followed in 1960 when another 53 percent was added to Soviet crude oil exports to Western Europe. In the course of the struggle for the market the price of Iraqi crude oil was also forced down, but only from \$14.80 per ton in 1956 to \$13.79 in 1960, or 7 percent. However, by 1961 the Soviet crude oil exports to Western Europe had increased more than ten times as compared with 1956.

Thus, considering the importance of oil in more than one sense, a very strong expansion in a short span of time was attained by the Soviets at a relatively modest sacrifice in prices. There can be hardly any doubt that, given normal growth conditions, the Soviet oil prices will again rise to the world price level.

The oil price "war" was not reflected in Soviet oil prices charged to the captive countries. On the contrary: the overcharge to these countries on Soviet crude oil, which in relation to the Iraqi price was 47 percent in 1956, increased to 59 percent by 1960. The overcharge to the captive countries in relation to the Soviet price for Western Europe increased from 34 percent in 1956 to 114 percent by 1961.

The comparisons in Table 10 of Soviet export prices on commodities with possibly highest homogeneity (except in the case of obviously superior quality of Swedish iron ore) with respective prices in Western Europe, proves that there is no special resistance to Soviet sales offers. Still less can there be any extraordinary price demands by Western European countries for their exports to the Soviet Union. The price on copper is a case in point.

There is also no reason to assume that the quality of Soviet goods sold to the captive countries has been higher, or other conditions to them more favorable, than with regard to similar Soviet goods exported to Western Europe, and that these disparities may have justified the charging of higher prices to the captive countries. Most probably the opposite has been the case. In trying to obtain the best possible prices in direly needed free currencies the Soviet Union must have been inclined to ship to Western Europe goods of higher quality than to the captive countries.

It follows that prices in Soviet trade with Western Europe can serve as a yardstick for establishing with reasonable accuracy the extent of Soviet price discrimination against the captive countries. According to available information, this appears not to be the case with prices in the captive countries' trade with Western Europe.

The Balance Sheet

During the seven years 1955-1961, Soviet exports to the captive countries amounted officially to \$17,920 million. Soviet imports added up, at the same time, to \$16,003 million indicating a nominal balance of \$1,917 million of Soviet exports to, over imports from, these countries. In fact, the situation was reversed:

On the export side the Soviet Union had overcharged the captive countries by \$3,287 million as compared with the value at prices in Soviet trade with Western Europe. This means that the actual value of Soviet exports to the captive countries was only \$14,633 million.

On imports the Soviet Union had underpaid the captive countries by \$3,064 million. The actual value of Soviet imports was, therefore \$19,067 million.

Thus, at prices existing in Soviet trade with Western Europe, the Soviet Union had received in seven years from the captive countries a goods surplus of \$4,434 million

over that it had shipped to these countries. However, instead of being credited with this amount by the Soviet Union, the captive countries were debited with \$1,917 million in favor of the Soviet Union.

As a rule the trade debts of one Soviet orbit country to another are supposed to be paid in goods. However, in trade with the free world the captive countries' exports exceeded their imports in 1955-1960 by \$1,194 million. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has had a chronically passive trade balance with the free world. It is, therefore, most probable that at least a part of the free currencies earned by the captive countries in their trade with the free world was used for payments to the Soviet Union.

Apart from this, some captive countries have developed during the last years increasing active trade balances with the Soviet Union even disregarding the price discrimination.

Romania, which had run up a nominal passive trade balance of \$113 million during the years 1955-1958, had an active balance of \$86 million during the three years 1959-1961. Czechoslovakia had a net passive balance of \$68 million during the period 1955-1959, and almost covered it with a total of \$67 million active balance during the years 1960-1961. With Albania the Soviet Union had in 1961 a passive trade balance (\$1.5 million) for the first time since the Soviet trade returns have been published.

Of the \$354 million nominal active trade balance of the Soviet Union with the captive countries in 1961, Soviet trade with East Germany was responsible for \$333 million. With the other six captive countries the Soviet export surplus was officially only \$21 million. This export surplus turns, however, into a Soviet import surplus if the \$1,041 losses of these six captive countries on price discrimination are taken into account.

According to the *Economicheskaja Gazeta* of December 29, 1962, payments between the Soviet orbit countries will be facilitated in the future through the introduction of a multilateral accounting system. Also, the establishment of a Bank of Socialist Countries has been considered advisable.

Disparities in Soviet Price Discrimination

The Soviet price discrimination against the captive countries is not spread uniformly among the captive countries. It varies in degree from country to country.

With regard to Soviet exports, of the six captive countries for which the data for individual comparison are adequate, the least abused country in 1961 was Albania. It had to pay, on the average, 27.1 percent more than was charged by the Soviet Union to Western Europe for similar goods (Table 7). On the other end of the line was Bulgaria with an overcharge of 44.2 percent. Overcharges for Hungary and Poland were respectively 34.7 and 31.2 percent.

In Soviet imports the discrimination was also uneven, only the order of the countries was different. Hungary which suffered least was paid only 11.6 percent less than the Soviet price for similar goods from Western Europe. Romania followed with 13.5 and Czechoslovakia with 16.0 percent. Bulgaria suffered most with 20.9 percent, followed by Poland with 19.6 and Albania with 19.1 percent.

Also, within single commodities the Soviet price discrimination varied considerably. Czechoslovakia and East Germany were both overcharged for coke 65 percent, Bulgaria only 29 percent. In Soviet cotton fiber sales the overcharge was reversed: Bulgaria had to pay 53 percent more than Western Europe, Czechoslovakia and East Germany respectively only 27 percent and 30 percent more. For asbestos the

overcharge to Hungary was 39 percent, to East Germany 55 and to Bulgaria 89 percent. For pig iron Bulgaria paid only 22 percent more, East Germany 35 percent and Hungary 46 percent. Overcharge on wheat for Poland was 11 percent, for Bulgaria 27 percent.

The Baltic States

Since the Soviet Union considers the three Baltic States formally annexed, a heavy indirect taxation combined with a large net transfer of goods to the Soviet Union takes care of most of the Soviet economic interests in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Data about the relative output of some goods in the Baltic States indicate the approximate extent to which goods are taken to the Soviet Union.

The combined population of the Baltic States constitutes only 3 percent of the population of the Soviet Union. However, they produced in 1961 among other consumer goods 16 percent of all Soviet radio sets, 17 percent of all washing machines, 13 percent of all bicycles, 8 percent of butter and 9 percent of fish.

Since the purchasing power of the population of the Baltic States is scaled to the all-union level, there can be but little doubt that very large quantities of these consumer goods were shipped to the Soviet Union.

Of producer goods Estonia's output alone was over 11 percent of all Soviet electric motors up to 100 kw, 8 percent (in 1960) of all electric motors over 100 kw and over 10 percent of all road graders. Latvia produced, among other things, nearly 26 percent of all railroad passenger cars and Lithuania nearly 6 percent of all Soviet lathes. Table 11 compares the per capita outputs of some production branches in the Baltic States with those of the Soviet Union.

With grain production in the Baltic States down to about one-half of the pre-war level, Soviet grain is the principal import commodity to the Baltic States. The Soviet Union supplies the Baltic States also with some raw materials and machinery. The aggregate value of these goods is only a fraction of the value of goods shipped to the Soviet Union.

TABLES TO THE SOVIET-CAPTIVE COUNTRIES TRADE IN 1961⁽¹⁾

Table 1

PRICE DISCRIMINATION ON SOVIET EXPORTS
TO SEVEN CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (C.E.C.) IN 1961
IN RELATION TO PRICES CHARGED TO WESTERN EUROPE

Commodity		Quantity	Weighted aver. price		% of C.E.C. Overcharge	
			in rbl. for	price	price to W.	or
			C.E.C.	W. Europe	Eur. price	undercharge
					(—) to C.E.C.	1000 rbl.
Crude oil	1000 t.	7029.3	19.6	9.2	213.6	73.267
Gasoline	1000 t.	1489.1	34.2	20.7	161.1	20,096
Kerosene	1000 t.	305.7	30.8	24.6	125.4	1,907
Diesel oil	1000 t.	1224.6	27.3	19.3	141.0	9,714
Mazut	1000 t.	538.7	12.9	8.9	145.4	2,165
Paraffin	1000 t.	11.5	136.8	126.9	107.8	114
Coal	1000 t.	8923.0	13.8	8.4	164.2	47,984
Anthracite	1000 t.	276.0	22.1	14.9	147.9	1,974
Coke	1000 t.	2359.0	23.2	14.4	161.7	20,890
Iron ore	1000 t.	15950.0	10.4	10.1	102.9	4,673
Manganese ore	1000 t.	461.0	39.7	28.6	138.6	5,094
Chrome ore	1000 t.	124.0	41.9	24.4	171.6	2,168
Asbestos	1000 t.	56.2	182.4	115.3	158.2	3,772
Sulfur	1000 t.	51.4	39.1	19.2	203.8	1,025
Pig iron	1000 t.	795.0	60.5	44.5	135.7	12,653
Ferro-alloys	1000 t.	75.4	306.5	167.8	182.7	10,459

- (1) The following sources have been used for the compilation of tables: (a) "Vneshniaia Torgovlia za 1957 god" (including years 1956 and 1957), Vneshtorgizdat, Moscow, 1958; (b) "Vneshniaia Torgovlia za 1959 god" (including years 1958 and 1959), Vneshtorgizdat, Moscow, 1960; (c) "Vneshniaia Torgovlia za 1961 god" (including years 1960 and 1961), Vneshtorgizdat, Moscow, 1962; (d) "SSSR v Zifrah v 1961 godu," Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1962; (e) "Sovietskaia Latvia," January 27, 1962; "Tiesa," January 30, 1962, Vilnius; (g) "Rahva Haal," Tallinn, February 2, 1962; (h) "United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics," June 1960, 1961 and 1962; (i) "The Review of Economics and Statistics," Vol. XLII, No. 2, May, 1960, "The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade," Dr. Horst Mendershausen, Harvard University Press; (k) "United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1960;" (l) "ACEN Doc. 235 (VII), Econ., New York, 1960; (m) "ACEN Doc. 258" (VII), Econ., New York 1961; (n) "ACEN Doc. 298" (VIII), Econ., New York 1962. All weights in metric tons. Ruble values and prices in new rubles. Prices respectively for 1 ton, 1 m³, 1000 m², 1000 meters, 1000 pieces, 1000 pairs or 1000 conditional cans. The capacity of one conditional can, except for a number of canned vegetables and fruits, is 353.4 cm³ (see Narodnoie Khoziastvo SSR v 1960 godu, Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1961, p. 881). New rubles converted into USA dollars at the rate of 0.9 rubles to 1 dollar, pre-1961 rubles at the rate of 4 rubles to 1 dollar. Prices and values f.o.b. exporting countries if not indicated otherwise.

Commodity		Quantity	Weighted aver. price in rbl. for C.E.C. W. Europe		% of C.E.C. price to W. Eur. price	Overcharge or undercharge (—) to C.E.C. 1000 rbl.	
Scrap iron	1000 t.	105.9	40.0	36.0	111.2		428
Rolled ferrous metals	1000 t.	2282.0	145.3	86.8	167.3		133,435
Sheet iron, white	1000 t.	5.9	201.0	223.8	89.8	—	134
Pipes, crude oil	1000 t.	49.8	213.4	169.0	126.3		2,213
Pipes, gas	1000 t.	32.3	154.1	155.0	99.4	—	29
Pipes, rolled	1000 t.	37.7	234.9	167.5	140.2		2,539
Steel wire	tons	9258.0	238.6	256.2	93.1		163
Band, cold rolled	tons	14797.0	181.4	189.0	96.0	—	112
Zink	1000 t.	34.9	211.3	196.9	107.4		506
Lead	tons	55350.0	239.3	154.2	155.1		4,707
Tin	tons	3729.0	1888.4	2163.6	87.3		1,026
Aluminum	1000 t.	66.3	479.0	408.6	117.2		4,667
Cadmium	tons	424.0	3238.2	2393.2	135.3		358
Rolled aluminum and duralum	tons	6469.0	1009.1	526.7	191.6		3,121
Calcinated soda	1000 t.	18.8	29.5	28.6	103.4		18
Benzol	1000 t.	56.8	72.0	92.5	77.8		1,165
Toluol	1000 t.	13.8	73.4	50.2	146.1		320
Creosote oil	1000 t.	36.5	38.1	26.0	146.3		440
Naphtalene	1000 t.	18.6	83.7	260.4	32.1	—	3,287
Methyl alcohol	1000 t.	17.2	63.3	57.5	110.0		99
Varnish	tons	3941.0	148.4	81.1	183.0		265
Colophony	tons	8003.0	166.4	228.4	72.9	—	496
Apatite concen- trate	1000 t.	1413.4	16.6	14.5	114.4		2,959
Ammonium nitrate	1000 t.	26.0	83.0	53.6	154.8		763
Caoutchouc, synthetic	tons	6132.0	485.3	506.0	95.8	—	127
Automobile tires	1000 sets	225.1	37.0	23.8	155.1		2,957
Round lumber	1000 m ³	1900.0	15.8	11.9	132.0		7,253
Sawn lumber	1000 m ³	1653.4	37.4	34.0	110.2		5,714
Cellulose	1000 t.	54.5	117.6	93.8	125.4		1,299
Newsprint	1000 t.	25.1	126.7	115.8	109.4		273
Cotton fiber	1000 t.	300.5	693.0	539.8	128.4		46,016

Commodity		Quantity	Weighted aver. price in rbl. for C.E.C. W. Europe		% of C.E.C. price to W. Eur. price	Overcharge or undercharge (-) to C.E.C. 1000 rbl.	
Flax fiber	tons	10507.0	340.1	370.7	91.8	—	323
Hemp	1000 t.	1.8	278.3	140.8	197.6		247
Glycerine	tons	1689.0	435.2	281.2	154.8		260
Oil cakes and bran	1000 t.	16.6	70.4	59.6	118.1		179
Wheat	1000 t.	2742.6	65.4	56.1	116.6		25,523
Rye	1000 t.	705.9	55.5	46.6	119.2		6,329
Barley	1000 t.	280.2	54.9	37.5	146.4		4,875
Oats	1000 t.	114.7	48.8	40.7	120.1		936
Corn	1000 t.	197.7	58.4	48.4	120.7		1,983
Frozen meat	1000 t.	43.3	423.5	300.0	141.2		5,347
Canned salmon, 1000 cond. cans		1300.0	424.6	362.6	117.1		81
Crab meat 1000 cond. cans		1000.0	626.0	709.4	88.2	—	83
Vegetable food oils	1000 t.	91.1	284.8	246.1	115.7		3,528
Cotton fabrics	1000m.	36386.0	373.2	129.5	288.1		8,867
Silk fabrics	1000 m.	6700.0	265.5	141.7	187.4		830
							497,290
							— 6,945
Net overcharge							490,345

Value of 62 comparable sample commodities exported from the
Soviet Union to the captive European countries:

	In 1,000 rbl.
at prices charged to the captive European countries ...	1,805,997
at prices charged to Western Europe ...	1,315,652

Total value of Soviet exports to captive European countries: 3,078.1 mill. rbl.

Sample coverage: $1,805,997 : 3,078,100 = 58.67246\%$

Table 2

PRICE DISCRIMINATION ON SOVIET IMPORTS
FROM SEVEN CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (C.E.C.) IN 1961
IN RELATION TO PRICES PAID TO C.E.C.

Commodity		Quantity	Weighted aver. price in rbl. for C.E.C. W. Europe	% of W.E. price to C.E.C. price (—) to C.E.C. 1000 rbl.	Under- payment or overpaym.	
Crude oil	1000 t.	115.0	14.0	16.9	120.9	336
Rolled ferrous metals	1000 t.	243.1	130.3	139.3	106.9	2,197
Pipes	1000 t.	338.0	192.7	231.4	120.4	13,056
Lead	1000 t.	4.1	264.1	168.0	63.6	— 394
Cable, power	1000 km.	8.694	3068.4	2896.7	94.4	— 1,493
Cable control	1000 km.	0.6	1700.0	1588.6	93.4	— 67
Cable cord	1000 km.	1.6	1954.4	1796.6	91.9	— 253
Caustic soda	1000 t.	107.7	54.6	53.7	98.4	— 95
Calcinated soda	1000 t.	194.3	29.3	31.5	107.7	440
Anhydride of phtalic acid	1000 t.	3.7	287.0	200.0	69.7	— 322
Polychlorvinyl resin	1000 t.	13.4	339.3	276.7	81.6	— 839
Calcium carbide	1000 t.	18.3	82.5	76.6	92.8	— 108
Soot	1000 t.	8.2	227.7	179.1	78.7	— 398
Caoutchouc synth.	1000 t.	26.5	491.2	372.8	75.9	— 3,140
Plywood, knife	1000 m ²	5581.5	258.0	426.9	165.5	943
Staple fiber	1000 t.	15.7	596.5	375.3	62.9	— 3,473
Tobacco	1000 t.	36.0	720.0	941.8	127.1	7,985
Hops	1000 t.	0.5	1368.0	1200.0	87.7	— 84
Vegetable food oil	1000 t.	2.5	360.0	247.9	68.9	— 280
Wool fabrics	1000 m.	7500.0	2142.0	3498.1	163.3	10,171
Silk fabrics	1000 m.	11523.2	789.1	488.0	61.8	— 3,470
Leather foot- wear	1000 prs.	19938.0	4147.8	5109.0	122.9	19,165
						54,293
						— 14,416
Net underpayment						39,877

Value of 22 comparable sample commodities imported by the
Soviet Union from the captive European countries:

	In 1,000 rbl.
at prices paid to Western Europe	349,947
at prices paid to captive European countries	310,070
Total value of Soviet imports from captive European countries: 2,759.3 mil. rbl.	
Sample coverage: 310,070 : 2,759,300 = 11.23727%	

Table 3

LOSSES OF SEVEN CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ON SAMPLE COMMODITIES IN TRADE WITH USSR IN 1959, 1960 AND 1961
IN PERCENTAGE OF VALUE (BY COMMODITIES ONLY)

	Soviet exports			Soviet imports		
	1959	1960	1961	1959	1960	1961
In relation to value at prices charged on Soviet exports to, or paid for Soviet imports from, Captive European Countries ...	22.7	24.1	27.2	15.3	29.3	12.9
In relation to value at prices charged on Soviet exports to, or paid for Soviet imports from, Western Europe	29.3	31.8	37.3	13.3	22.6	11.4

Table 4

LOSSES OF SEVEN CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (C.E.C.)
ON ALL TRADE WITH USSR IN 1955-1961 CALCULATED ON THE BASIS
OF LOSSES ON SAMPLE COMMODITIES, IN PERCENTAGE OF VALUE AND
IN MILL. DOLLARS (BY COMMODITIES ONLY)⁽²⁾

	USSR exports to CEC, in mill. doll.		Loss to CEC		USSR imports from CEC, in mill. doll.		Loss to CEC		Total loss	
			%	mill. doll.			%	mill. doll.		mill. doll.
1955	1,792		16.0	287	1,663		13.0	216		503
1956	1,768		11.0	194	1,815		22.0	399		593
1957	2,550		7.0	178	1,914		21.0	402		580
1958	2,320		12.0	278	2,206		20.0	441		719
1959	2,950		22.7	668	2,520		15.3	387		1,055
1960	3,120		24.1	753	2,819		29.3	825		1,578
1961	3,420		27.2	929	3,066		12.9	394		1,323
1955-61	17,920		18.3	3,287	16,003		19.1	3,064		6,351

Table 5

USSR TRADE BALANCE WITH SEVEN CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
IN 1955-1961, IN MILL. DOLLARS

	At actual prices			At prices in USSR trade with Western Europe		
	Exports	Imports	Value of exp. over imp.	Exports	Imports	Value of imp. over exp.
1955	1,792	1,663	129	1,505	1,879	374
1956	1,768	1,815	— 47	1,574	2,214	640
1957	2,550	1,914	636	2,372	2,316	— 56
1958	2,350	2,206	114	2,042	2,647	605
1959	2,950	2,520	430	2,282	2,907	625
1960	3,120	2,819	301	2,367	3,644	1,277
1961	3,420	3,066	354	2,491	3,460	969
1955-61	17,920	16,003	1,917	14,633	19,067	4,434

(2) Percentages of price discrimination on sample commodities: for the years 1955-1958 from op. cit. sub 1 (i), for the years 1959 and 1960 from op. cit. sub 1 (I) and (n).

Table 6

TRADE BALANCE OF SEVEN CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (C.E.C.) WITH
MAINLAND CHINA, MONGOLIAN P.R., NORTH KOREA AND
NORTH VIETNAM IN 1955-1961, IN MILL. DOLLARS⁽³⁾

Year	CEC exports to 4 Asian countries	4 Asian countries exports to CEC	Value of CEC exp. over 4 Asian countries exp.
1955	275	225	50
1956	317	245	72
1957	329	265	64
1958	460	310	150
1959	408	380	28
1960	442	370	72
1961	166	158	8
Total	2,397	1,953	444

Table 7

LOSSES ON SAMPLE COMMODITIES OF SIX CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ON ACCOUNT OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN TRADE WITH USSR IN 1961,
BY COUNTRIES, IN THOUS. DOLLARS AND IN PERCENTAGE OF VALUE

<i>USSR exports to Captive European countries</i>					
Country	Value of samples at		Net over- charge	% of net overcharge in	
	actual prices	W. Eur. prices		rel. to value at actual prices	W. Eur. prices
Albania	7,800	6,136	1,664	21.3	27.1
Bulgaria	131,336	91,080	40,256	30.7	44.2
Czechoslovakia	383,671	274,022	109,649	28.6	40.0
Hungary	206,146	153,090	53,056	25.7	34.7
Poland	293,569	223,756	69,813	23.8	31.2
Romania	164,734	115,819	48,915	29.7	42.2
Total	1,187,256	863,903	323,353	27.2	37.4
<i>USSR imports from Captive European countries</i>					
Country	Value of samples at		Net under- payment	% of net underpayment	
	actual prices	W. Eur. prices		rel. to value at actual prices	W. Eur. prices
Albania	4,659	5,757	1,098	23.6	19.1
Bulgaria	28,947	36,576	7,629	26.4	20.9
Czechoslovakia	114,507	136,321	21,814	19.1	16.0
Hungary	26,649	30,160	3,511	13.2	11.6
Poland	50,473	62,762	12,289	24.3	19.6
Romania	61,398	70,954	9,556	15.6	13.5
Total	286,633	342,530	55,897	19.5	16.3

(3) Excluding Albania and Hungary in 1961.

Table 8

TOTAL LOSSES OF SIX CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON ACCOUNT OF
PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN TRADE WITH USSR IN 1961,
BY COUNTRIES, IN MILL. DOLLARS

Country	USSR exports			USSR imports			Total Loss
	Value at act. price	Over- charge %	Loss	Value at act. price	Underpay- ment, %	Loss	
Albania	20.3	21.3	4.3	21.8	23.6	5.1	9.4
Bulgaria	356.2	30.7	109.2	326.1	26.4	85.9	195.1
Czechoslovakia	652.7	28.6	186.5	697.6	19.1	132.9	319.4
Hungary	359.3	25.7	92.4	326.8	13.2	43.1	135.5
Poland	530.7	23.8	126.2	476.9	24.3	116.1	242.3
Romania	291.8	29.7	86.7	340.8	15.6	53.1	139.8
Total	2,211.0	27.4	605.3	2,190.0	19.9	436.2	1,041.5

Table 9

USSR TRADE BALANCE WITH SIX CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
IN 1961, BY COUNTRIES, IN MILL. DOLLARS

Country	At actual prices			At prices in USSR trade with Western Europe		
	Exports	Imports	Value of expt. over imp.	Exports	Imports	Value of imp. over exp.
Albania	20.3	21.8	— 1.5	16.0	26.9	10.9
Bulgaria	356.2	326.1	30.1	247.0	412.0	165.0
Czechoslovakia	652.7	697.6	— 44.9	466.2	830.5	364.5
Hungary	359.3	326.8	32.5	266.9	369.9	103.0
Poland	530.7	476.9	53.8	404.5	593.0	188.5
Romania	291.8	340.8	— 49.0	205.1	393.9	188.8
Total	2,211.0	2,190.0	21.0	1,605.7	2,626.2	1,020.5

Table 10

COMPARISON OF SOME FREE WORLD MARKET PRICES WITH USSR PRICES
ON EXPORTS TO THE FREE WORLD AND TO THE CAPTIVE EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES (C.E.C.) QUANTITIES: IN 1000 M. TONS. PRICES: AVERAGE
WEIGHTED PRICES PER M. TON IN DOLLARS

WHEAT					
Year	Quant.	France' exp. Price f.o.b.	USSR exp. to W. Eur. Quant.	Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	891.7	60.7	1264.8	63.6	74.8
1960	1325.7	64.5	926.8	62.8	73.8
SUGAR REFINED					
Year	Quant.	U. Kingdom exp. Price f.o.b.	USSR exp. to free world Quant.	Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to commun. domin. countries
1959	548.1	102.7	186.4	104.0	130.7
1960	489.8	106.3	238.4	103.6	135.3

CRUDE OIL

Year	Quant.	Iraqi exp. Price f.o.b.	USSR exp.to W. Eur. Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1956	29628	14.80	865 16.21	21.78
1957	20254	15.64	1139 19.34	22.66
1958	33789	15.38	2110 15.62	21.59
1959	39800	14.19	4807 13.88	22.06
1960	45206	13.79	7367 11.70	21.99
1961	—	—	9068 10.19	21.78

COKE

Year	Quant.	U. Kingdom exp. Price f.o.b.	USSR exp. to W. Eur. Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	1393.0	15.38	382.0 16.91	26.16
1960	1576.2	15.45	411.0 15.77	26.23

IRON ORE

Year	Quant.	Swedish exp. Price f.o.b.	USSR exp.to W. Eur. Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	15617	10.42	245 12.35	11.46
1960	19984	10.25	341 12.35	11.51

MAIZE

Year	Quant.	W. Germ., Italian & U. Kingdom imp.	USSR exp. to W.Eur.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	4898.9	58.6	91.7 54.1	54.7
1960	5739.9	58.1	74.5 57.7	67.0

COPPER

Year	Quant.	France', W. Germ. and U. Kingdom imp. Price c.i.f.	USSR imp. from France W. Germ. and U. Kingdom Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	1004.6	634.8	39.6 645.8	658.2
1960	1249.3	672.3	39.9 687.9	686.3

ZINK

Year	Quant.	France', W. Germ. and U. Kingdom imp. Price c.i.f.	USSR exp. to W. Eur. Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	307.7	232.1	30.1 232.7	235.2
1960	370.2	259.2	45.8 247.4	234.3

ALUMINUM

Year	Quant.	France', W. Germ. and U. Kingdom imp. Price c.i.f.	USSR exp. to W. Eur. Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	384.7	500.8	33.7 457.3	534.8
1960	563.7	514.8	15.7 467.9	531.2

LEAD

Year	Quant.	France', W. Germ. and U. Kingdom imp. Price c.i.f.	USSR exp. to W. Eur. Quant. Price f.o.b.	USSR price f.o.b. to CEC
1959	296.4	211.2	6.1 194.9	267.7
1960	360.5	205.1	20.9 197.9	267.1

Table 11

PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF SOME CONSUMER AND PRODUCER GOODS
IN USSR, ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA IN 1961, INDICES, USSR=100

Item	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Cotton fabrics ⁽⁴⁾	395	85	21
Wool fabrics	179	258	157
Linen fabrics	299	212	195
Hosiery	147	254	270
Footwear, leather	172	186	135
Butter, industrial production	354	301	237
Meat, industrial production	220	186	213
Fish catch	411	362	223
Canned goods	233	215	117
Radio sets ⁽⁵⁾	76	1459	74
Bicycles ⁽⁶⁾	—	455	658
Washing machines ⁽⁷⁾	—	1745	—
Furniture	302	280	119
Paper	646	317	148
Electric energy ⁽⁸⁾	171	51	31
Electric motors up to 100 kw ⁽⁹⁾	1992	—	113
Electric motors over 100 kw ⁽¹⁰⁾	1464	—	—
Excavators	676	—	—
Road graders	1758	—	—
Lathes	—	—	453
Railway passenger cars	—	2614	—
Oil shale	12000	—	—
Mineral fertilizer	586	215	—

(4) Indices of Estonia and Latvia based on output in m², of Lithuania on output in running meters. USSR index including unfinished fabrics; the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian indices include finished fabrics only. In addition to finished fabrics Estonia produced, in 1959, nearly 50 million meters of unfinished fabrics and probably as much in 1960 and 1961. The inclusion of this output into the Estonian index would raise it to about 550.

(5) Production in Estonia consists of large sets "Estonia" retailing at 200 rubles and over, as contrasted to the USSR production consisting largely of smaller sets "Strelna," "Rekord," "Muromets," etc., retailing at 25 to 110 rubles.

(6) USSR and Latvian output figures including motorbikes.

(7) USSR production includes "washing machines and washing devices." The Latvian production consists of "electric washing machines" only.

(8) Index for Estonia excluding about 600 million kwh output of the Narva hydro-electric plant. Including this output, the index for Estonia would be about 200.

(9) Index for Estonia by capacity of manufactured motors, for Lithuania by the number of manufactured motors.

(10) Output in 1960, by capacity of motors.

Table 12

AVERAGE PRICES OF SOME MORE IMPORTANT COMMODITIES OF USSR EXPORTS TO WESTERN EUROPE AND TO CAPTIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN 1961, BY COUNTRIES, IN RUBLES PER TON AND INDICES (W. EUROPE=100)

Country	Overall		Crude oil		Coal		Coke		Pig iron		Cotton fiber		Wheat	
	price	ind.	Rbl.	Ind.	Rbl.	Ind.	Rbl.	Ind.	Rbl.	Ind.	Rbl.	Ind.	Rbl.	Ind.
W. Europe	100	9.2	100	8.4	100	14.4	100	44.5	100	540	100	56.1	100	
Albania	127	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	762	141	66.0	118	
Bulgaria	144	—	—	9.8	117	18.6	129	54.2	122	824	153	71.1	127	
Czechoslovakia	140	20.8	227	13.6	162	23.7	165	65.6	147	687	127	67.6	121	
E.Germany	137	17.2	188	14.1	168	23.7	165	60.3	135	701	130	64.5	115	
Hungary	135	20.0	218	12.9	154	22.9	159	64.9	146	699	130	65.9	117	
Poland	131	20.9	228	14.8	117	—	—	62.0	139	661	122	62.5	111	
Romania	142	—	—	15.2	181	22.8	159	65.3	147	673	125	—	—	

(Rapporteur, Mr. Aleksander Kutt, Estonia.)

3. OTHER DOCUMENTS

(a) Main Policy Statements

TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON NATO-WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATIONS

Deeply concerned by news about the possibility of Nato-Warsaw Pact negotiations as an outgrowth of the Cuban settlement, Assembly of Captive European Nations most respectfully calls to your attention, Mister President, the adverse consequences which would flow for the West if this idea were to be acted upon. The Warsaw Pact is not an agreement between coequal independent states, but a legal cover for a relationship of subordination comparable to the imperial systems of the past. Hence if the objective is security, this can be sought through negotiation with the only principal on the Communist side, the Soviet Union. Involving the Warsaw Pact countries, which have no voice in the determination of Soviet policy, would be viewed by the people of our homelands as condonation of the status quo and a further contribution to the consolidation of the Soviet-imposed regimes. Our apprehension is all the greater as we have reason to believe that the determination displayed by the United States in the Cuban crisis and the demonstration that the Soviet Union is reluctant to face a showdown with the USA, are having an electrifying effect in our homelands. Hope in the future of freedom and faith in the Western Powers are being revived for the good of both peace and

freedom. Assembly of Captive European Nations respectfully appeals to you, Mister President, not to engage in negotiations and not to enter into agreements in a Nato-Warsaw Pact framework. The only purpose of the Soviet Union in seeking such an approach is to secure confirmation of the illegal subjugation of the captive countries and to consolidate thereby the regimes Moscow has foisted upon them.

—October 28, 1962

**MEMORANDUM TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE
OCCASION OF THEIR MEETING IN PARIS IN DECEMBER, 1962**

The Assembly of Captive European Nations once again conveys the best wishes of the silenced peoples of East Central Europe to the distinguished statesmen assembled in Paris for the NATO Council. Convinced that freedom is nowhere more indivisible than it is in Europe, the Assembly confidently anticipates that the right of self-determination of the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania will form part of the deliberations of the Council. The Assembly ventures to hope that such deliberations will result *First*, in the re-affirmation of the principles set forth by the Council in December, 1956, in its declaration of policy for Eastern Europe; *Second*, in a decision to initiate the requisite steps to inscribe the issue of the denial of self-determination to the peoples of East Central Europe on the agenda of the United Nations and to keep it on the agenda until the rightful aspirations of these peoples are fulfilled; *Third*, in resolve to insist in the U.N. on compliance with the Resolutions on Hungary and, consequently, to oppose attempts at diminishing U.N. concern, condoning Soviet aggression or endorsing the Kadar regime.

We respectfully remind Your Excellency that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, comprising parliamentarians from sixteen countries, of which four are neutral, unanimously adopted last September a documented Report on the Methods of Soviet Colonialism in Eastern Europe, and asked that the respective governments demand before the U.N. free elections; that the NATO Parliamentarians last month re-affirmed the right to self-determination of the captive nations, and that in the recent colonialism debate in the U.N. General Assembly, several speakers enlarged upon Soviet colonialism. All these would indicate that Western public opinion is cognizant of the real status of the captive countries and favors U.N. and diplomatic action expressing at least the same degree of solidarity of the West toward the subjugated nations belonging to Western civilization as is shown daily in the U.N. toward the few remaining dependent African and Asian peoples by the representatives of the nations of these continents.

In giving the lie to the claim persistently spread by Soviet propaganda that the balance of power has decisively shifted in favor of the USSR and that the world-wide victory of communism is only a matter of time, the Cuban confrontation significantly bolstered the morale of the captive peoples. A clear indication of NATO concern and political support at this auspicious time would further fortify their spirit of resistance, whose deterrent value can hardly be overstressed at a time when NATO examines a major revision of its basic strategy. By strengthening their faith in a better tomorrow, it would furthermore help them bear their present plight with patience and fortitude.

For many years our peoples have warned the West, through their spokesmen in the free world, against the danger of over-estimating both the power and the risk-taking willingness of the Soviet rulers. The Cuban confrontation fully vindicated their warnings. If its lessons will be fully taken to heart, it will come to mark the turning of the tide: the end of Communist expansion and the beginning of the mighty surge of the forces of freedom. If not, another opportunity to reverse the course of history will be tragically missed. In appealing for a favorable consideration of its three point plea, the Assembly of Captive European Nations feels therefore enjoined to earnestly caution against the eagerness displayed in certain Western circles for agreements on Berlin, even at the price of general non-aggression or security pledges that would indirectly confirm the finality of the present partition of Europe. We submit that such pledges would give the Soviet Union or their puppets no guarantees of security that are not already embodied in the United Nations Charter. The only reason the Soviet rulers have consistently sought them was their awareness that they would be viewed by the captive peoples as proof of their final abandonment and hence would lead to their general resignation.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations urgently appeals to the NATO powers to reconsider their general attitude and position in their negotiation on European problems in the light of their improved situation following the Cuban showdown. Specifically, ACEN trusts that the NATO Powers will henceforth press for a general European settlement in harmony with the right of self-determination and will only be prepared to consider Soviet demands, be they on Berlin, on the dismantling of military bases or on matters of control and limitation of armaments, in the framework of negotiations aiming at the general settlement based on the right of self-determination and providing for the very procedure of realization which the Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed before the United Nations for various African countries.

—December 11, 1963

THE WESTERN CHOICE IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE A MEMORANDUM

At a time of decision for Western civilization and the entire cause of freedom, it is incumbent upon the Assembly of Captive European Nations to affirm, once again, its conviction that:

- (1) the struggle for Europe, the decisive arena in the global contest between freedom and communism, is far from being over;
- (2) the people of East-Central Europe are apt to play a very significant role in this struggle;
- (3) durable and secure peace will remain unattainable as long as Soviet power will be left in control of the geographic center of Europe;
- (4) to serve both the short and long term requirements of a free Europe, moral and political obligation and self-interest equally enjoin the Western Powers to voice and demonstrate by meaningful political action their vital stake in the freedom of the Eastern half of Europe, as well as their steadfast resolve to help, by all legitimate means, the captive peoples recover the exercise of their right of self-determination.

The validity of these views was increasingly confirmed in the last two years. Western policy has, nevertheless, tended to move away from them. It has, in fact, been inclined to downgrade, if not to discount altogether, the beneficial impact of an active Western support of the freedom yearnings of the captive peoples upon the outcome of the continuing struggle for the freedom of Europe. Its favorite assumption seems to be that Western restraint generates Soviet moderation, and both beget stability in Europe. Hence, accommodation with the Communist regimes is not only the "realistic" course, but the only way in which the West could extend its influence to the ultimate benefit of the people concerned.

These clearly discernible trends call for more than a re-affirmation of deeply held convictions. They demand (I) an examination of both Western views and current misconceptions on East-Central Europe, (II) a presentation of the views of the Assembly on the present stakes of the West in the same area, and (III) an outline of specific measures designed to promote the vital common interests of the Western Powers and their allies in East-Central Europe. This is, indeed, what this memorandum attempts to do.

I

Fairness commands that the examination of Western views on and policies toward East-Central Europe be prefaced by the statement that it

is in the legislative bodies of the Western nations, the United States Congress above all, and in such international parliamentary assemblies as the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, that the issue of the freedom of the captive nations receives nowadays the greatest attention and the most outspoken support. It is in such bodies that the purpose of an East-Central Europe—free from outside domination and living under institutions and governments freely chosen by the respective peoples—is most consistently upheld. It is in these respected bodies that practical policies incompatible with the proclaimed purpose find few advocates or supporters.

In the absence of a common policy in the framework of NATO, there is, in the West, on the executive governmental level, a wide range of positions in regard to East-Central Europe. Three major trends deserve examination.

The *first*, as set forth in authoritative United States statements,* correctly notes that despite changes in the direction of more internal autonomy, "Soviet military power remains the ultimate force that sustains the power and authority of the Communist minorities, guarantees the continued existence of the regimes, and prevents any national defection from the Soviet bloc". In line with this basic assessment of the situation, the United States objective is defined as "to see in Eastern Europe fully independent nations enjoying internal freedom and normal relations with all countries." The expectations are, however, very sober. Because of Soviet domination "any far-reaching change, involving a rollback of Soviet control is unlikely at an early date", and, except in the event of unforeseen developments, "progress toward the United States long-term objective" in Eastern Europe "appears realizable only by gradual means." Extension of United States and Western influences "by maintaining and developing more normal and active relations with the Eastern European governments of the Soviet bloc"—is declared to be the practical policy. This is to be pursued to the extent possible to do so without, at the same time, sacrificing basic American principles, "without endorsing the internal and foreign policies of the governments, or accepting or implying that we (i.e. the United States Government) accept in any way the *status quo* of Soviet domination as a satisfactory or permanent condition of affairs in that area."

This neatly balanced definition of goals and means, and sober assessment of future outlook presents one basic flaw. Experience indicates, indeed, that any progress on the road to more active relations with the Eastern European governments is likely to be paid by silence on the ultimate goal

* Particularly in the most comprehensive recent statement of United States policy on the captive nations, the statement of the Honorable William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State, before the Subcommittee on Europe of the United States House of Representatives, on September 13, 1962.

("silence is consent" is an old saying the Russians like to quote when it serves their purpose), by the elimination from the agenda of the United Nations of the one fragment of East European subjugation with which the World Organization is concerned, the Question of Hungary which might be an "irritant" to the Soviet rulers but is a stimulant to the captive peoples; by subdued information programs; in short, by actions of commission or omission conveying to the people most concerned the depressing message of the acceptance of the *status quo*.

There seem to be some misconceptions at the root of this attempt to reconcile ends and means which in practice, if not in theory, are mutually exclusive. One is the belief that direct contacts—personal, cultural, economic, through governmental channels are the *sine qua non* of Western influence with both regimes and peoples. The fact that contacts are but minor means of carrying influence is overlooked. In a situation like the one prevailing in Eastern Europe, the choice of the carrier itself would preclude any positive influence upon peoples profoundly, if mostly silently, hostile to the regimes. As to the ruling groups, it would be self-deceptive to expect that regimes perfectly aware of their utter dependence on Soviet power could be tempted to help engineer their own doom. The main point is that influence is not a function of contacts but rather of the message the West can give to the captive peoples. To the extent to which it succeeds in projecting itself as strong, determined and winning, and to the extent it also cares to identify itself with the goal of the captive peoples, it exercises a stimulating influence on the people and a restraining influence on their unchosen rulers. Conversely, eagerness to develop official contacts is viewed as a sign of weakness. It breeds contempt among the ruling groups and discouragement among the broad masses of the people.

It follows that the pursuit of contact and gradual ameliorations can only be reconciled with the proclaimed goal of freedom and independence, if this goal is never drowned in silence but, on the contrary, is frequently and authoritatively voiced and pursued by meaningful, if not immediately effective, political actions. Past experience would indicate, however, that such efforts at reconciliation are fraught with so many practical difficulties that the prospects of accomplishing them successfully for any length of time appear very dim.

The *second trend*, quite widespread in Europe, is to regard the issue of Soviet imperialism at the expense of the captive nations as a convenient point of rebuttal whenever Soviet "anti-colonialism" displays an excessively cynical form in international assemblies. In this view, the issue of the freedom of the Eastern half of Europe is a long-range moral problem; it has ceased to belong to practical politics. The Communist regimes and the *status quo* of the captive nations' subordination to Moscow are accepted

as "realities" which neither the peoples concerned nor the West is prepared or able to change fundamentally. Contacts and trading with these regimes are viewed as matters of expediency and national interest, and are all the more welcomed as they are deemed to contribute to the evolution of the Communist regimes toward more humane and rational ways.

Lastly, a *third trend* averts a direct confrontation with the problem of the captive nations by holding out the more far-reaching prospect of a continental system stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. It rests on a rather sanguine conception of the power of Communist China and the threat it would represent for the Soviet Union.

In spite of being so different, the aforementioned trends rest on a number of closely related, if not common, premises, assumptions and judgments. They bear a closer review.

1. "The situation in Europe is stabilized and can only be changed at the prohibitive price of war"—is more often than not the fundamental premise of the opponents of an active East-Central European policy.

This proposition fails to pass any closer scrutiny. The Soviet Union is as intent as ever to gain further ground in Europe and its rulers believe that they could succeed in this without war, by intimidation and a crisis strategy.

For more than three years they have been pursuing this strategy by stirring up the Berlin crisis on the calculation that sooner or later, when faced with a clear-cut choice between risking all or accepting Soviet terms—the West will yield. This, Moscow expects, would undermine the credibility of the American guarantee and induce a gradual break-down of the Western alliances. The fact that a halt was called to this offensive, following the Cuban miscalculation, might only indicate that, before probing again or pushing to a showdown, Moscow wants to complete the build-up of its military potential and certain specific armament programs, bring some order in the Communist house, and in the process, sow confusion and complacency among its opponents.

A Western policy which would not aim beyond stabilization would prompt a bolder Soviet bid for the mastery of Europe, for the simple reason that it would suppress one of the deterrents to a reckless policy of intimidation: the spirit of resistance in East-Central Europe. Paradoxically enough then, to achieve stability, the West must aim beyond stability to a Europe united in its natural confines.

2. By denouncing the coexistence policy of Khrushchev—one often hears—Communist China has certified the genuineness of this policy.

In fact, Khrushchev himself has called coexistence a form of struggle for the achievement of the ultimate Communist goal. The program adopted at the XXII Party Congress leaves no doubt that for Moscow *peaceful co-*

existence is—in the words of an American authority on Soviet affairs—“a prolonged contest in which it must exert its full strength and will in order to make decisive gains by all means short of nuclear war.”

3. Since liberation of East-Central Europe is only possible by some kind of military action, it is said, and since the United States and its allies do not contemplate any such action—it would be irresponsible to represent freedom and independence for the captive nations as an objective of American or Western policy.

Commitment to a purpose is in itself a political action productive of far-reaching effects. The Communists have always recognized and acted upon this truth. Their strength lies precisely in their ability to bring change in their favor by means of all-out war. To accept the theory that an area or a people once taken over by communism are beyond recovery by similar means is to admit defeat in advance.

4. It is claimed that Eastern Europe is in the midst of a process of relaxation of terror and gradual liberalization. The process would be disturbed by a Western insistence of maximal goals. It could be, on the contrary, furthered by Western aid and an expanded Western program of contacts, trade and cultural exchanges.

To begin with, it would be much more correct to speak in terms of relaxation of repression than in terms of liberalization. The changes which have occurred in East-Central Europe since the death of Stalin represent essentially a lessening of irrational and unnecessary terror. They are not changes in the nature of the totalitarian dictatorships, or in the nature of the relationship with the Soviet Union.

These relaxations of repression, varying in degree from country to country, occurred in the past and are likely to appear again in three circumstances:

- (a) Uncertainty in regard to the real source of ultimate authority in Moscow, with the ensuing caution and vacillation on all echelons of power. This was the case during the struggle for power in the Kremlin, following Stalin's death.
- (b) Communist fear of a general uprising at a particularly inauspicious time. This was the case of Poland, in October, 1956, and it caused a substantial tactical retreat on the part of the Communist regime.
- (c) Confidence among the ruling groups deriving from international developments favorable to the Soviet Union and from a mood of dejection among their subjects.

The first two of these circumstances were certainly not products of Western aid, credits, contacts or good will. They were the result of a

combination of internal and external pressures. As for the third circumstance in which some relaxation occurred in the past, discouragement among the ruled and confidence among the rulers, this certainly involved Western responsibilities. But these were not of a sort that warrant any satisfaction. For discouragement means more security for Soviet Russia and, hence, a bolder Soviet policy toward its main target: Western Europe.

Economic aid, it must be conceded, could at best help in preserving some of the gains secured by popular pressure in a country like Poland, providing, however, that the respective regime is kept aware that any further encroachment on the very limited rights and liberties the Polish people recovered in 1956 would bring about the termination of aid.

A recent report of the Special Study Mission of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, rightly remarks that "the Western European countries tend to look at the Soviet bloc mainly as a market for their exports—while the Communists regard the West primarily as a source of essential goods." "Western exports of capital goods enable the bloc—continues the report—to telescope technological progress in various fields." "The Soviet bloc derives greater benefit from this trade than do the countries of free Europe"—concluded the report. The Western Powers seem to be set to pursue such trade. If so, in the light of these findings, they should at least avail themselves of their powerful bargaining position. They do not have to help the expansion of the Communist war-making machine by credits. And they could use their position to induce an increase in the production of consumer goods. They could even avail themselves of their important economic bargaining power to wrest political concessions that would directly benefit the people in the captive lands. Then, indeed, they could lay claim to a real contribution to the welfare of these people.

II

The Western stake in East-Central Europe derives from the strategic location of the area, from the increment Soviet power is now drawing from the manpower and resources of the region, as well as from the historic incompatibility between Soviet aims and the interests and aspirations of its ancient nations.

East-Central Europe—half a million square miles and one hundred people strong—lies between the Soviet Union proper and free Western Europe. It is the place where the very centers of power of the two contending camps stand in close, direct and decisive confrontation. Just beyond it lie prime strategic goals: westward—free Europe, the great concentration of skills and resources, which is, in the Communist strategy plan, a decisive way-station in their drive for world conquest: *eastward*—the very heart of the Soviet

Union. Within this area live historic nations—hostile to the foreign rule and alien pattern of life foisted upon them, nations which yearn to live in freedom and have, therefore, strong reasons to obstruct the Soviets and help the West. From the point of view of manpower and production, East-Central Europe represents a 40 per cent increment to the economic power of the Soviet Union.

From the short-range point of view, East-Central Europe may play a decisive role in thwarting the present Soviet strategy of gradual expansion by political means, into the Western half of the old continent. Once this objective is achieved, East-Central Europe would become the area in which the West can accomplish the most significant strategic gains. It is the place where a United States-backed Western Europe can gradually expand eastward, by political means, the border of freedom. An East-Central Europe from which Soviet political control has been eliminated, would change the whole strategic picture. The Soviet Union would become a danger of manageable dimension, a danger which could largely be checked by local means alone, leaving American power free to look after its numerous global commitments. It would become itself a vulnerable target of Western political warfare aimed at transforming Soviet Russia into an open society by the Western-supported exertions of the peoples directly concerned.

The *short-range* stake of the West in East-Central Europe has increased and not diminished as a result of what, for want of a better name, is described as nuclear stalemate. As long, indeed, as the United States possessed overwhelming nuclear supremacy, the security of Western Europe was absolute. Strategically it mattered little whether the peoples of East-Central Europe were friendly or hostile to the Soviet Union. Once, however, the Soviet Union has acquired a significant strategic nuclear striking power, both nuclear powers are reluctant to resort to these frightening weapon systems. Unlike the West, however, the Soviet Union is systematically engaged in gaining ground by exploiting, on the one hand, its superior ground forces and, on the other, the fear and sense of responsibility of the West.

This analysis of the dangers the West is still faced with in Western Europe seems to be largely confirmed by certain conclusions drawn by responsible quarters of the United States from the Cuban confrontation. It was stressed that the success of the confrontation on the withdrawal of Soviet missiles was primarily due to the strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States in the Caribbean area. It was furthermore underscored that because of the specific strategic conditions involved, the Cuban confrontation does not provide a valid indication of Soviet behavior in different circumstances. This could only mean that in Cuba the United States could impose its will without having to resort to a nuclear war, while the Soviets

could only counter United States action by having recourse to its strategic nuclear arms. In Europe, the situation is exactly the opposite. Hence the crisis of confidence marked by attempts to build up independent nuclear striking forces in Europe. Hence also the American insistence to build up the conventional forces of NATO and thereby reduce the capability of Moscow to score gains by intimidation and blackmail.

In these conditions, every factor which weighs negatively in the calculus of risk of the Soviet Union acquires strategic significance. One of such factors is certainly the trouble-making capacity of the people of Eastern Europe. Whether or not the Soviet rulers must reckon in their calculations with a significant risk factor in the area lying between their borders and their Western targets may influence the degree of their recklessness. This would be particularly relevant in a situation like that in Berlin, in which the objective is precisely to make the West believe that the choice is confined to risking all-out nuclear war or making concessions that would discredit American reliability and induce in Western Europe "realistic" trends toward disengagement and neutrality.

It is within the power of the West to compel the Soviet rulers to reckon with an important risk factor in Eastern Europe. The risk factor is indeed in direct ratio with the intensity of the spirit of resistance of the people of East-Central Europe. And the latter hinges on the prevailing impression with regard to the will to win of the West and with regard to the Western commitment to the cause of their freedom and independence. These are the sources of hope on which the spirit of resistance feeds.

Until the Cuban events, the prevailing impression on both counts was negative. Hope in a better future and faith in the West, and with them the spirit of resistance, were at their lowest ebb. The Cuban confrontation has somewhat improved the assessment of Western will and power. Should the West, as it is hoped, appear henceforth consistently in the posture of the firm and winning side, the problem of keeping hope alive and thereby strengthening the East-Central European deterrent will have been largely solved. It remains however for the West to prove its concern for the people of East-Central Europe. This can only be accomplished by an early and clear identification of the West with the peoples of the captive countries and their goal to recover free choice in regard to their internal and international affairs.

Such a long-range objective is not unrealistic. Liberation without war, though not without protracted political struggle, is possible. The Soviet empire is obviously rent by serious internal contradictions. The difficulty of maintaining ideological unity and central direction, as illustrated by the Sino-Soviet discord; the inability of the Soviet Union to keep up the armament race without withdrawing some of the material improvements its

people have gained in the last few years, and/or without diminishing their abnormally high investments in the heavy industry; the imbalanced nature of the Communist economy and the utter failure of collectivized agriculture; the increasing non-conformity of youth and the ferment among intellectuals; the unbridgeable gulf between the requirements of subordination and exploitation in the Soviet empire, and the national pride of the historic nations of East-Central Europe—these are but a few of the contradictions. If they have, as yet, not generated dramatic consequences, this is largely due to the demoralizing effect of the easy and unnecessary successes Western misjudgment, irresolution and weakness have afforded to the USSR. Ever since the end of the Second World War, the Soviets have been permitted to show, by their actions, that history was on their side; that changes invariably occur in their favor and that, accordingly, the victory of communism on a world-wide scale is only a matter of time. If the West were to act on the perfectly justified assumption that the Soviet empire has more reasons to fear any major war than the West, it could at least deny its adversary any further successes. The effect would be most far-reaching. The latent forces of disruption and opposition, no longer inhibited by a sentiment of futility, would be unleashed in Eastern Europe. In favorable circumstances, which can be fostered by a purposeful Western policy, such as a struggle for supreme power or internal disturbances in the Soviet Union that would tie down the Soviet armed forces, the captive Nations could begin making good their escape.

III

In the view of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the morale of the captive European peoples and their faith in the West would be bolstered, and the interest—short and long term—of both free and captive nations would be advanced should the United States and her principal allies adopt the specific measures listed under "What to do," while refraining from the action listed under "What not to do".

What to do:

(1) To raise in all high-level conferences with the rulers of the Soviet Union the issue of the restoration of the right of self-determination to the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.

(2) To counter Soviet demands on Berlin with the plan for an over-all peace settlement based on the right of self-determination and designed to solve all the unresolved consequences of the Second War in Europe.

(3) To inscribe the question of the denial of self-determination to the nations of East-Central Europe on the agenda of the United Nations regard-

less of the prospect to secure the required majorities. To raise, in other words, the issue in the U.N. on its merits and not as a mere point of rebuttal.

The initial purpose of such action would be to assure the peoples concerned that their issue is an objective of Western policy, an open and not a closed issue as claim the Soviet rulers. This would be accomplished if a group of Western Powers, backed by the United States, would take the initiative. For durable impact, such action would have to be renewed at every session on the pattern of the wearing-down tactics followed by the Soviet Union on the question of the Chinese representations in the United Nations. The Western Powers could easily pattern their draft resolution on one of the proposals introduced in the United Nations by the Soviet Union. The draft resolution introduced by the Soviet delegation on April 24, 1962, in the Special Committee on decolonization, is almost ideally suited for this purpose.

(4) To keep the question of Hungary on the agenda of each United Nations General Assembly session and renew steadfastly the demand for compliance with past resolutions.

(5) To give assurance to the people of Albania that the territorial integrity of their country and their right of self-determination will be safeguarded against any intervention on the part of their neighbors.

(6) To maintain carefully the policy of non-recognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union.

(7) To insist that the United Nations Declarations on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is of universal scope and validity and, accordingly, oppose the double standard gaining ground in the UN on self-determination, and to urge the Special Committee of 24 Nations, charged with the implementation of the above declaration, to extend its concern and investigation to the peoples and countries subjected to Soviet colonial rule.

(8) To carry out in the United Nations and at all appropriate international gatherings a campaign of truth with respect to the denial of human rights and freedom in the captive countries.

(9) To give support in the United Nations to the proposal of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions for an investigation of the condition and status of political prisoners and for the elaboration and enactment of an international convention on the regime of the political prisoners.

(10) To be always mindful, in their trading policies, of the fact that the interests of the welfare of the captive peoples and of the security of the West are both adversely affected by the preferential treatment given by the Communist regimes in East-Central Europe to the development of heavy

and armament industries, at the expense of the needs of the people concerned. Similarly, to take advantage of trade negotiations in order to press for the suppression of existing prohibitive duties on individual food, clothing and medicine gift packages from the free world to individuals in the captive countries.

(11) To develop, extend and invigorate broadcasts to the captive countries, and to consider the establishment, in the framework of NATO, of a General Staff for Political Warfare.

(12) To warn all Western visitors to the captive countries against permitting their hosts to use them as tools of their political propaganda, as well as against fraternization with local Communist leaders.

What not to do:

(1) Not to engage in actions or enter into agreements implying or suggesting that the Western Powers have reconciled themselves to the *status quo* and regard it as final. The oft-mentioned idea of a non-aggression pledge or pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries would certainly be construed by the people of East-Central Europe as a Western sell-out. Such pledges would give the Soviet Union or their puppets no guarantees of security that are not already embodied in the United Nations Charter. The only reason the Soviet rulers have consistently sought them was their awareness that they would create legal obstacles to any further Western concern with the fate of the captive peoples, and that, by generating discouragement and resignation, they will have consequences highly detrimental to Western security. Past commitments, declared principles and self-interest, therefore equally command to the Western Powers to stand firmly on the position that any and all security arrangements should follow, and not precede, an overall European settlement based on the right of self-determination.

(2) Not to undertake actions and moves which give respectability to the satellite regimes and compound the damaging effect of past acts of recognition.

(3) Not to grant aid, long or short term credits to the satellite regimes. Assistance in the special case of Poland can only be justified to the extent it helps preserve the gains the Polish people wrested in 1956. The helping countries should, therefore, make it clear that any aid would terminate if there is a return to forced collectivization, and/or if the rights of the church, the freedom of worship or any other rights or freedoms were further curtailed.

(4) Not to place undue reliance on the political benefits to be drawn from exchange programs, and to insist on full reciprocity in such exchanges.

— March, 1963.

MESSAGE TO NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THEIR MEETING IN OTTAWA

The Assembly of Captive European Nations conveys the best wishes of the silenced peoples of East-Central Europe to the distinguished statesmen assembled in Ottawa for the NATO Council. While welcoming the steps of NATO members toward closer unity, the Assembly trusts that the right of self-determination of the captive European Nations will form part of the deliberations in Ottawa. Today the spirit of resistance of the captive European peoples is subjected to grave trials because of Western inclinations to pursue a policy of accommodation with the Communist regimes in Captive Europe instead of outspoken support of legitimate freedom aspirations of the captive peoples. The Assembly ventures to hope that the NATO countries represented in Ottawa will: First, reaffirm the principles set forth by the NATO Council in its December, 1956 declaration of policy for East Europe; Second, initiate steps to inscribe the issue of captive Europe on the agenda of the United Nations; Third, retain the Question of Hungary, the most flagrant case of Soviet aggression, on the agenda of the United Nations; Fourth, refrain from any steps that might be construed as recognition of the existing situation in East Europe, such as a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the so-called Warsaw Treaty Organization.

—May 24, 1963.

(b) The Problem of Hungary

TELEGRAM TO U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE URGING ACTION ON HUNGARY IN U.N.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, convening in its 103rd Plenary Session, respectfully expresses to you, Mr. Secretary of State, its deep concern with regard to the fate of the Hungarian question before the U.N. General Assembly. Although this question is scheduled to come up at the Special Political Committee within the next seven days, no specific initiative has yet materialized. The result is, on the one hand, confusion and diminishing interest among past supporters, on the other hand, the tendency to construe the absence of forceful initiative as an indication that the intention is to introduce a weak resolution which would substantially downgrade the U.N. concern by suppressing the position of the U.N. representative, held by Sir Leslie Munro, and dropping any call for compliance with the past resolutions. The announcement of the Secretary General's visit to Budapest seems to lend credence to such pessimistic anticipations.

Profoundly apprehensive of the adverse psychological impact of any Western retreat on the question of Hungary throughout East-Central Europe at the very time when the Cuban showdown had had a most beneficial effect, we respectfully appeal to the United States Government: (1) to propose, as in the past years, that no favorable action be taken on the Hungarian credentials; (2) to introduce a resolution urging compliance with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the Question of Hungary, and above all with the demand to restore the political independence of Hungary by means of free elections following withdrawal of Soviet troops and reestablishment of human rights.

—December 10, 1962.

TELEGRAM TO U.S. LEGISLATORS ON POLICY CHANGES TOWARD KADAR REGIME

The Assembly of Captive European Nations conveys to you its deepest concern about change in United States' Government attitude toward Communist regime imposed on Hungary by Soviet armed might. We submit that approval of the credentials of the Hungarian Communist Delegation in the United Nations and especially the planned resumption of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the Kadar Regime are not justified for the following reasons: *First*, the concessions made by the Kadar Regime are spectacular, but slight, and do not substantially alleviate the lot of the Hungarian people. *Second*, the number of political prisoners actually released is still unknown since even two months after promulgation of amnesty decree, neither the number nor the identity of the released persons have been published by the regime. The amnesty obviously does not affect a substantial portion of individuals jailed for participation in the 1956 Revolt. *Third*, the fate of thousands of youths deported to the Soviet Union after the 1956 revolt remains undisclosed (see U.N. Resolution 1127 of November 21, 1956). *Fourth*, the autonomy and basic rights of the Roman Catholic church have not even partially been restored. *Fifth*, the demands of U.N. Resolutions for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Hungary and self-determination for the Hungarian people through free elections have not been implemented. There is no change in the institutional pattern of violations of basic human rights. Since the U.N. Secretary General has not yet submitted any report of the Hungarian case as he was charged to do by the December 1962 Resolution, any handouts of legitimacy and respectability to the Kadar Regime seem premature and tantamount to pressure for achieving genuine concessions. We submit that the official condonement of the illegal Communist rule in Hungary will encourage Communist efforts to take over still free countries.

—May 16, 1963.

STATEMENT DEPLORING APPROVAL OF KADAR DELEGATION'S CREDENTIALS IN U.N.

The approval of the credentials of the Kadar regime by the United Nations Credentials Committee will come as a great shock to the people of Hungary and other captive countries. The absence of any attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the representatives appointed by a regime the U.N. had branded as one established by Soviet military intervention will, we feel, be viewed as proof that to all practical purposes the question of Hungary has been dropped, as proof that sheer expediency and not principle determines the policies of the Western powers. The abstention of the U.S. delegation will be credibly represented to the captive peoples by communist propaganda as evidence that the *status quo* in East Central Europe has come to be accepted as final. It will further demoralize the captive peoples and thus weaken an essential deterrent to Soviet aggressiveness in Europe.

The damage this action is bound to cause to the prestige and the vital interest of the Western powers can still be repaired, at least in part. The United States and other free nations can bring up the substance of the matter at the Autumn session of the United Nation's General Assembly. They can and should ask for the inscription of the real issue on the agenda of the next U.N. session. And the real issue is not whether some amelioration has occurred in Hungary, but whether the right of self-determination has or has not been restored to its people. The U.N. resolutions have called indeed for the restoration of political independence of Hungary by means of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, reestablishment of human rights and free elections. These are demands the passage of time cannot render obsolete. It is the hope of the Assembly of Captive European Nations that public opinion in the United States and other free nations will lend strong support to the plea that the real issue be raised as a matter of principle, regardless of the chances of securing a majority vote.

—June 6, 1963.

(c) U.N. and Captive Europe

TELEGRAM TO U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ON NEED FOR SINGLE STANDARD ON SELF-DETERMINATION

Assembly of Captive European Nations, gathered in its 100th Plenary Meeting, sincerely congratulates Your Excellency upon election as President of Seventeenth Session of General Assembly. The captive peoples of East-Central Europe, whose aspiration for freedom our Assembly represents,

will be heartened and inspired by your opening statement yesterday in which you affirmed the right of all peoples and nations to quote "freedom, dignity and a reasonable standard of well-being." Your stress on the universality of the right to freedom and your pledge to keep the yearning of hundreds of millions around the globe for freedom in forefront of your mind, augurs well for the beginning of the end of the double standard now prevailing in United Nations on questions of colonialism and self-determination. We hope and pray that by recovering their freedom and independence our nations, too, will come to benefit from that change in the relationship between nations to which Your Excellency so eloquently referred.

—September 19, 1962.

LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL CHALLENGING HIS STATEMENT ON BELIEFS OF CAPTIVE PEOPLES

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, gathered in its 100th Plenary Meeting, has noted with deep concern a statement Your Excellency made in the press conference yesterday. We refer to the remark that while personally believing in human dignity and fundamental freedoms, you are also "aware of the fact" that "there are hundreds of millions of people who believe otherwise." Given your staunch support of self-determination and other human rights for the peoples who lived or live under Western colonial administration, this statement can only refer to the countries under Communist rule. It will certainly be construed as a reflection of your conviction that the regimes in power in these countries were established by the free choice of the peoples concerned.

Our Assembly must take the strongest exception to the statement in question and to its implications as far as our countries are concerned. The peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania represented in the Assembly have a long record of independence and a strong tradition of respect for human rights. They lost both independence and the enjoyment of human rights as a result of the armed intervention of the Soviet Union, a fact which at least in one case, Hungary, was established by the United Nations General Assembly itself. The contempt for the dignity of man, the denial of human rights and the absence of democratic governments in these countries can, therefore, not be attributed to the indifference of the people of our countries to these values. It is due entirely to the fundamental fact that they have been forcibly deprived of their right of free choice by a permanent member of the United Nations, who likes to pose in the world assembly as the champion of self-determination.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are entitled to expect that if the United Nations is reluctant to take remedial action, it should at least refrain from representing as freely chosen a situation imposed by foreign force. It is the hope of our Assembly that Your Excellency will promptly clarify his statement.

—September 19, 1962.

**TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ASKING FOR UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION**

Convened in its 103rd Meeting to observe Human Rights Day, the Assembly of Captive European Nations offers its sincere congratulations to the United Nations for the success of its efforts to secure the blessings of the right of self-determination to the peoples of certain parts of the world. In commending this splendid record, we would be remiss in our duties if we were to refrain from giving voice to our disappointment in the face of the reluctance of the World Organization to concern itself with the denial of self-determination to scores of millions of people in the once free and independent countries of East-Central Europe and in the Soviet Union proper.

As the number of former Western colonial possessions constantly diminishes, the Soviet colonial empire stands out more and more as an anachronism, a danger for other nations, and a threat to the very foundations of the United Nations and peace itself. The Human Rights of one hundred million people of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania can and must be secured through the restoration of their right to self-determination. We trust that Your Excellency will devote increasing attention to ways and means to put an end to the double standard now prevailing in the United Nations over the issue of self-determination and that every effort will be made to achieve universal observance of human rights.

—December 10, 1962.

**LETTER TO UNESCO DIRECTOR GENERAL
PROTESTING SOVIET-AUTHORED UNESCO BOOKLET**

A booklet entitled *Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, by I. P. Tsamerian and S. L. Ronin, has recently been published under the UNESCO imprint. It is with great regret and dismay that we are compelled to say that this publication contains false statements and untruthful allegations.

We would like especially to call your attention to the following statement: "In 1940 the Soviet regime was restored in the Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) which voluntarily joined the Union." We are sorry to say this is simply a lie.

According to historically established facts, in 1939 the USSR, after concluding a secret pact with Nazi Germany which divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, imposed the so-called mutual assistance pacts upon Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania allowing Soviet Russian military bases in each of these nations, but at the same time guaranteeing that there would be no interference with their internal affairs and that "this pact should not affect to any extent the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties." Contrary to the provisions of these mutual assistance pacts and other existing treaties, such as the Non-Aggression Pacts (September 28, 1926, with Lithuania; February 5, 1932, with Latvia; May 4, 1932, with Estonia) reinforced in 1933 by the signing of a USSR-Lithuanian convention defining aggression, the Soviet Union, without provocation, did in June 1940, invade and take military and political control over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Under the protection of the occupying Red Army forces, political commissars of the Kremlin (Zhdanov in the case of Estonia, Vishinsky in the case of Latvia and Dekanozov in the case of Lithuania) dissolved the legal governments, arbitrarily established puppet governments to control the people and on July 14, 1940, conducted elaborately staged mock elections, with the support of powerful military forces, the results of which were completely assured before the first ballot was cast. Only one list of candidates, hand-picked by the Kremlin, was presented to the voters, and the exercise of the secret ballot was denied.

By the process of mock elections the political commissars of the USSR installed puppet parliaments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which, on July 21-22, 1940, adopted resolutions prepared in Moscow, petitioning the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union for recognition as Soviet Republics. This action by the puppet parliaments was in violation of the sovereign will of the Baltic peoples and it was simply a device covering the Soviet aggression.

As was stated in Resolution 189 (1960) adopted on September 28, 1960, by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, "this illegal annexation took place without any genuine reference to the wishes of the people." Furthermore, the same resolution also takes note "that the independent existence of the Baltic States is still recognized *de jure* by a great majority of the governments of the nations of the free world."

In view of the overwhelming and conclusive evidence that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly occupied and illegally annexed by the

Soviet Union, it is obvious that Messrs. Tsamerian and Ronin abused the authority and good name of UNESCO in order to publish under the cloak of this much-respected organization a piece of cheap Soviet propaganda falling short of the standards of objectivity and regard for truth which ought to be observed in UNESCO publications.

On behalf of the Assembly of Captive European Nations speaking for the silenced people under Soviet-Communist domination, I appeal to you, Mr. Director General, for an immediate withdrawal from circulation of the booklet *Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR* as injurious to the standards required by UNESCO and harmful to the inalienable rights of self-determination of the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

—February 8, 1963

**LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
PROTESTING APPOINTMENT OF BULGARIAN COMMUNIST
DELEGATION TO U.N. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DECOLONIZATION**

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, representing the freedom aspirations of one of the largest areas in the world still under colonial rule, has been following with particular interest the progress of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That is why we were astonished to learn that the list of the new members, who have accepted Your Excellency's invitation to serve on the Special Committee, under the terms of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly Resolution 1810 (XVII) of December 17, 1962, also includes Bulgaria. May we call Your Excellency's attention to the following facts, related to Bulgaria's membership in the Special Committee:

- (1) The so-called government of Bulgaria was established under the military occupation of the Soviet Union and as a result of direct intervention of the same Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Bulgaria.
- (2) The regime thus established in power has never secured the consent of the people and was able to maintain itself only with the help of the Soviet Union.
- (3) The Communist regime in Bulgaria has been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 385 (V) November 3, 1950) for "breaches . . . committed of those articles under which *Bulgaria*, Hungary and Romania are obliged to secure the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their countries," as well as for "callous" indifference to the "sentiments of the world

community." The record of the Bulgarian Communist regime has not improved with regard to human rights since the above condemnation, but has become even worse.

- (4) Proof that Bulgaria today has only nominal independence can be deduced from each and every action of the Bulgarian Communist regime. It suffices to mention here that in the United Nations the Bulgarian Communist Delegation has never voted at slightest variance with the Soviet Union; that when the statues and pictures of Stalin were removed in the USSR, they soon dutifully disappeared in Bulgaria; that when the USSR adopted a school reform law in December, 1958, only seven months later the same law was adopted in Bulgaria, in an almost identically worded document; that last year Premier Khrushchev and lesser Soviet officials openly intervened in the crisis of the Bulgarian Communist regime and installed in the leading positions persons of whom they approved.

Accordingly, the present government of Bulgaria has no mandate from the people of Bulgaria to represent them internationally. Its only mandate derives from a foreign power, the Soviet Union, which in utter disregard of the United Nations Charter, of valid international agreements, and of the inalienable rights of the Bulgarian people, exercises in and over Bulgaria powers that are not only comparable but, in many respects, more extensive than the power exercised by the Western countries over lands and territories under their colonial administration. The fact that Bulgarian and other countries of Eastern Europe are only nominally independent but in fact subjugated to a colonial type of foreign control has been repeatedly called to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly by representatives of important member states. The Assembly itself submitted a detailed account of objections to the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Special Committee "on territories under Portuguese administration," in a letter addressed to Your Excellency's predecessor, on March 8, 1962. It is most regrettable that these valid objections were disregarded in considering Bulgaria's recent admission to the Special Committee.

In the light of the foregoing, you will understand, Mr. President, that your decision to assign the hand-picked agents of a colonialist power to the role of supervisors of a process of decolonization will be received with shock and dismay by the people of Bulgaria and all other victims of Soviet colonialism. It is the duty of our Assembly to register their profound regret for this decision and their firm conviction that it is in flagrant contradiction with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and incompatible with the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

—February 9, 1963

(d) Non-Committed Nations

TELEGRAM TO AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE IN MOSHI, TANGANYIKA

Assembly Captive European Nations free voice of forcibly silenced peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, sends greetings to the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference. Aware of devotion of participating nations to right of self-determination, Assembly appeals to Conference to lend its support to universal application of this birthright of all peoples regardless of race, geographic location or legal trappings under which the subjection of any people to the will of a more powerful state is disguised. Assembly respectfully submits that in extending its concern to peoples fallen victims to Soviet colonialism, Conference will strengthen its moral authority and thus hasten the accomplishment of its present purposes.

—February 5, 1963

TELEGRAM TO AFRICAN HEADS OF STATES ON PERSECUTION OF AFRICAN STUDENTS IN BULGARIA

Assembly of Captive European Nations condemns Communist acts of brutality and persecution against African students in Bulgaria and other countries of East-Central Europe. We congratulate students affected on their political maturity and devotion to liberty. As Chairman of the Bulgarian National Committee, it is my duty to emphasize that people of Bulgaria expressly disassociate themselves from discriminatory acts of Bulgarian Communist officials and police. People who rule Bulgaria and other captive European countries today are mere agents of the greatest contemporary colonial power, Soviet Russia. Assembly hopes that recent experiences of African students in captive Europe will bring more support of African countries to efforts by captive European peoples to regain self-determination. Only when countries of East-Central Europe are free from Soviet colonial rule, will they be able to welcome African students as honored guests and grant them full human rights.

—February 18, 1963.

(e) General Policy

APPEAL TO FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION ACEN Doc. 322 (IX) Gen.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, composed of the democratic representatives in the free world of the subjugated nations of Albania,

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, presents greetings to the members of parliaments from free nations, assembled in the 51st Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and wishes success to their deliberations in Brasilia, the proud creation of Brazilian genius, labor and determination.

It is incumbent upon the Assembly of Captive European Nations first of all, to challenge the qualifications of so-called parliamentarians from the captive countries of East-Central Europe to be members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and to participate in its Conference alongside freely elected parliamentarians. The individuals claiming the status of members of parliament from these countries do not derive their mandate from the people of their countries. They were not elected in free and competitive elections. They were instead nominated on single lists by the holders of exclusive political power, the leaders of the respective Communist Parties—themselves hand-picked by the rulers of the Soviet Union. These single lists were then given “popular endorsement” through polling procedures, marked not only by the absence of alternatives and by lack of secrecy for the voter, but also by heavy penalties for abstainers. Furthermore, the assemblies to which these bogus parliamentarians belong do not have any of the attributes with which parliaments are universally associated. They meet for a few days a year to approve mechanically ready-made legislation or endorse decrees enacted by the executive throughout the year. Opposition, debate or criticism are unknown to them.

Because of the origin of their mandate and the nature of the assemblies to which they belong, the participants from the countries previously listed are not entitled to call themselves parliamentarians. And because of the origin—foreign imposed—of the regimes they serve, they represent nobody but the Soviet power which imposed and maintains these regimes in power.

The first appeal of the Assembly of Captive European Nations to the Inter-Parliamentary Union is on behalf of the most forgotten victims of these regimes: the political prisoners. Countless thousands of men and women, young and old, political leaders and members of parliament, clergymen and teachers, artists and scientists, businessmen, peasants and workers have already been starved or tortured to death in Communist prisons. Countless others still languish in prisons and forced labor camps for no other guilt than their faithfulness to their nation and beliefs.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the voice of 109 trade union organizations with a membership of 56 million workers, recently called the attention of the United Nations to the fate of these prisoners and urged the World Organization to institute an investigation with a view to enacting an international convention on the rights of political prisoners, comparable with the Geneva Convention on Prisoners

of War. The Assembly of Captive European Nations is confident that the Inter-Parliamentary Union will join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in this humanitarian initiative, will use its great influence to bring about the release of all political prisoners and will voice its grave concern for the denial of the basic rights of man in the Communist-ruled countries of East-Central Europe.

The second appeal to the free parliamentarians in Brasilia concerns the denial of the right of self-determination to the captive European nations. That these nations have been deprived of the substance of their independence and are, in fact if not in name, colonial possessions of the Soviet Union was conclusively demonstrated in a documented report on the "Methods of Soviet Colonialism" which the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, a body composed of members of 16 European parliaments, unanimously adopted on September 20, 1962, in Strasbourg. By their experience and geographic position, the countries represented in the Council of Europe—Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom—are uniquely qualified to pass judgment on origin and nature of the present political regimes in Eastern Europe.

It is the hope of the Assembly of Captive European Nations that the free members of the IPU Conference will study the report of their European colleagues and will agree with their recommendations that the question of the denial of self-determination to the peoples of East-Central Europe be placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

The right of self-determination is today universally recognized. The scope of its application cannot be restricted. The peoples of the once-free countries of East-Central Europe are at least as much entitled to enjoy this right as are the peoples on other continents who have been and still are most effectively helped by the United Nations in their process of emancipation from colonial rule. And it is the duty of free men everywhere to see to it that the procedures which proved effective for the peaceful termination of Western colonialism be applied with the same persistence and determination to help ancient nations fallen under the rule of Soviet colonialism recover their freedom and independence.

Aware that the "establishment and development of democratic institutions" is one of the fundamental purposes of the Union, the Assembly of Captive European Nations is confident that the Conference will favorably consider its appeal and will join the Council of Europe and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in calling for an end of the double standard in the United Nations on self-determination and for free

elections enabling the people of East-Central Europe to determine, without any outside constraint or domestic coercion, the institutions and governments under which they would live.

—October 18, 1962

TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON MEASURES TAKEN IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

Assembly of Captive European Nations assures you, Mr. President, in this grave hour, of its understanding and support for the historic decisions you have taken on behalf of the world-wide cause of freedom. This is the significance millions of people in Eastern Europe will give to the actions initiated to block the Soviet strategy of expansion in the Western Hemisphere. They will rejoice at this evidence of American determination and will hopefully regard it as the beginning of the big roll-back of communism, as a vital contribution to that peace with freedom to which you rededicated last night this great country—the best hope of mankind.

—October 23, 1962

APPEAL TO WORLD FOOD CONGRESS ON CAPTIVE FARMERS RIGHTS

The Assembly of Captive European Nations respectfully calls the attention of the delegates assembled in the World Food Congress to the forcible collectivization, pauperization of peasants and neglect of food production in the captive European countries. Collectivization has been foisted upon the peasants for political reasons: to make them utterly dependent on the totalitarian state for their daily bread. It enables the regimes to rob the farmer of the fruits of his toil and to allot resources thus extorted for the development of a heavy industry which is placed primarily in the service of Soviet military power and expansionism. By destroying incentives and neglecting investment in agriculture, the policies pursued by the Communist regimes in East-Central Europe have artificially caused a drop or at best a stagnation in output of agriculture. They have contributed to the world food shortage.

In the name of the silenced peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the Assembly of Captive European Nations calls upon the World Food Congress to take a resolute stand against politically motivated agricultural policies. The Assembly respectfully appeals to the Congress to urge all governments to adopt policies conducive to maximum food production, social welfare and respect for the fundamental human rights of farmers.

—June 6, 1963

TELEGRAM TO FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION IN BELGRADE

The Assembly of Captive European Nations greets the members of parliaments from free nations assembled in the fifty-second conference of IPU. Their basic task, "the establishment and development of democratic institutions and the advancement of the work of peace and international cooperation" is inseparable from the strict allegiance to the principle of free popular will expressed by democratic elections. Therefore the Assembly challenges the qualifications and protests the participation in the IPU conferences of pseudo-parliamentarians from the captive countries of East Europe who have not been elected by the respective peoples, but appointed by the soviet-imposed regimes. Their presence in the Belgrade deliberations makes a mockery of the noble ideals of IPU and perpetuates the insult to the captive peoples of Europe whose oppressors they serve. The Assembly trusts that the IPU Conference will serve the cause of free parliamentarianism by stressing the universality of the right to self-determination, calling for an end to the double standard in the United Nations on self-determination, and upholding the right of the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania to have governments of their own choice by means of free elections.

—September 12, 1963

II. THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN STRASBOURG

THE ROAD TO FREEDOM IN EAST—CENTRAL EUROPE: ACCOMMODATION WITH THE REGIMES OR SUPPORT TO THE PEOPLES?

Report presented in the Conference in Strasbourg, on May 5, 1963

ACEN Doc. 346 (IX) Gen.

The title of this debate represents one of the cardinal questions facing the free world's policy makers today. It has acquired added importance by the perceptible shift in the direction of the Western policy—the shift away from support of the freedom aspirations of the captive peoples toward an accommodation with the Communist regimes in East-Central Europe.

The shift is most clearly evident on the executive governmental level, while in the legislative bodies of the Western nations the issue of the freedom of the captive nations continues receiving its most outspoken support. Yet it is on the executive level that policies are determined and pursued that affect the hopes, the morale and the resistance spirit of the captive European peoples.

I

Let us take a brief look at the three major trends among the Western Great Powers in their policies toward East-Central Europe.

The *first trend* still sees “fully independent nations in Eastern Europe” as the objective of United States policy. Since, however, this objective “appears realizable only by gradual means,” the practical policy is to extend United States and Western influence “by maintaining and developing more normal and active relations with the Eastern European governments of the Soviet bloc.” This policy is to be pursued without sacrificing basic American principles and without recognizing the permanence of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe.

The *second trend*, gaining ground in Europe, is to regard the issue of the freedom of East-Central Europe as no more belonging to practical

politics but to the realm of long-range moral problems. Therefore, contacts and trading with the Communist regimes are considered as both expedient and in the national interest.

The *third trend* is to subordinate the problem of the captive nations to the distant prospect of a continental system stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.

II

How valid are the premises, assumptions and judgments underlying the new policy line? Here, in brief, are the main points:

- (a) one can change the stabilized situation in Europe only at the prohibitive price of war;
- (b) since liberation entails military action, the West would be irresponsible in representing freedom and independence as an objective of its policy;
- (c) Western insistence on maximal goals would merely disturb the process of relaxation and gradual liberalization now under way in Eastern Europe.

Such is the groundwork of reasoning, observation and hope on which the new policy line rests. Unfortunately, at closer scrutiny this groundwork reveals important flaws. For instance: Can anyone seriously claim that the Soviet Union is no more intent to gain further ground in Europe? To accept the theory that Communist-occupied countries are beyond recovery by means of political pressure—is not this tantamount to admitting defeat in advance and opening the door to more defeats? Is it correct to describe a reduction of unnecessary terror, without change in the essential nature of totalitarian dictatorship, as “liberalization”?

It was the hope for a genuine and constant liberalization process that inspired the advocates of a cautious and conciliatory Western policy toward the Communist regimes. Has this hope been justified? For an answer, let us glance at the changes in East-Central Europe since the XXII Soviet Communist Party Congress at the end of 1961, which generated considerable ferment in the captive countries. Albania remains as terror-ridden as before. In Bulgaria, the Stalinist Premier Vulko Chervenkov was replaced by Todor Zhivkov, another Stalinist and an obedient Soviet tool. Czechoslovak Communist leaders limited liberalization to a few phrases and the pulling down of the Stalin statue in Prague. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, new repressive laws were introduced and the Russification campaign intensified. In Hungary, Kadar was forced to grant concessions to obtain at least a passive cooperation of the population, but no basic changes were introduced. The Polish people, who compelled the regime

in 1956 to make concessions in the field of human rights, have seen some of their hard-won liberties whittled down. And in Romania, the Stalin-appointed satraps continue ruling the country in the same oppressive manner.

Liberalization means at least an attempt to respect basic human rights. A recently prepared ACEN Reference Table, which compares the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights with the actual situation in East-Central Europe, shows that respect for the basic human rights is still non-existent in the captive European countries. Basically, the changes in East-Central Europe amounted to the lessening of the irrational aspects of terror; the machinery of terror, however, was kept intact. Criminal legislation was even made harsher. The warning is clear: long prison terms await any dissenter. With socialization, including collectivization of agriculture, almost fully completed, direct control of everybody's livelihood provides the rulers with an effective means to keep the population in line. Under such conditions, the Communist regimes can give more attention to considerations of economic efficiency.

Were these changes due to the goodwill of the Communist regimes, or to the Western policy of accommodation toward them? A close look at the recent events in East-Central Europe will show that whenever changes took place, they were due, first and foremost, to the pressure of the anti-Communist populations. Whenever the changes threatened to get out of hand and trigger off a genuine liberalization process, the regimes did not hesitate to use repressive measures again. An eloquent example in this respect is Khrushchev's handling of the Soviet intellectuals since March of this year, and the reverberations of this new repression in the rest of East-Central Europe.

III

The West has paid for extended contacts with Communist governments the heavy price of silence on its ultimate goal in East-Central Europe. The most conspicuous example in this respect is the elimination of the Question of Hungary from the agenda of the World Organization. The elimination has caused shock and disillusionment among the Hungarian people. They interpreted it as a Soviet victory and another desertion of the Hungarian people by the West; they also expressed their fears that with United Nations pressure eliminated, Moscow would feel free to liquidate the outward show of leniency in Hungary. At the same time, the Communist ruler of Hungary, Kadar, took pains to emphasize that his more "realistic" methods of building "socialism" should not be interpreted as a lessening of the fight against any vestiges of non-Marxist-Leninist ideology. In his report to the Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Communist

Party (November 20-24, 1962), he called for an "all-out offensive of Marxism-Leninism" to achieve the "socialist transformation" of the outlook of the whole people.

The net result: a population that is less confident in the West and less inclined to resist the existing situation; a Communist regime endowed with added prestige and going about its task of final communization with new eagerness and confidence. Can this be called a victory for the cause of freedom?

The developments in the rest of East-Central Europe since the initiation of the new Western policy, closely resemble the Hungarian pattern. The spirit of resistance of the populations is being sapped, as they are being pressured both by East and West to accommodate themselves to the *status quo*. The Communist regimes, installed and maintained by Soviet power alone, are receiving injections of respectability and confidence. Western eagerness to develop official contacts with the regimes of quislings and bureaucrats is breeding contempt among the ruling groups and discouragement among the broad masses.

If Western policies toward Eastern Europe are not quickly reversed, this state of affairs is bound to deteriorate even further. Once one has set out to improve relations with Communist governments, one will always find reasons to be silent about the final goal, and silence precedes oblivion. In theory, it may be possible to reconcile the ultimate objective of freedom with temporary compromises and accommodation; in practice, this reconciliation has proven to be most difficult, if not impossible.

There are more grave dangers for the West in the slackening of the resistance spirit of the captive European peoples and the rise of the status of the Communist regimes. The trouble-making capacity of the captive European peoples has constituted an important risk factor for the Soviet rulers in Europe. As this risk factor diminishes, the Soviets will feel freer to engage in political and military adventurism, bringing the West closer to the narrow choice between nuclear war and concessions to the Soviets.

An illuminating case in point here is the immediate aftermath of the Cuban confrontation in 1962. At the peak of the crisis, some lower rank Communists panicked and, apparently, fearing imminent changes, sought to ingratiate themselves with the people. The people themselves, however, remained cautious; they suspected that the West would again retreat to a compromise and would not follow through after its initial success. This attitude of the populations of the captive European countries shows a marked difference from the spirit they displayed, for instance, a dozen years ago. Elation, trust in the West, and zeal to topple the Communist regimes have changed to caution, scepticism, distrust. As a result, the Soviet Union is faced with a lesser risk factor in East-Central Europe.

IV

In view of the foregoing, the Assembly maintains that the vital interests of the captive European peoples and those of the Western Powers are in their essence identical. These interests demand that the West, instead of attempting to achieve an illusory accommodation with the Communist regimes, makes self-determination for East-Central Europe a major point of its foreign policy.

In the execution of such a policy, the United States and her principal allies should:

- (1) Raise in all high-level conferences with the rulers of the Soviet Union the issue of the restoration of the right of self-determination to the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
- (2) Counter Soviet demands on Berlin with the plan for an over-all peace settlement based on the right of self-determination and designed to solve all the unresolved consequences of the Second War in Europe.
- (3) Inscribe the question of the denial of self-determination to the nations of East-Central Europe on the agenda of the United Nations regardless of the prospect of securing the required majorities. To raise, in other words, the issue in the United Nations on its merits and not as a mere point of rebuttal.
- (4) Keep the question of Hungary on the agenda of each United Nations General Assembly session and renew steadfastly the demand for compliance with past resolutions.
- (5) Give assurance to the people of Albania that the territorial integrity of their country and their right of self-determination will be safeguarded against any intervention on the part of their neighbors.
- (6) Maintain carefully the policy of non-recognition of the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union.
- (7) Insist that the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is of universal scope and validity and, accordingly, oppose the double standard gaining ground in the United Nations on self-determination, and to urge the Special Committee of 24 Nations, charged with the implementation of the above declaration, to extend its concern and investigation to the peoples and countries subjected to Soviet colonial rule.

At the same time, the West should not undertake actions and moves which give respectability to the satellite regimes or imply that the Western Powers have reconciled themselves to the *status quo* and regard it as final.

The signing of a non-aggression pledge or pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for instance, would certainly be interpreted by the captive European peoples as a Western sell-out.

A free East-Central Europe without war is not an illusion, but a distinct possibility in our time. But it is a goal that can be achieved only by a joint effort of the free and the captive peoples. The peoples of East-Central Europe have contributed and will contribute to their utmost to that goal, provided the West:

- (a) keeps faith with the freedom aspirations of the captive peoples,
- (b) matches the economic power of Europe with corresponding military power and political unity;
- (c) ceases yielding to the Soviets and thereby shattering the myth that the victory of communism is historically inevitable;
- (d) begins to act on the perfectly justified assumption that Moscow has more reason to fear a major war than the free world;
- (e) turns from its present reactive policy toward an active policy aimed at exploiting the countless contradictions in the Soviet empire, above all the deep-seated permanent conflict between the rulers and the ruled.

Then, and only then, will the future crisis in the Soviet empire—be it an inevitable struggle for power in Moscow, or a rift between Communist ruling groups—provide the captive countries with a realistic opportunity to escape from the prison of nations.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Lithuania).

EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE—FACTOR OF WESTERN SECURITY

Report presented in the Conference in Strasbourg, on May 6, 1963

ACEN Doc. 346 (IX) Gen.

The Problem

The Western stake in East-Central Europe derives from the strategic location of the area, from the increment Soviet power is now drawing from the man-power and resources of the region, as well as from the historic incompatibility between Soviet aims and the interests and aspirations of its ancient nations.

East-Central Europe—half a million square miles and one hundred million people strong—lies between the Soviet Union proper and free Western Europe. It is the place where the very centers of power of the two

contending camps stand in close, direct and decisive confrontation. Just beyond it lie prime strategic targets: *westward*—free Europe, the great concentration of skills and productive power, which is, in the Communist strategic plans, the decisive way-station in their drive for world conquest; *eastward*—the very heart of Soviet Russia. Within this area live historic nations—hostile to the foreign rule and alien pattern of life foisted upon them; nations which yearn to live in freedom and have, therefore, strong reasons to obstruct Soviet Russia and help the West. From the point of view of manpower and production, East-Central Europe represents a 40 percent increment of the economic power of the Soviet Union.

Until quite recently it was, nevertheless, widely held that, in the nuclear and missile era, the combination of human, geographic and economic factors we find in East-Central Europe has lost most, if not all, strategic significance. Some based this view on the theory that the capability of each of the two world powers to inflict unacceptable damage on the other has created a *nuclear stalemate*, the effect of which was the stabilization of the *status quo* in Europe.

Others reasoned that the Soviet Union has adopted a nuclear strategy which rules out the possibility of limited wars fought with conventional weapons. According to the supporters of this view, this situation has rendered strategically insignificant the geographic and human factors present in East-Central Europe.

Changes in the Strategic Picture

Serious differences with regard to the most effective way to provide security for Western Europe have lately come to the surface. The debates to which they have given rise may—and, we hope, will—in the end, prove to be most salutary. They promise, indeed, to lead to a re-assessment of well-rooted views which were made obsolete by the developments of the last few years. The first unlamented victim of this re-assessment may well be the assumption that the nuclear stalemate has brought stability to Europe. The second casualty could and should be the propensity to under-estimate East-Central Europe as a significant factor of Western security.

The differences and the debate they have caused, *focus* on a concept which is often invoked, but seldom clearly defined: deterrence. In the strict sense of the word *deterrence* means, of course, discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain. But this is not all. Deterrence also means reasonable certainty in one's own camp that those who will be called to make the decisions in a crisis would not be tempted to yield to counsels of weakness or to the enemy's demands—particularly if the

risks of total war involved in a refusal to yield would appear disproportionate to the concessions required to avert these risks. It follows that a deterrent is effective to the extent it discourages foe and reassures friend.

Viewed in the light of this definition, the *crisis* the Western Alliance is undergoing at this time appears, above all, as a crisis of confidence. It arises not from distrust among specific statesmen, but from the fact that, in a changed situation, the defenses of Europe continue to be based primarily on the American strategic striking power.

"When NATO was formed," a distinguished American political commentator wrote recently, "the Americans had a vital monopoly of atomic weapons, capable of responding to any Soviet incursion into Western Europe by an overwhelming nuclear attack on Russia itself from American bases in Europe and North Africa. The Russians however, could not imperil the continental United States, and thus the American guarantee to Europe was both militarily and psychologically convincing. But today these conditions—continues the American commentator—no longer exist. The missile age now allows America and Russia to obliterate one another within a matter of hours—without relying on foreign bases. For Europe, this means that a completely new element—the vulnerability of the United States—has become the crucial factor of the American guarantee."

Attempts to build up national nuclear striking forces in Europe; plans to create such forces on a multi-national basis, and United States efforts to prod the Western European powers into expanding their ground forces—are all clear reflections of a changed strategic picture. They are all part of the search for psychological rather than military reassurance against the day when the United States might find itself faced with the awesome choice between risking all and yielding to specific but carefully limited Soviet demands.

European efforts at a nuclear build-up essentially stem from the conviction that, regardless of the magnitude of its exertions, NATO will never come near to counter-balancing Soviet ground forces. They, therefore, could be described as a search for a second-line deterrent. In this frame of mind, American proddings for an expansion of the ground forces are viewed as attempts to escape from existing commitments and not, as is really the case, to thwart the Soviet crisis strategy by building up a *complete spectrum of deterrence*.

A complete spectrum of deterrence means many things. It means, first of all, a Western military power so well balanced that Soviet resort to any kind of military action would become practically inconceivable. This involves not only a superior nuclear striking power, but also a reassuring distribution of weapons and of the decision-making power. It furthermore

involves, as a compensatory element for the continued inferiority of the West on the ground—such state of spirit in Eastern Europe that the Soviet rulers would have to reckon with an important risk factor in this transit and staging area for any military action or credible military threat against the West. The existence of a full spectrum of deterrence would not only prevent war in Europe (by design or miscalculation), but would also thwart the Soviet strategy of seeking gains by political means—such as sowing distrust in the effectiveness of Western defenses and the dependability of the American guarantee with the view to generating a process of disengagement, a trend toward neutralism.

It is only in this context that the problem of whether the peoples of East-Central Europe could play a significant role in the necessary effort to develop a full spectrum of deterrence can be meaningfully answered. The question in short is: are these peoples capable of influencing the *decisions* on which peace or war, political defeat or victory—may hinge?

The East-Central European Deterrent

We submit that the peoples of East-Central Europe are in a position to influence, in the coming years, in a significant measure, the course of events in Europe. We believe that the advent of the era of nuclear stalemate has increased and not diminished the strategic importance of our countries.

So long, indeed, as the United States possessed overwhelming nuclear supremacy and practical invulnerability, the security of Western Europe was absolute. Strategically it mattered *little* whether the peoples of the East-Central European area were friendly or hostile to Soviet Russia. Now, however, that the two sides possess comparable nuclear striking power; that each is equally reluctant to resort to these frightening weapons while only one, Soviet Russia, is systematically working to gain ground by exploiting the fear and sense of responsibility of the other—every factor which weighs negatively in the calculus of risk of the Soviet rulers acquires strategic significance. This, we hold, is the case for East-Central Europe. And, we add, it is up to the West to commit itself so openly and convincingly to the goal of freedom for our nations that the spirit of resistance of our peoples will be re-invigorated and our common enemy will be compelled to reckon with an additional risk factor.

The Major Premises

Our thesis on the present strategic significance of East-Central Europe is based on several premises.

First, the Soviet rulers are irrevocably committed to the achievement of one world—a Communist world.

Second, the means by which this fixed goal is to be achieved are flexible. They range from internal subversion to a foreign policy as ready to use power for intimidation as it is reluctant to get involved in actual warfare. One of the essential features of Soviet political strategy is the ingrained capacity of Soviet leadership to effect tactical and even strategic retreats whenever this appears the only alternative to a full-scale showdown involving the risk of a nuclear war. Responses motivated by emotion and by considerations of prestige can be ruled out. In the nuclear age, cool calculation, as taught by Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung and Stalin, can safely be assumed to preside in decision making even more than before the advent of this age.

Third, in Soviet strategic thinking control over Western Europe constitutes the essential prerequisite to the achievement of the ultimate goal. Advances in power vacuums, like Africa and Latin America, are viewed chiefly as tactical moves designed to foster the image of an irresistibly winning Soviet Union and, thereby, soften up resistance in the main strategic theater.

Fourth, in view of the prohibitive nature of nuclear warfare, present Soviet strategy calls for the achievement of the main goal by political means.

Fifth, the present Soviet strategic plan is to exploit fear of a nuclear holocaust by creating crises designed to maneuver the West into believing that its choice has been narrowed down to risking all-out war or yielding piecemeal to carefully limited Soviet demands. To this end, each demand must be so proportioned that yielding to it would appear infinitely more reasonable than running the risk of an all-out war. To this same end, the image of a Soviet Union capable of recklessly irrational behavior must be preserved and fostered.

Sixth, the Soviet expectation is that because of its numerically inferior conventional forces, the West must envisage, in any conflict, an early resort to tactical and then strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, whenever faced with a credible military threat in areas strategically advantageous to Soviet Russia, the United States would rather comply with Soviet demands than risk escalation to a catastrophic nuclear war. By such a process, the dependability of the United States guarantee to her allies would be gradually undermined. A neutralist trend would be set in motion. The prerequisites to Communist take-overs by internal subversion would thus be created.

Seventh, as a preparatory tactical move in this grand strategy, Soviet diplomacy persistently seeks to wrest from the Western Powers the express or at least tacit admission that the political *status quo* in East-Central

Europe is permanent. In turn, Soviet propaganda tirelessly strives to convince our peoples that the world balance of power has shifted decisively in favor of the Communist camp. (Both efforts prove that the Soviet rulers are aware of their vulnerability in the captive area and are intent upon promoting there a spirit of hopelessness, leading to passivity and resignation. For this alone would permit them to discount the likelihood of active resistance in all circumstances).

Thwarting Soviet Strategy in Europe

To thwart Soviet strategy, the West must act on two major postulates: *first*, that the Soviet Union has more reason to fear an all-out war than the West and, therefore, should be more reluctant to risk it; *second*, the Soviet rulers have to take into account when calculating the risks involved in any military action or threat not only the military forces of NATO, nuclear and conventional, but also the unreliability of the satellite armed forces and the vulnerability of their lines of communication through East-Central Europe.

It should always be borne in mind that the Polish, Czechoslovak, East German, Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian Communist regimes dispose of one million men—63 regular divisions—and of about 3,000 airplanes. It should also be remembered that the 160 active line divisions of Soviet Russia comprise a very large proportion of Balts, Ukrainians and other non-Russians.

The satellite armed forces can do one of three things:

- (a) turn their arms, in favorable conditions, altogether against Soviet Russia;
- (b) appear so unreliable to the Soviet command as to compel it to tie down important Soviet forces to police or even disarm them;
- (c) cooperate effectively with the Red Army.

As regards the safety of the Soviet lines of communication, the captive peoples can help or deny help to Western saboteurs behind the enemy lines for demolition tasks; they can join or not any special forces dropped behind the lines to organize guerrilla units. Furthermore, the captive peoples as a whole can heed or ignore Western calls to large-scale passive resistance in the form of general strikes, for instance, that would burden the Soviets with the task of running all communications and services.

It is within the power of the West to compel the Soviet rulers to count with all these risk factors and thereby substantially affect their decisions, not to speak of actual cooperation on the part of the captive peoples should deterrence fail. But these risk factors are in direct ratio with the

intensity of the spirit of resistance of our peoples and with the degree of demoralization of the lower-echelon Communist officials. The effectiveness of both depends on the prevailing impression with regard to the will to win of the West and with regard to the strength of the Western commitment to the cause of their freedom and independence. These are the sources of hope and faith on which the spirit of resistance feeds.

It is our duty to warn that this spirit of resistance cannot be taken for granted; that Western setbacks and neglect of the goal of freedom have equally contributed to a continuous drop in the morale of the people in our homelands. Western silence on this goal (apart from a few honorable exceptions) and the absence of Western political and diplomatic actions indicating more convincingly that the issue remains wide open—have been compounded by various Western inclinations and gestures.

The increasing tendency to blur the distinction between rulers and ruled; talk about recognition of the East German regime and NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pledges; credits liberally extended by Western business firms to the Communist regimes; fraternization with the oppressors by visiting Western parliamentarians, officials, scientists, artists and particularly businessmen; Western press reports extolling the "achievements" of the regimes; honors bestowed upon satellite representatives in international organizations; the timidity of Western broadcasts—are but some of the factors which have undermined the faith of our peoples in the West. They can and must be carefully avoided in the future. Let no one delude himself into thinking that all this will be easily forgotten and that when the need will arise, our peoples could be promptly and easily stirred into action. For this to happen, the requisite moral climate must be prepared well ahead of an actual crisis. This can only be accomplished by an early and clear identification of the West with our peoples and their goal to recover free choice in regard to internal and international affairs. Meaningful political actions in the United Nations and in high-level negotiations in support of these yearnings are the least our peoples are entitled to ask from the West, if they are to exert a restraining influence on Moscow and if they are to help when their help will be sorely needed.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations has for many years voiced its conviction that the struggle to prevent any further extension of Soviet power in Europe cannot be separated from the struggle for the recovery of freedom in Eastern Europe. Were East-Central Europe to become hostile to the West or only passive, the peril to the freedom of the West would greatly increase. Conversely, if Western Europe were to lose its freedom, the fate of the captive nations would be sealed. The position of the Assembly regarding the deterrent potential of Eastern Europe should be viewed in this spirit and not as a sacrificial offer. The consolidation and

integration of the forces of freedom in Western Europe is the first essential step toward the recovery of freedom in the Eastern half of the Continent.

Once this is accomplished; once Western Europe becomes a power center commensurate to its economic, moral and spiritual strength; once Soviet Russia is starved of any further success in her quest for world dominion and thus can no longer credibly claim that history is on her side—the latent forces of disruption and disintegration, of which we already have so many signs, will grow stronger. Then and only then will freedom slowly but surely assert itself in East-Central Europe. Then and only then will Europe be fully secure.

Sum-up

To sum up, we maintain that:

- (1) The struggle for Europe, the decisive arena and prize in the global contest between freedom and communism, is far from being over.
- (2) The peoples of East-Central Europe are apt to play a very significant role in this struggle.
- (3) Durable and secure peace will remain beyond reach so long as Soviet power is left in undisturbed control of the geographic center of Europe.
- (4) To serve both the short and long term requirements of a free Europe, moral and political obligation and self-interest equally enjoin the Western Powers to voice and confirm by meaningful political action their vital stake in the freedom of the Eastern half of Europe, as well as their unwavering determination to help, by all legitimate means, the captive peoples in the recovery of their forcibly suppressed right of self-determination.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Brutus Coste, Romania.)

WHITHER EUROPE? CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION, ATLANTIC UNION OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH?

Report presented in the Conference in Strasbourg, on May 6, 1963

ACEN Doc. 348 (IX) Gen.

Our now captive nations have no more essential wish than to see the Western world becoming as strong as possible as a result of their ever tighter solidarity. It is their wish, indeed, that the Western Powers come to exercise an effective and decisive influence on the future of mankind;

that they succeed in attracting all peoples to freedom and the Western form of civilization.

Our nations are confident that the combined material and spiritual forces of the Western Powers will be able to accomplish this historic mission. For they know that it is the vocation of Western civilization to expand or perish. This is why the knowledge that the West is able to defend itself does not satisfy our nations. They want the West to be able and determined to win. And, in their minds, the best way to succeed without war is for the Western Alliance to be stronger and stronger by virtue of their ever increasing solidarity.

Our subjugated peoples rejoice every time they learn that a step forward has been taken in this direction. They rejoice when they see friendship replacing erstwhile enmities. The economic, political and military collaboration among the Western countries invariably strengthens the spirit of resistance and the courage of our nations. Our countries belong to Europe and have not yet lost the sentiment of their profound attachment to Western Europe. For our countries there is no such thing as a Western Europe and an Eastern Europe: for them there is but one Europe—today divided and mutilated by Soviet aggression. Their historical, cultural and political background, their economic interests as well as their enduring aspirations link them to the Western part of the Continent from which they are separated by barriers that are as inhuman as they are artificial. Our countries have drawn benefits from Western civilization. But, in turn, they have contributed to the greatness, prosperity and defense of the Continent. They want to resume their historic role.

Our peoples know and feel that only a strong Western Europe will be able to help them accomplish this goal. For them, as for the entire world, a strong Europe represents not only an aggregation of technical, economic and material resources, but also an intellectual power and a unique capacity of political organization.

We often hear nowadays that the world of today is troubled, ravaged by an ideological struggle. How could the Western world succeed and even survive if it will not advance its own ideology? If it will not oppose actively the totalitarian surge and terror with its own freedom and tolerance? If it will not oppose the domination of one nation by another with the freedom of man and the independence of nations? Our peoples know that Western Europe will not shun its vocation and will not shirk its responsibilities. They therefore want to see her strong and thus capable of affirming and accomplishing her mission.

Strong in each of her countries, strong through deep solidarity of all her nations, strong through her extensive collaboration with the United States

of America and other countries of the Atlantic Alliance—this is our fundamental desire and wish.

It is not for us to say by which methods and in which form this solidarity can be achieved. It is up to the representatives of the Western countries to discuss and to decide this problem. And we are very glad that some most qualified representatives of Western Europe have accepted the invitation to express here their views and their preferences.

The words spoken by them will evoke a wide echo in our countries. Our countries have lived through too many deceptions and they deserve this token of friendship on this occasion where Europeans address themselves to Europeans.

(Rapporteur, Mr. Constantin Visoianu, Romania.)

CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE IN STRASBOURG

Declaration adopted in the Conference in Strasbourg, on May 7, 1963

ACEN Doc. 349 (IX) Gen.

As a result of discussions held from May 5 to 7 in Strasbourg, the participants in the Conference of the Assembly of Captive European Nations have agreed on the following conclusions.

I

The Assembly affirms that the vital interests of the captive European peoples and those of the Western Powers are, in their essence, identical. These common interests demand that the West avoid an illusory accommodation with the Communist regimes imposed on our countries, that the West help the captive nations of East-Central Europe to regain their political independence and that it make self-determination for them one of the aims of its foreign policy. In the execution of such a policy, the Western Powers should:

- (1) Raise in all high-level conferences with the rulers of the Soviet Union the issue of the restoration of the right of self-determination to the peoples of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
- (2) Counter Soviet demands on Berlin with the plan for an overall peace settlement based on the right of self-determination and designed to solve all the problems left as the aftermath of the Second War in Europe.

- (3) Inscribe the question of the denial of self-determination to the captive nations of East-Central Europe on the agenda of the United Nations and demand that the principles of the Declaration of the United Nations of December 14, 1960, concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, as well as terms of reference of the Committee of 24, be extended to the captive nations.
- (4) Abstain from any actions and moves which might give respectability to the satellite regimes or imply that the Western Powers have reconciled themselves to the *status quo* and regard it as final. The signing of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would constitute an abandonment and would certainly be interpreted as such by Soviet Russia and the captive peoples.

The re-establishment by peaceful means of the independence of the countries of East-Central Europe is not an illusion. This goal can be achieved by joint efforts of the free and the captive peoples.

II

The peoples of East-Central Europe are in a position to influence, in the coming years, in a significant measure, the course of events in Europe. The nuclear stalemate has increased and not diminished the importance of our countries.

So long, indeed, as the United States possessed overwhelming nuclear supremacy and practical invulnerability, the security of Western Europe was absolute. Strategically, it mattered little whether the peoples of the East-Central European area were friendly or hostile to Soviet Russia. Now, however, that the two sides possess comparable nuclear striking power—each is equally reluctant to resort to these frightening weapons. But only Soviet Russia is systematically working to gain ground by exploiting the fear and sense of responsibility of the free world. In these circumstances, every factor which weighs in the calculus of risk of the Soviet rulers acquires strategic significance. The spirit of resistance of our peoples is one of these factors. The West should fortify it by appropriate political actions.

We are convinced that:

- (1) Europe remains the principal objective in the contest between freedom and communism. This contest is far from being over.
- (2) The peoples of East-Central Europe are apt to play a very significant role in this struggle.

- (3) So long as the Soviet Union is left in control of the geographic center of Europe and has at its disposal a great superiority in land forces, nuclear disarmament will be impossible to achieve.

III

Our nations have no more essential wish than to see the Western world becoming as strong as possible as a result of its ever tighter solidarity.

Our nations are confident that the combined material and spiritual forces of the Western Powers will be able to accomplish this historic mission. For they know that it is the vocation of Western civilization to expand or perish.

Our subjugated peoples rejoice every time they learn that a step forward has been taken in this direction. They rejoice when they see friendship replacing erstwhile enmities. Our countries belong to Europe and have not lost the sentiment of their profound attachment to Europe. For our countries there is no such thing as a Western Europe and an Eastern Europe: for them, there is but one Europe—today divided and mutilated by Soviet aggression.

Our countries have drawn benefits from Western civilization. But, in turn, they have contributed to the greatness, prosperity and defense of the Continent. They want to resume their historic role and they know that only a strong Western Europe can help them in achieving this aim.

III. ORGANIZATION OF ACEN AND CURRENT REFERENCE

GENERAL COMMITTEE

(Ninth Session: 1962-1963)

Chairman: GEORGE M. DIMITROV, *Bulgaria*.

Vice-Chairman: ALEKSANDER KUTT, *Estonia*.

Members: VASIL GERMENJI, *Albania*; JOZEF LETTRICH, *Czechoslovakia*; FERENC NAGY, *Hungary*; VILIS MASENS, *Latvia*; VACLOVAS SIDZIKAIUSKAS, *Lithuania*; STEFAN KORBONSKI, *Poland*; CONSTANTIN VISOIANU, *Romania*.

Secretary General: BRUTUS COSTE, *Romania*.

Deputy Secretary General: EDMUND GASPAR, *Hungary*.

Observers: ADOLF PROCHAZKA, *Christian Democratic Union*; WLADYSLAW MICHALAK, *International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile*; MILAN GAVRILOVIC, *International Peasant Union*; RAOUL BOSSY, *Liberal Democratic Union*; GEORGE PETKOFF, *Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe*.

OFFICERS OF THE WORKING COMMITTEES

(Chairman; Vice-Chairman; Secretary)

CULTURAL COMMITTEE: Prof. Augustin Popa, *Romania*; Mr. Vytautas Vaitiekunas, *Lithuania*.

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: Mr. Aleksander Kutt, *Estonia*; Dr. Martin Kvetko, *Czechoslovakia*; Mr. Vilis Hazners, *Latvia*.

INFORMATION COMMITTEE: Dr. Jozef Lettrich, *Czechoslovakia*; Mr. Zoltan Pfeiffer, *Hungary*; Mr. V. Vaitiekunas, *Lithuania*.

LEGAL COMMITTEE: Mr. Zoltan Pfeiffer, *Hungary*; Mr. Ion Vardala, *Romania*; Mr. Leonhard Vahter, *Estonia*.

SOCIAL COMMITTEE: Mr. Boleslaw Biega, *Poland*; Mr. Ilmar Raamot, *Estonia*; Mr. Istvan Revay, *Hungary*.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE: Mr. Antanas Trimakas, *Lithuania*; Mr. Arnost Heidrich, *Czechoslovakia*; Mr. Dimitar Petkoff, *Bulgaria*.

LIST OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DELEGATES*

ALBANIA: Mr. Isuf Begeja, former army officer, journalist, independent; Dr. Ragip Frasheri, lawyer, member Monarchist Party; Dr. Athanas Gegaj, former professor, author on history, Agrarian Balli Kombetar-Dosti faction (C, L); Mr. Vasil Germenji, former professor, journalist, member Free Albania Committee, independent, Chairman of the Delegation (I, P); Mr. Ndue Gjomarkaj, member Free Albania Committee, executive member of National Independent Bloc; Mr. George Gogh, former professor, journalist executive member of Monarchist Party (I); Dr. Ali Klissura, former member of Parliament, writer, Chairman of Balli Kombetar Organization, member of Council of Free Albania Committee; Dr. Rexhep Krasniqi, former professor, former Minister of Education, President of the Free Albania Committee, independent (C, S, E); Mr. Rexhep Kumbarce, student in political science, independent (S); Mr. Petraq Ktona, former journalist, Agrarian Balli Kombetar-Dosti faction (P); Rev. Dr. Joseph Oroshi; Mr. Theodor Papalilo, former professor, executive member Balli Agrar-Dosti (P, E); Mr. Nexhat Peshkepia, former professor, journalist, member Free Albania Committee, Secretary General Balli Kombetar Agrar Dosti faction (C, I); Mr. Sami Repishti, student of economics (E); Mr. Mahmut Tsungu, construction engineer (P); Mr. Tajar Zavalani, noted Albanian writer, author of "How strong is Russia" and "Historija e Shqiperise."

BULGARIA: Mr. Emil Antonoff, former Member of Parliament, member of the Executive Committee of the Bulgarian National Committee (S); Dr. Nikola Antonoff, former Minister Plenipotentiary, President of the Democratic Party in Exile, Member of the Executive Committee of the Bulgarian National Committee (P); Mr. Tsenko Barev, journalist, Member of the Executive Committee of the Bulgarian National Committee; Dr. George M. Dimitrov, M.D., former Member of Parliament, President of the Bulgarian National Committee, Chairman of the Delegation; Dr. Nikola Dolapchieff, Dr. Jur. (Berlin and Bonn), former Minister Plenipotentiary, professor of law, former Vice-President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Executive Committee of the Bulgarian National Committee (C, L); Dr. Biser Kolev M.D., representative of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party; Dr. Kiril Konakchiysky, Dr. Rer. Pol (Innsbruck), economist (E); Mr. Ivan Metev, Doctor of Arts (C); Mr. Boris Nojaroff, President of the Bulgarian Trade Union Center in Exile (S, E); Mr. Leo Olivenbaum, lawyer, expert on legal and cultural problems; Mr. Dimitar K. Petkoff, lawyer and former career diplomat, member of the Executive Committee of the Bulgarian National Committee (L, P); Mr. Iskar Shumanov, journalist (I); Mr. Christo Stoyanoff, scientist (C, E, I).

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dr. Frantisek Cerny, former Minister Plenipotentiary (L); Dr. Josef Cerny, former Cabinet Minister, former Member of Parliament (L, P); Mr. Vasil L. Fedinec, Chairman of the Subcarpathian Ruthenian National Council; Mr. Arnost Heidrich, Ambassador, former Secretary General, Foreign Office (P); Mr. Vaclav Holub, former Member of Parliament; Dr. Fedor Hodza, former Member of Parliament, former Secretary General, Democratic Party of Slovakia; Dr. Martin Kvetko, former Slovak Commissioner for Agriculture, Member of Parliament (E); Dr. Jozef Lettrich, former President, Slovak National Council, former Chairman, Democratic Party of Slovakia, former Member of Parliament, Representative in the General Committee (C, I); Mr. Vaclav Majer, former Cabinet Minister, former Member of Parliament (S); Dr. Stefan Osusky, Ambassador, former Cabinet Minister.

*The membership of the delegates in the working committees is indicated by first letters of those committees: Cultural, Economic, Information, Legal, Political, Social.

ESTONIA: Mr. Karl Ast, former member of government and parliament, former member, Central Committee of the Estonian Socialist Party; The Very Rev. Aleksander Hinno, Dean of the First Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Conference, member, Estonian World Council; Mr. August Karsna, lawyer, member of the Board, Estonian National Committee in the United States, member of the Board, Association of former Members of the Estonian Agrarian Party; Mr. Raimond Kolk, journalist, member, Committee for a Free Estonia, member of the Board, Estonian National Council in Sweden, Secretary, Estonian Socialist Party in Exile; Mr. Aleksander Kutt, former Chairman and Executive Vice-President, Central Cooperative Associations, former Associate Publisher, "The Baltic Times," Chairman, Committee for a Free Estonia, Representative in the General Committee (E); Mr. Heinrich Laretei, former Cabinet Minister, former Member of Parliament, former Estonian Minister to Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen, Vice-President, Estonian National Congress in Sweden; Mr. Nikolai Maim, former Member of Parliament, former Dean of Law Faculty, Estonian State University of Tartu; Mr. Aksel Mei, former President of the Nõmme Town Council, member, Committee for a Free Estonia (C, I, L); Mr. Olev Piirsalu, former Deputy Secretary General, Estonian Agrarian Party, President, Association of former Members of the Estonian Agrarian Party, President, Estonian World Council; Mr. Ilmar Raamot, former Secretary General, United Farmers and Smallholders' Party, member, Committee for a Free Estonia (I, S, P, E); Mr. Elmar Reisenberg, former Deputy Mayor of Viljandi; Mr. Enn Salurand, journalist, Secretary General, Estonian National Committee in Canada; Mr. Albert Suurkivi, former Member of Parliament, former member of Presidium, Farmers' and Smallholders' Party, member of the Board, Estonian Political Association; Mr. Meinhard Treilmann, former District Secretary, Estonian Socialist Labor Party; Mr. Leonhard Vahter, former Member of Parliament, Vice-Chairman, Estonian World Council, member, Committee for a Free Estonia (C, L, S, P); Mr. Aleksander Warma, former Minister of Estonia to Finland, Vice-Chairman, Estonian National Council in Sweden, Chairman, Estonian Liberal Democratic Union in Exile.

HUNGARY: Mr. Paul Auer, former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, former Hungarian Minister to France, member of the Hungarian Committee; Mr. Istvan Barankovics, editor, former Member of Parliament, member of the Hungarian Committee (C); Mr. Alexander Hahn, lawyer (S); Mr. Gustav Hennyey, former Foreign Minister; Mr. Pal Jonas, Chairman of the Petoffi Circle, member of the Hungarian Committee (P, E); Major-General Bela Kiraly, Commander of the Hungarian National Guard during the Revolution of 1956, member of the Hungarian Committee; Mr. Sandor Kiss, former Member of Parliament, Director, Hungarian Peasant Association, member of the Hungarian Committee (I); Mr. Joseph Kovago, former Mayor of Budapest, Vice-Chairman of the Hungarian Committee (E); Mr. Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary, member of the Hungarian Committee, Chairman of the General Committee (P); Mr. Zoltan Pfeiffer, former Member of Parliament, former Under-Secretary of State for Justice, Leader of the Hungarian Independence Party, member of the Hungarian Committee (I, L, P); Mr. Istvan Revay (C); Mr. Ferenc Vali, Professor of International Law, member of the Hungarian Committee (L); Msgr. Bela Varga, former President of the Hungarian Parliament, Chairman of the Hungarian Committee, Chairman of the Delegation; Expert: Dr. Laszlo Bartok (P).

LATVIA: Mr. Alfreds Berzins, former Cabinet Minister, former Member of Parliament, member of the Committee for a Free Latvia, Vice-Chairman of the Latvian World Federation, Deputy-Chairman, American Latvian Association; Mr. Karlis Dzilleja, lawyer, member of the Board, Latvian Reconstruction Committee, European Center, member of the Committee for a Free Latvia; Mr. Peteris Eglitis, lawyer,

President, Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church Council; Mr. Vilis Hazners, former member of the Latvian Army General Staff, Chairman, Committee for a Free Latvia, Chairman of Former Latvian Army Officers' Association, Vice-Chairman, Board of Latvian Veterans' Association "Daugavas Vanagi" (E, S); Mr. Adolfs Klive, former Member of Latvian Parliament, former Chairman of the Council of the Bank of Latvia, member of the Committee for a Free Latvia (I, P); Mr. Arvids Kripens, former member of the Latvian Army General Staff, former Director, Latvian Military Academy, member of the Board, Latvian Australian Federation; Mr. Roberts Liepins, former Cabinet Minister, former Mayor of Riga, member of the Board, Latvian Reconstruction Committee, European Center, diplomat; Mr. Boleslavs Maikovskis, lawyer, Vice-Chairman of the Board of the American Latvian Association; Dr. Vilis Masens, diplomat, Chairman of the Latvian Delegation to ACEN, former Chairman of CFL, member of the Committee for a Free Latvia, Representative in the General Committee (L); Dr. Peteris Norvilis, Vice-Chairman of the Board of the American Latvian Association, Chairman of the Latvian Humanitarian Association (C); Mr. Dainis Rudzitis, member of the Board of the American Latvian Association; Mr. Arnolds Skrebers; Mr. Viktors Upeslasis, lawyer, Chairman of the Board of Canadian Latvian Federation; Mr. Janis Vinters, teacher, member of the American Latvian Association; Mr. Arvids Zageris, member of the Board of American Latvian Association.

LITHUANIA: Mr. Juozas Audenas, Vice-Chairman of the Lithuanian Peasant Populist Union, Deputy Delegate to the International Peasant Union (C, E); Mr. Valteris Banaitis, journalist; Mr. Kipras Bielinis, former Member of the Lithuanian Parliament, Secretary General of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, Delegation in Exile; Mr. Martynas Brakas, lawyer, member of the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, member of the Committee for a Free Lithuania (L, P); Mr. Juozas Brazaitis, professor, journalist, former Deputy Prime Minister; Dr. Petras Karvelis, Head of Foreign Service of the Executive Council of the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, former Minister of Finance of Lithuania; Mr. Juozas Lanskoronskis, journalist, former Attache Militaire of Lithuania in Paris; Dr. Bronius Nemickas, lawyer, Chairman, Lithuanian National Movement (L, S); Mr. Vincas Rastenis, journalist, Chairman, Lithuanian Independence Alliance; Mr. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Chairman of the Committee for a Free Lithuania, Chairman of the Lithuanian Delegation to ACEN; Dr. Antanas Trimakas, professor, diplomat, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania (I, P); Mr. Eduardas Turauskas, Minister Plenipotentiary; Mr. Pranas Vainauskas, Vice-Chairman of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union, former Minister of Commerce of Lithuania, member of the Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania (S, E); Mr. Vytautas Vaitiekunas, lawyer, journalist, member of the Committee for a Free Lithuania (C, I); Mr. Juozas Valaitis, former Member of the Lithuanian Parliament; Mr. Juozas Vilcinskas, civil engineer, journalist.

POLAND: Mr. Stanislaw Banczyk, lawyer, former Member of Parliament, Acting Chairman, Polish Peasant Party (S); Mr. Boleslaw Biega, former Secretary, Polish Underground Council of National Unity, Vice-Chairman, Polish Christian Labor Party (C, S, P); Mr. Wladyslaw Furka, social worker, former Underground Youth Leader in Poland (I); Mr. Bohdan Gajewicz, lawyer, Vice-President, Polish Council of Unity in the United States (L); Mr. Adam Galinski, lawyer, former leader of the Underground Organization in Eastern Poland, former inmate of the Soviet forced labor camp in Vorkuta; Mr. Stefan Korbonski, lawyer, former Chief of the Underground Government in Poland, former Member of Parliament, Chairman of the delegation, Representative in the General Committee; Dr. Otton Pehr, lawyer, former Secretary General, Foreign

Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, former Chief, Office of the Council of Ministers in the Polish Government in Exile, in London, President, Polish Council of Unity in the United States (J. P, E); Dr. Marian Piotrowski, Professor of Economics (E); Mr. Michal Plucinski, civil engineer; Mr. Andrzej Pomian, writer, journalist, former Lt.-Col. of the Underground Army in Poland (C); Mr. Jerzy Ponikiewski, journalist.

ROMANIA: Mr. George Assan, former Under-Secretary of Commerce, former Member of Parliament; Dr. Asra Berkowitz, former editor of "L'Indépendance Roumaine" (I); Mr. Cornel Bianu, former Member of Parliament (E); Mr. Romulus Boila, Editor of the newspaper "La Nation Roumaine"; Mr. Alexander Bunescu, former Under-Secretary for Reconstruction (E); Mr. Grigore Constantinesco, former Minister Plenipotentiary; Mr. Silviu Craciunas, lawyer, writer; Mr. Charles A. Davila, former Minister to the United States of America, former Member of Parliament; Mr. Eftimie Gherman, former Member of Parliament, former Secretary General, Union of Romanian Mine Workers; Dr. Sabin Manuila, former Under-Secretary, Presidency of the Council of Ministers (I); Mr. Naum Neagoe, civil engineer, former Member of the National Liberal Party; Professor Augustin Popa, former Member of Parliament (C, P); Mr. Ion Vardala, former Diplomat (L); Professor Virgil Veniamin, former Professor, Bucharest University, former Assistant Secretary General, National Peasant Party (L); Mr. Constantin Visoianu, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, President, Romanian National Committee, President of the Romanian Delegation, Representative in the General Committee; Mr. Iancu Zissu, Member of the Central Committee, Independent Social Democratic Party (S).

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF CENTRAL EUROPE; Mr. Laszlo Kish, Member, CDUCE; Dr. Miha Krek; Mr. Karol Popiel, Vice-Chairman of CDUCE; Dr. Adolf Prochazka, Chairman of the delegation, Chairman, Executive Committee CDUCE, former Member of Parliament of Czechoslovakia (P); Dr. Ludovik Push, Deputy Secretary General CDUCE; Mr. Adolfas Venskus.

INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF FREE TRADE UNIONISTS IN EXILE: Mr. Arno Hais, Vice-President, ICFTUE, former Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Socialist Trade Unions, Treasurer, ICFTUE; Mr. Alois Lisy, Member ICFTUE (E); Mr. Wladyslaw Michalak, former Chairman of the Christian Transport Workers' Union of Poland, Chairman of the Polish Christian Trade Union in Exile, member of the Council, ICFTUE, Chairman of the delegation (S); Mr. Karl Rudolf Pakalns, teacher, former member, leadership of the Social Democratic Youth of Latvia, former member, Latvian Teachers' Union, member, Executive Committee of Latvian Social Democratic Party in Exile, Member, Latvian Free Trade Union Group, Member, Latvian Free Trade Unionists Groups in the United States (P); Mr. Aleksander Skrodzki, Secretary General of the ICFTUE.

INTERNATIONAL PEASANT UNION: Mr. Henrikas Blazas, Managing Editor of the Bulletin of the IPU, member of Lithuanian Populist Peasant Union (P); Dr. Vladimir Dostal, Member IPU; Dr. Milan Gavrilovic, Representative in the General Committee; Mr. Halil Maci, Member IPU (L); Mr. Jani Shopov, Member IPU (S).

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC UNION OF CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: Dr. Oton Ambroz, journalist, member, Executive Committee, LDU (E, I); Mr. Nicholas Balabanov, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee, LDU, former Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary (C, P); Mr. Raoul Bossy, Chairman of the Delegation, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Liberal Democratic Union, former Romanian Minister Plenipotentiary (S, P); Dr. Nuci Kotta, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee, LDU, Lecturer at Columbia University.

SOCIALIST UNION OF CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE: Mr. Valdemaras Bastjanis, member SUCCE; Mr. Vilem Bernard, *Secretary of SUCCE*; Dr. George Petkoff, *Chairman of the Delegation (S)*; Dr. Zivko Topalovich, *Vice-Chairman SUCCE*.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN STRASBOURG (May 5-7, 1963)

1. National Delegations

ALBANIA: Dr. Vasil Germenji, Dr. Ragip Frasheri.
BULGARIA: Dr. George M. Dimitrov, Mr. Tsenko Barev.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dr. Jozef Lettrich, Mr. Fedor Hodza.
ESTONIA: Mr. Aleksander Kutt, Mr. Aleksander Warma.
HUNGARY: Mr. Ferenc Nagy, Mr. Paul Auer.
LATVIA: Dr. Vilis Masens, Mr. Roberts Liepins.
LITHUANIA: Mr. Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Dr. Petras Karvelis.
POLAND: Mr. Adam Ciolkosz, Mr. Stefan Korbonski.
ROMANIA: Mr. Constantin Visoianu, Prof. Virgil Veniamin.

2. Delegates of the Associate-Member Organizations

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF CENTRAL EUROPE: Mr. Adolfas Venskus.
INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF FREE TRADE UNIONISTS IN EXILE: Mr. Alexander Skrodzki.
INTERNATIONAL PEASANT UNION: Mr. Boguslav Alexich.
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC UNION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: Mr. Georges Caranfil.
SOCIALIST UNION OF CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: Mr. Serban Voinea.

OFFICERS OF DELEGATIONS, REPRESENTATIVES AND OFFICES ABROAD

(As of October 15, 1963)

Officers of Delegations and Offices

ARGENTINA: Mr. Visvaldis Gusts (*Latvia*), Chairman; Mr. Titus Mihailescu (*Romania*), Vice-Chairman; Mr. Ceferino Iujnevich (*Lithuania*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: ACEN Office, Dr. Laszlo Simon, Director, Lavalle 361, Entrepiso, Buenos Aires.

AUSTRALIA: Mr. Arthurs Berztiss (*Latvia*), Chairman; Mr. Vladas Jakutis (*Lithuania*), Vice-Chairman; Mr. Jan Viola (*Czechoslovakia*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: ACEN Office, 9 Linton Street, Ivanhoe, N. 21, Victoria, Australia.

BRAZIL: Mr. Tadeusz Skowronski (*Poland*), Chairman; Lt. Col. Edward Ressel (*Romania*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: Lt. Col. Edward Ressel, Rua Toneleros 257, Apt. 602, Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro.

CANADA: Mr. J. Simanavicius (*Lithuania*), Chairman; R. V. Frastacky (*Czechoslovakia*), Tudor Nenitescu (*Romania*), Vice-Chairmen for Toronto and Montreal, resp.; G. Nagy (*Hungary*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESSES: Mr. T. A. Nenitescu, 5623 Cork Avenue, Montreal 29, Que.; Mr. George Nagy, c/o Canadian Hungarian Federation, 519 Dundas Street West, 28, Toronto, Ont.

FRANCE: Mr. Eduardas Turauskas (*Lithuania*), Chairman; Mr. Tsenko Barev (*Bulgaria*), Vice-Chairman; Mr. Marian Czarnecki (*Poland*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: Mr. Edmund Rehak, Director, ACEN Office, 15 rue Villaret-de-Joyeuse, Paris 17e.

GERMANY: Gen. Gustav Hennyey (*Hungary*), Chairman; Mr. Vilis Janums (*Latvia*), Vice-Chairman; Mr. Mark Traboini (*Albania*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: ACEN, Hervarthstrasse 6, Bonn 53, Germany.

GREAT BRITAIN: Mr. Juozas Vilcinskas (*Lithuania*), Chairman; Mr. Kazimierz Trebicki (*Poland*), Vice-Chairman; Mr. Vaclav Holub (*Czechoslovakia*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: Mr. Antoni Dargas, Director, ACEN Office, 72 Queensborough Terrace, London, W.2.

ITALY: Mr. Ragip Frasheri (*Albania*), Chairman; Mr. Witold Zahorski (*Poland*), Vice-Chairman; MAILING ADDRESS: Mr. Ragip Frasheri, Via Cagliari 13, Rome, Italy.

SWEDEN: Mr. Aleksander Warma (*Estonia*), Chairman; Mr. Miron Giuroiu (*Romania*), Vice-Chairman; Mr. Janis Rutkis (*Latvia*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: Mr. A. Warma, Box 16005, Stockholm, Sweden.

URUGUAY: Mr. Alphonse Max (*Bulgaria*), Chairman; Jan K. Tarnowski (*Poland*), Vice-Chairman; Kasimir Cibiras (*Lithuania*), Secretary. MAILING ADDRESS: Mr. Alphonse Max, Casilla de Correa 1135, Montevideo.

Representatives

CHILE: Mr. Antonio Hadik (*Hungary*), ACEN Representative, MacIver 180-Depto, Santiago de Chile.

COLOMBIA: Mr. Stany Sirutis (*Lithuania*), ACEN Representative, Apartado Aereo 42-33, Bogota; Rev. M. Tamasiunas, Carrera 39, No. 54-31, Medellin, ACEN Representative.

DENMARK: Mr. August Koern (*Estonia*), ACEN Representative, 21 Blidahpark, Copenhagen-Hallerup.

GREECE: Mr. Radu Arion (*Romania*), ACEN Representative, 23 Odos Karneadou, Athens.

LEBANON: Dr. Zygmunt Zawadowski (*Poland*), ACEN Representative, P. O. Box 1261, Beirut.

MEXICO: Mr. Jerzy Skoryna-Lipski (*Poland*), ACEN Representative, Retorno 102, No. 29, Lomas de Sotelo.

PERU: Mr. Grigore Cugler (*Romania*), ACEN Representative, Nicolas de Rivera No. 648, San Isidro, Lima.

PHILIPPINES: Mr. Romualdas G. Vildzius (*Lithuania*), ACEN Representative, Neris Philippine Inc., Zamora Bldg., Manila Hotel, Manila.

VENEZUELA: Mr. Matei Ghica (*Romania*), ACEN Representative, Apartado 3443, Caracas.

Correspondents

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JAPAN: Mr. Eiichi Nobushima, ACEN Correspondent, C.O.P. Box 742, Tokyo.

SECRETARIAT

Secretary General : Brutus Coste

Deputy Secretary General : Edmund Gaspar

Staff Members :

Paul Vajda (Press), Feliks Gadomski (Social, Cultural, Economic Affairs),
Dr. Miron Butariu (Administration), Algirdas Landsbergis (Political Affairs),
Cvetana Bachvarov (Documentation).

ACEN PUBLICATIONS

(As of October 15, 1963)

- No. 1 Assembly of Captive European Nations. First Session, Plenary Meetings of September 20 and 21, 1954. 68 pp. (Out of print.)
- No. 2 Appeal to the Nations of the Free World. New York, December 20, 1954. 8 pp.
- No. 3 Appel aux Nations du Monde Libre. New York, le 20 décembre, 1954. 8 pp.
- No. 4 Llamado a las Naciones del Mundo Libre. Nueva York, 20 diciembre de 1954. 8 pp.
- No. 5 Assembly of Captive European Nations. First Session, September 20, 1954-Feb. 11, 1955. Organization, Resolutions, Reports, Debate. 198 pp. (Out of print.)
- No. 6 Assemblée des Nations Captives d'Europe, 1955. 64 pp.
- No. 7 Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, 1955. 25 pp. (Second Edition—12 pp.)
- No. 8 Soviet Objectives at the Geneva Conferences, 1955. 28 pp. (Out of print.)
- No. 9 Assemblée des Nations Captives d'Europe. Session Spéciale, Strasbourg, 1-4 juillet, 1955. Résolutions, rapports, débats. 84 pp.
- No. 10 Assemblée des Nations Captive d'Europe. Deuxième Session (septembre, 1955-mars, 1956). 84 pp.
- No. 11 Objectivos Sovieticos a la luz de las Conferencias de Ginebra. 36 pags.
- No. 12 Assembly of Captive European Nations. First Session. Second Part. Feb. 12-Sept. 20, 1955. Organization, Resolutions, Reports, Debates. 175 pp.
- No. 13 Assembly of Captive European Nations. Origin, aims, views, general information. 12 pp.
- No. 14 Assemblée des Nations Captives d'Europe. Origines, buts, activités, informations d'ordre général. 12 pp.
- No. 15 Asamblea de Naciones Europeas Cautivas. Origen, propositos, puntos de vista, informacion general. 12 pags.
- No. 16 Assembly of Captive European Nations. Second Session, September 22, 1955-November 11, 1956. Resolutions, Reports, Organization.
- No. 17 Assemblée des Nations Captives d'Europe. Deuxième Session Spéciale. Strasbourg. 12-15 Avril, 1956. Résolutions et Déclarations, Débats, Délégués.
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